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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (20 Aug 69) FOR CT-UT-692249

11 September 1969

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Robert E. Lynch

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96384

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20 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

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William L. Dupart 2-0 460

WILLIAM L. DUPART
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Adjutant General

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
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SECTION I
OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

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The 89 day period between 1 February 1969 and 30 April 1969 encompassed the entire third phase of the Command and Control Improvement Program.



Phase I had involved initiation of a broad array of intensive programs aimed at increasing efficiency and economy in logistical operations. Special titles such as COUNT, FILL, and RAGS were employed to better focus attention on policies and procedures which, in many cases, were already existent. During Phase II, these activities were carefully examined, reinforced and consolidated. The number of new projects initiated was kept to a minimum while careful thought was given to project priorities and additional programs for the future.

By 1 February 1969, after this period of consolidation, the command was again ready to move out. The initiation of new projects during Phase III coincided with the continuation of those initial projects which had proved so successful during Phase I. Projects like STOP/SEE, FILL, INTRANSIT, CCIL, and IMI were joined by a whole new array of programs. Many new projects with names like COUNT II, SKILLS I, FIND, STOCK RECORD SUPPORT, ASSET CONTROL, and PRE PUNCH were initiated to refine and improve the logistical support provided by this command.

The chart below, which shows only a portion of the project titles utilized in Phase III of the CCIP, indicates how all of the programs are interrelated and interacting in the overall plan of logistics improvement. These projects are not necessarily new to the Army logistics system; they are simply a means by which emphasis is added to existing policies.


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LOGISTICAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN (LIP)



Before the start of the Command and Control Improvement Program in-ordinate quantities of all classes of supply tended to defeat attempts to reduce stock locations, accomplish precise accounting, efficient inventory, receipt or issue. Some items were in critically short supply, deadline ratios were increasing for certain equipment; there was an excessive number of emergency supply actions and low credibility levels with respect to stockage data.

The first steps in achieving more effective control were taken during Phase I (for details, refer to 1st Logistical Command Operational Report - Lessons Learned for quarter 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969).

Phase III was in effect a continuation of Phase I. During these move out phases of the improvement program, major efforts were initiated, with strong backing from Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, in general supply, ammunition, transportation, maintenance, and property disposal. In Phase III, as well as in Phase I, effective logistical support continued to be stressed, but still greater emphasis was placed on efficiency and economy in operations. Some of the major accomplishments of Phase III that are available at this time are:

- a. The frustration, diversion, or cancellation of excess requisitions valued at \$4.7 million. (Project STOP/SEE)
- b. The cancellation of \$19 million worth of requisitions resulting from a review of NCR 500 ledgers. (Project CLEAN)


c. The identification of excess stockage items worth \$144 million which will be eliminated from in-country stocks in the near future. (Command Excess Program)

d. The retrograde of 185,433 STONS of cargo out of RVN.


e. The inventory of 179,794 line items as a part of a command wide cyclic inventory. (Project COUNT II)

Through these and other programs, depot demand satisfaction improved during the period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969 from 63 percent to 75 percent and depot demand accommodation remained fairly constant at a high 87 percent.

1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
DEPOT DEMAND SATISFACTION
FY 69





1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
DEPOT DEMAND ACCOMMODATION
FY 69









To further improve customer service, pre-punched requisition cards have been issued to customer units, (Pre-Punch); responsibility for stock record support has been assumed by USAICCV and in-country depots (Stock Record Support); Closed Loop Items are being issued on a DX basis (CIS-DX); the number of items under intensive management has been increased from 3100 to 3310 (FILL); and a study has been conducted to determine how requisitions get lost and what can be done to rectify the situation (FIND).


To further reduce stockage levels, on hand stocks at the DSUs and depots have been studied to determine if further reductions are possible while supply support remains constant (Levels I & II).

Despite the extreme conditions to which equipment in RVN is subjected, the close coordination between a more efficient supply and maintenance system has kept the operational rates for many items at a level never before achieved in a combat zone.









In the case of self propelled artillery, in particular the M107/M110, the Repair and Return (R&R) Program has been successful in maintaining the operational rates at a high level. During the quarter, 56 weapons were brought to a direct support maintenance unit for seven days of intensive maintenance while their crews (392 crew members in all) received comprehensive 1st echelon maintenance training.


Other programs were initiated to improve the logistical situation within country. Emphasis was placed on "repairing" an item by replacement (Direct Exchange), maintaining or returning all material to a "ready for issue" condition (Care and Preservation), insuring the proper handling of unserviceables by managing them as theater assets with strict accountability and audit trails being established and maintained (Asset Control), and determining the "life expectancy" of overhaul items (Our Life).

In an attempt to keep the handling of excess material at a minimum, forward units continued to ship excesses directly to an in-country depot, another customer, or out of country (Project THRU-PUT). Similarly, the program to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition beyond the in-country capability for repair continued to be implemented. Phase II of the ammunition retrograde program was completed on 28 February 1969 and Phase III begun. The three month goal of 22,500 STON was exceeded by 1,078 STON. The wisdom of establishing a lower stockage objective and reducing on-hand balances during the previous quarter became readily apparent with the increase in enemy activity which began during the latter part of February 1969. The reduced amount of ammunition on the ground precluded higher combat losses than the \$17.5 million worth of ammunition actually lost, and combat losses were able to be quickly replaced under the "inventory in motion" concept. This concept depends on a foreknowledge of manifest data and the arrival date of shipments from CONUS. Thus stockage levels on the ground are able to be reduced to a more manageable level.

To further reduce excesses within country, problems hindering the property disposal mission in RVN continued to be isolated and actions initiated to resolve them. Increased emphasis was placed on reducing the amount of inactive usable property on hand; training classes were conducted, and new PDO procedures initiated under the MAPEX program. The on-hand quantity of disposable materials decreased for the second consecutive quarter from 74.7 thousand STON at the end of January to 59.7 thousand STON currently on hand.

In the final analysis, efficient, effective and responsive combat service support to the fighting man ultimately depends upon the individual soldier. Cognizant of this fact, the command continues to make every effort to improve the morale, welfare and the technical proficiency of its personnel. Special councils, established to improve communications between enlisted men, NCO's and officers have helped to maintain troop morale at a high level. Strong command emphasis continues to be placed on safety, personal hygiene, and good conduct (TON TRONG) to reduce the number of non productive man hours. In addition every effort is being made to return stockade prisoners to duty as soon as possible and prevent others from taking their place (Preventive Law Program).

As a tribute to the members of this command who have given their lives, and as a means of preserving the spirit of fellowship among members of this command, the 1st Logistical Command Association was formed. The memorial now under construction is depicted below along with the purpose of the association.



The shortage of technically qualified personnel was relieved somewhat with the implementation of detailed orientation briefings, MOS training classes and formal on the job training for newly assigned personnel (SKILLS I). Training of Local Nationals in the basic skills was again emphasized during this period in conjunction with the civilianization of military spaces. This civilianization program led to a reduction of the authorized level within the command from 53,766 to 52,521. For a breakdown by support command of this reduction refer to the charts below.

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PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (C)
Authorized as of 30 April 1969

CATEGORY BY CMD	OFF	MILITARY		TOT	DAG		CONTRACT		TOT	TECH		LN		TOT
		WO	EM		TOT	US	TCN	LN		ASST	PERS	DIRECT HIRE	LN DAILY HIRE	
HQ 1st Log	169	7	292	468	29					32		128	53	710
ICCV	70	6	285	361	184					31		110	30	716
USAPAV	44	0	14	58	59					0		77	0	194
Other Units	40	10	347	397	76					0		25	0	498
Sub Total	322	23	938	1284	348					63		340	83	2118
SGN	956	299	17803	19058	149	353	1098	4924	6375	68		8283	1173	35106
CRB	427	143	9879	10449	83	387	2073	1177	3637	16		3322	195	17702
QNH	573	141	12555	13269	79	40	2087	1083	3210	22		3899	1127	21606
DNG	450	91	7920	8461	28	0	2	0	2	35		1074	333	9933
TOTAL	2729	697	49095	52521*	687	780	5260	7184	13224	204		16918	2911	86465

* Includes Civilianization

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

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
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (C)
Assigned as of 30 April 1969

CATEGORY BY COMD	OFF	MILITARY		TOT	DAC		CONTRACT			TOT	TECH		IN		DAILY		TOT
		NO	EM		US	TCN	LN	ASST	PRS		DIR	HIRE	HIRE				
HQ 1st Log	261	15	327	603	22						32		100		53		810
ICCV	74	5	291	370	171						31		101		30		703
USAPAV	50	2	42	94	51						0		75		0		220
Other Units	42	11	458	511	17						0		19		0		547
Sub Total	427	33	1118	1578	261						63		295		83		2280
SGN	913	274	18929	20116	102	353	1098	4924	6375	68		7747		1173		35581	
CRB	399	109	8433	8941	52	387	2073	1177	3637	16		2334		195		15675	
QNH	546	138	11302	11986	50	40	2087	1083	3210	22		3798		1127		20193	
DNG	422	82	7482	7986	21	0	2	0	2	35		938		333		9315	
TOTAL	2707	636	47264	50607	486	780	5260	7184	13224	204		15612		2911		83044	

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RATIO - SUPPORTING TO SUPPORTED FORCES



From all indications Phase III has been highly successful. However, the final evaluation of its accomplishments will not be possible until the end of May when all the statistical data becomes available. During the next two months, Phase III will be examined closely, and the experience gained from this move out phase will go a long ways toward forming the basis for establishing plans and procedures for fiscal year 1970.

ANNEX A (U) COMMAND GROUP

1. (U) Distinguished visitors to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and support commands are indicated at Inclosure 1. Colonel Homer D. Smith, Jr. assumed the duties of Chief of Staff on 4 April 1969. The Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Data Systems commenced operations on 5 March 1969 and the Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Combat Security was established on 1 April 1969.

2. (U) Principal changes of key staff personnel during the quarter: Colonel Richard F. Amity, ACofS, SP&O, replaced Colonel Thomas J. McDonald; Colonel David D. Hulsey, ACofS, Supply/CO, ICCV replaced Colonel Max Timmons; Colonel John J. Wren, ACofS, Comptroller, replaced Colonel Homer D. Smith, Jr.; and Colonel Joseph F. Gioe, ACofS, Procurement replaced Colonel William H. Minor, Jr.

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ANNEX B (C) ACofS, COMPTROLLER

1. (C) The Management Analysis Division was recently reorganized and staffed to provide the command with a management analysis capability similar to that which is available to private industry. This division is responsible for providing the command with a special studies, review and analysis, cost reduction and on-site management engineering capability.

a. Management Engineering Branch.

(1) A Cat Lai - Cogido Ammunition Movement Study was undertaken in order to determine the Cat Lai port capacity and the capacity of the Cogido barge site to off-load barges. The study group determined that the Cat Lai operation would discharge 1926 short tons per day or load 1338 short tons per day retrograde and that the operation at Cogido should produce or discharge 1680 short tons per day. The study further recommended additional qualified supervisors, improved methods changes, color coding of ammunition pallets and the addition of two tugs and one new buoy. In conjunction with this study was a study at the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LBASD). Recommendations were as follows: That each ammunition company have an objective of a total lift per day of 1158 short tons; that the 5 ton cargo truck be used exclusively for the Cogido and LBASD operations; that the Saigon Support Command make an extensive review of the availability of Material Handling Equipment for the LBASD; and that 20 ton truck mounted cranes be substituted for the 20 ton rough terrain cranes.

(2) A management study was made of the Marine Maintenance Contract with Vinnell Corporation at Cam Ranh Bay in order to establish systems, procedures and records necessary to evaluate the contractor's performance and to perform an auditability survey of the systems used to supply material used by the Vinnell Marine Repair Facility. The survey team recommended specific performance standards to be used for the annual overhaul of each type of vessel; recommended that the completion of a seawall would add to the overall capacity of the facility; and that an internal review be made of the supply system in coordination with the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

(3) Project Find II was implemented to determine the causes of losses and delays in requisition processing and to determine the adequacy of the audit trail and document control. Recommendations were as follows: that a system of batch controls be employed between organizational elements; that more Command Emphasis be placed on documentation of fringe items; that there be an enforced sixty day reconciliation between the Direct Support Units and the Using Units; that contact teams be assigned to implement practical instruction of supply procedures to the Units on

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a frequent basis; that Command Emphasis be placed on adherence to the priority system of requisitioning; and that the Standard Supply System be incorporated to allow an immediate customer status inquiry capability at depot level.

(4) A study of the harbor tug operations in the Saigon Support Command revealed the need for a decision to be made either to replace the present antiquated tug inventory with new equipment or to phase out present tug assets and replace them through civilian contract arrangements. While this decision is being made, it was recommended that civilian contract tugs be used for all static harbor operations. It was also suggested that an investigation be conducted into the time involved in out-of-country overhauls and the possibility of using in-country overhaul capability until the out-of-country asset situation is improved.

(5) The Long Binh Depot Collection, Classification and Salvage (CC&S) wash rack was studied to eliminate the backlog existing there. It was recommended that an additional concrete loading area be constructed, adequate heavy lift equipment be added and additional pumps be provided. Recent observations have shown greatly improved operations which insure timely retrograde of closed loop items.

b. Review and Analysis Branch.

(1) The program for eliminating unauthorized reports is now operating successfully. The next step in strengthening the Reports Control Program is a concentrated effort to eliminate unnecessary reports. To carry this out, an ad hoc committee now meets twice a month and requires a representative from a selected staff section to justify the reports required by that staff section. If a report cannot be justified, it then is rescinded. The goal is to rescind one report for every one initiated.

(2) The Command and Control Improvement Program designated by Major General Heiser in December 1968 has been fully implemented. Nine of the major objectives in this program are now incorporated in the monthly Review and Analysis with nine more to be added in April. There will be a continuing review of the Command and Control Improvement Program for charts that are candidates for the monthly Review and Analysis.


c. Cost Reduction Branch.

(1) Cost Reduction Program Status - The FY 69 cost reduction goal for 1st Logistical Command is \$10 million. At the end of the 3d quarter (31 Mar 69), 1st Logistical Command had validated four actions worth \$16.4 million or 164% of its official goal. The 3d quarter was highlighted by the validation of two actions, (1) The elimination of an Intransit Yard at Cam Ranh Bay saved \$692.1 thousand for FY 69 - FY 71 and (2) the

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Project Clean/NCR 500 management action initiated in September was validated for \$12.8 million. The contract for the Intransit Yard at Cam Ranh Bay was eliminated by the aggressive application of the Thru-put concept. Thru-put is the intensified management of transportation resources so that cargo is moved directly to its destination without staging at an intransit yard. Project Clean/NCR 500 was a manual review of the stock accounting ledgers in the NCR 500 system used at the Direct Support Unit level. This review discovered administrative errors which were corrected by initiating and cancelling requisitions. The net cancellation of supplies resulted in savings of \$12.8 million.



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(2) In April, the cost reduction branch expanded the Cost Reduction Program in the Headquarters by the appointment of Combat Service Support Efficiency Monitors in key staff sections. The program was expanded for three reasons. First, the command wished to express the results of its many projects in terms of dollar savings. Improved efficiency expressed in dollar savings terms will allow comparison and comprehension of 1st Logistical Command projects by individuals not familiar with logistical reporting terms. Secondly, the independent audit performed by the US Army Audit Agency assures the validity of the reported savings. And thirdly, the reporting of future projects will be designed to include statistics on dollar savings. Also, Command emphasis on reporting results in terms of dollar savings will enable submission to the cost reduction program of the many Command & Control Improvement Projects initiated this year.


2. (U) The ADP Division was reorganized under a Special Assistant to the Commanding General for Data System.

3. (u) Budget Division.

a. During mid-February the ACofS, Comptroller caused responsible General/Special Staff Offices to accomplish a comprehensive review of all programs/projects under their jurisdiction for the purpose of verifying the validity of the dollar requirements stated in the respective Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) or contract for the purpose of releasing funds for reprogramming or redistribution. These reviews ultimately resulted in approximately \$11,500,000.00 in commitments which in turn increased the 28 February 1969 uncommitted balance to \$21,446,000.00.

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Status of Funds



AOB —————
 COMMITMENTS - - - - -
 OBLIGATIONS

b. HQ, USARV letter AVHGF-B dated 20 March 1969, subject: Third Quarter Review of the USARV FY 69 Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Budget, advised that the USARV FY 69 OMA budget would undergo a complete Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) review as of the end of the third quarter and requested the submission of revised resource requirements based on eight months actual experience.

c. By 1st Indorsement AVCA-GF dated 28 March 1969 this command submitted revised FY 1969 in-country resource requirements of \$128,132,-600.00, a net reduction of \$16,956,000.00 in the then current Approved Operating Budget. With this restatement of requirements, a total of \$48,208,497.00 had been returned to USARV since receipt of the initial Approved Operating Budget of 3 July 1968.

d. Subsequent action by the USARV PBAC further reduced available funding by \$1,095,600.00 and on 22 April 1969 this command received an Approved Operating Budget of \$127,037,000.00.

4. (U) Finance & Internal Review Division.

a. Auditors from Finance & Internal Review Division completed reviews and analyses in the following areas during the period: Imprest Fund Administration and Operation, Validity of Filled Requisitions and Reporting in Support of Naval Support Activity, Saigon, Review of Laundry Contracts, Cost Analysis of Military vs. Contractor Transportation Qui Nhon, Project Find, Review of all non-appropriated funds within Headquarters 1st Logistical Command, Review of non-appropriated fund activities and Central Accounting Offices in Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon Support Commands. US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) completed audits on Property Disposal Activities (Command request Audit), and construction, engineer, and industrial equipment. USAAA started an audit of Interservice Support.

b. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) completed their field work and issued comments on their review of refrigerated vessels. Six new reviews were started by GAO. Two were suspended for approximately 90 days; they were Survey of Transportation of Ammunition and Review of Transportation and Management of Sea Land containers. Reviews in progress at the end of the period were: Inventory Control and Supply Responsiveness, Piaster Rate utilized by Contractors, Balance of Payments and War Risk Insurance (Contractors) and control of USAID cargo.


c. USARV Internal Review completed their audit of port operations and currently reviewing general purpose vehicles.

d. Technical inspections were conducted at the 92nd Finance Section (Disbursing) in Cam Ranh Bay and at the 292nd Finance Section (Disbursing) in Vung Tau.

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ANNEX C (C) ACofS, SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS, Security Division

1. (C) Enemy activity directly affecting logistical operations showed a significant increase during the period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, due primarily to the Post-TET Offensive initiated by the enemy on the night of 22-23 February 1969. A comparison between the TET Offensive of 1968 and the Post-TET Offensive this year follows:



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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
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2. (C) The TET Offensive in 1968 began on 30 January and was characterized by a low to moderate frequency of incidents for the month before and a high frequency for the month after the beginning of the Offensive. The Post-TET Offensive in 1969 began on 22 February and was characterized by a moderate frequency of incidents for the month preceeding the offensive and for the month after the beginning of the offensive. However, differences in the types and the intensity of incidents between the 1968 and 1969 offensives were of considerable significance to 1st Logistical Command. In the Post-TET Offensive 1969, lines of communication such as shipping, convoys, and pipelines received a greater share of enemy activity than in the TET Offensive 1968. On the other hand, TET Offensive 1968 showed greater enemy activity in ground attacks and attacks by fire, particularly against tactical units, and population centers than did Post-TET Offensive 1969.

COMPARISON OF ENEMY INCIDENTS 1968-69
(Incidents Involving 1st Log Comd)



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3. (C) Both offensives were designed to end the war in one swift blow, but, the strategy and tactics of the two offensives were quite different. In the 1968 offensive, the enemy sought to capture and hold centers of population; to substantially reduce the combat effectiveness of allied troops by large scale ground confrontations; and to initiate or encourage a popular uprising in support of the NLF/NVN movement which would ultimately result in the collapse of the SVN government. There were several reasons why the 1968 offensive failed. One of the major reasons was the considerable casualty losses inflicted upon the enemy by allied forces. Another reason for the failure of the 1968 offensive was the almost total lack of popular support for the NLF/NVN movement. Further, the swift and substantial support effort upon which the tactical units were able to rely contributed to the defeat of the enemy's TET Offensive 1968. Perhaps because of this, the strategy and tactics of the 1969 Post-TET offensive placed emphasis on destroying or disrupting logistical support by attacking logistical installations and lines of communications (to include allied air facilities); avoiding large scale ground confrontations with allied troops, and the capture and holding of SVN centers of government in an effort to topple that government. The 1969 offensive failed primarily because we were prepared for it. Intelligence reports were numerous and accurate. Tactical units responded by blocking and executing well-planned operations which consistently prevented and disrupted the approach of enemy troops. The number of incidents reported were about the same as the number reported for the 1968 offensive but the scale of the attacks was much smaller. Attacks by fire were seldom accompanied by ground attacks and the damage sustained by friendly forces was therefore lessened.

4. (C) The significant enemy incidents involving 1st Logistical Command during this period have been of six types; attacks on shipping, attacks on convoys, interdictions of pipelines, ground/sapper attacks, harassments, and attacks by fire.

5. (C) Figure 3 indicates the number of enemy incidents involving shipping. Figure 4 shows a comparison of shipping attacks during TET 1968 and those that occurred during TET 1969.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING SHIPPING




Figure 3

Figure 4

Shipping, like other lines of communications, received significant attention from the enemy. Attacks on shipping increased by more than 300% over the last reporting period. Fortunately, however, major damages have not resulted from these attacks. Some examples of attacks on shipping were:

a. On 22 February 1969, in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), the ship "OCALA VICTORY" received rocket and mortar fire. There were no casualties or damages.

b. On 15 March 1969, in the RSSZ, tug #2111 from the 11th Transportation Detachment received 4 rounds of B-40 rocket fire. Three rounds hit the galley and one hit the forward deck causing minor damages and 3 US wounded in action (WIA).

c. On 5 April 1969, in the RSSZ, the vessel "BUCYRUS VICTORY" was fired upon with 3 rounds of rocket fire but the rounds landed short. There were no casualties or damages.

6. (C) Figure 5 and 6 depict enemy attacks on convoys and a comparison of incidents between TET 1968 and TET 69.

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ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING CONVOYS




Figure 5

Figure 6

For statistical purposes, convoy incidents have been divided into ambushes, sniper fire, and mine incidents. The charts show a 65% increase in convoy incidents in this reporting period over the past reporting period. This increase is an indicator of the increased emphasis the enemy has placed on interdiction of lines of communication, especially since the increase is most significantly in ambushes (almost 270%) and mine incidents (100%), but sniping incidents decreased (25%).

7. (C) Road and bridge interdiction is another type of enemy action. However, since this type of action seldom results in casualties, damages or significant convoy delays, it has not been included in the statistical count reflected by the chart. Also, because of improved road clearing and repair procedures, security, patrolling, and reaction time by friendly forces, the frequency of this type of incident has been reduced considerably. In addition, rail interdiction has not been included because rail use by the 1st Logistical Command is very limited and has little or no effect upon operations.

8. (C) During the reporting period, convoys which seem to be most often the object of enemy activity are those which travel between Long Binh and Tay Ninh/Dau Tieng in III Corps, and those which travel between Qui Nhon and Pleiku in II Corps. Some examples of convoy ambushes are:

a. On 14 February 1969, on Highway 19, 3 kilometers east of An Khe, a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy received small arms (SA), automatic weapons (AW), and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire from an unknown size enemy force. Gunships and elements of the 1/50th Mechanized

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Infantry supported the convoy. Eight friendly troops were wounded (3 1st Logistical Command, 5 popular force) and a jeep and a 5-ton truck were damaged. The enemy had 3 killed, 2 wounded, and 3 captured.

b. On 20 March 1969, on highway 19, 15 kilometers west of An Khe, a Han Jin convoy was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force using SA, AW and B-40 fire. The contact lasted 5 minutes. Two US were wounded and 2 Han Jin 8-ton trucks were disabled. Enemy results were unknown.

c. On 15 April 1969, on highway 19, 13 kilometers west of Cha Rang, a Republic of Korea (ROK) convoy heading west and a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy heading east were ambushed while passing each other. The size of the enemy force was estimated at 75-100 and they employed mortar, B-40, SA AW and M-79 fire. Two gunships and three guntrucks supported the convoy and two ROK companies were inserted into the area. There were 13 wounded (8 US, 5 ROK) and one 10-ton tractor W/lowboy plus its cargo (M-88 tank retriever) was destroyed. One ROK jeep was also damaged. The enemy lost an estimated 15 to 20 KIA.

d. On 28 April, on highway 13, 15 kilometers south of An Loc, a 48th Group convoy received SA, AW and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. Tactical air strikes, artillery, and gunships supported while elements from the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 2d Infantry reinforced. Four friendly troops were KIA (1 1st Logistical Command) and ten were wounded (1 1st Logistical Command). Five 5,000 gallon fuel tankers, one 5-ton ammunition truck, one V100 armored car, one Armored Personnel Carrier (APC), one gunjeep, one UH-1H medevac and one AH-1G helicopter were destroyed. The enemy lost 11 KIA.

9. (C) The following are some examples of convoy mine incidents reported during the period:

a. On 17 March 1969, 13 kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng, the third vehicle in the first march unit of the Long Binh to Tay Ninh convoy hit and detonated a mine. The truck had both rear wheels blown off and a 3x2 foot crater was made in the road. There were no casualties.

b. On 21 April 1969, 8 kilometers west of Bien Hoa, a 2½-ton truck in the Phuoc Vinh to Long Binh convoy was hit by a command detonated mine. The mine destroyed the vehicle and caused the cargo (propane bottles) to catch fire. Both the driver and assistant driver received burns.

10. (C) The following are examples of enemy sniper incidents directed against convoys:

a. On 23 March 1969, 28 kilometers west northwest of An Khe on highway 19, the Pleiku to Qui Nhon convoy received SA fire from an estimated enemy squad. There were no casualties or damage.

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b. On 26 April 1969, 10 kilometers southeast of Quang Tri on highway 1, a 3/4-ton courier truck received 2 rounds of SA fire which hit the right side of the windshield. There were no casualties.

11. (C) Figure 7 and 8 depict enemy incidents involving pipelines and a comparison between TET 1968 and TET 1969.

ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING PIPELINES




Figure 7

Figure 8

These figures depict a slight increase in pipeline incidents over the previous reporting period (1 November to 31 January: 32 incidents; 1 February to 30 April: 34). Most of the incidents were sabotage by satchel charge or by SA fire. The following are examples of these types of incidents:

a. On 25 February 1969, the Phan Rang 8-inch JPL pipeline was blown by an unknown size charge. Loss of fuel was not significant.

b. On 24 March 1969, a maintenance crew on the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline received SA fire which set the pipeline on fire. The fire spread to 30 Vietnamese houses some of which contained 55 gallon drums of POI (suspected pilferage).

c. On 24 April 1969, on the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline a fire (suspected VC sabotage) was discovered. Damages included 9 sections of pipe and an estimated loss of 1,000 barrels of diesel fuel.

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12. (C) Another prevalent form of attack against the pipeline is attacks by fire on the pump stations (figure 7). Some examples of these are as follows:

a. On 4 March 1969, pump station #4 on the Qui Nhon to An Khe pipeline received an unknown number of SA and mortar rounds. There were two ROK soldiers killed and the mess hall was heavily damaged.

b. On 23 March 1969, pump station #7 on the An Khe to Pleiku pipeline received SA fire from an estimated 25 to 30 enemy personnel. One bunker was hit by a grenade. Four US were wounded and an estimated 10 enemy were killed.

13. (C) The enemy's determined effort to interdict the Qui Nhon to Pleiku pipeline requires that a study be made to determine if it is economically more feasible to deliver POL by other means. The results of this study is not available for this reporting period at this time.

14. (C) Ground/sapper attacks involving 1st Logistical Command installations are depicted in figure 9. A comparison of TET 1968 and TET 1969 are shown in figure 10.

ENEMY GROUND/SAPPER ATTACKS DIRECTED AT 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND INSTALLATIONS




Figure 9




Figure 10

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Although the percentage of increase for ground/sapper attacks for TET 1969 is large (600%), the difference between this period and the last is not that great because of the small numbers during both periods. They differ from TET 1968 in that the enemy changed from the tactic of overwhelming and holding a position to penetrating, destroying and withdrawing. Consequently, most of the TET 1969 attacks were of a small sapper unit nature, but some of these attacks were very effective. The following are examples of ground/sapper attacks which occurred during the reporting period:

a. On 10 March 1969, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Point received a sapper attack. Losses included 9 US WIA, and 1,728.89 short tons of ammunition valued at \$3,208,113.00.

b. On 10 March 1969, tank farm #2 at Qui Nhon received a sapper infiltration attack. Losses included 1 US WIA, three 10,000 barrel fuel tanks (containing fuel) and two 3,000 barrel fuel tanks (containing fuel). In addition there were numerous drums of diesel fuel, grease and lube oil destroyed.

c. Also on 23 March 1969, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot received an enemy sapper attack. Losses included 28 US WIA, 23,700 rounds of 105mm, 2,960 4.2-inch mortar rounds, 7,452 M-16 AP mines and 9,971 rounds of 155mm.

15. (C) Figure 11 and 12 depict enemy harassing activity directed against 1st Logistical Command elements and a comparison between TET 1968 and TET 1969.

ENEMY HARASSING INCIDENTS




Figure 11

Figure 12

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There was a noticeable increase in harassing incidents during the reporting period (280%), but the number of incidents remained small. Perhaps this can be attributed to the strength and combat effectiveness problems the enemy is experiencing in his VC local force units to whom most of this type activity is attributed. The following are examples of harassing incidents which occurred during the reporting period.

a. On 16 February, the Qui Nhon rock quarry received 10-12 rounds of SA fire resulting in damage to two flood lights.

b. On 6 March 1969, Tank Farm #1 at Qui Nhon received 8 rounds of SA fire. There were no casualties or damages.

c. On 17 March 1969, 22 kilometers west of An Khe a 5-ton gun truck from the 88th Transportation Company travelling west on Highway 19 received SA and AW fire from an unknown size enemy force. There were no casualties or damage.

16. (C) Figure 13 and 14 depict enemy attacks by fire directed at 1st Logistical Command installations and facilities and a comparison between TET 1968 and TET 1969.

ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE




Figure 13




Figure 14

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The category of attacks by fire has been changed from that used in the 1st reporting period. This period, attacks by fire do not include ground or sapper attacks as it did previously. This change has been made primarily to differentiate between the two and because the enemy has changed his emphasis from coordinated ground attacks with fire support to stand-off attacks using indirect fires only. There were almost three times as many attacks by fire this reporting period as compared with the last period and almost two thirds the number that occurred during the 1968 TET Offensive. The following are some examples of enemy attacks by fire which occurred during the reporting period.

a. On 23 February 1969, the Qui Mon Ammunition Base Depot received a rocket/mortar attack. Losses totaled 8,378.79 short tons of ammunition valued at \$10,317,857.00.

b. On 15 March 1969, the Logistics Support Area at Phan Rang received 20-40 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. Five personnel were wounded (3 1st Logistical Command). One 3/4-ton trailer was destroyed. One 3/4-ton truck and one reefer were damaged.

c. On 23 March 1969, the Quan Loi Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) received an unknown number of rocket/mortar fire. Losses included 32 175mm charges, 96-175mm rounds, 1,081 8-inch charges, 7,770 primers. There were no casualties.

d. On 26 March 1969, the Dong Tam ASP received a mortar attack. Losses included 2 KIA, 65 WIA, five pads of ammunition, the Logistical Support Activity headquarters, the ASP office, two 6,000 pound rough terrain forklifts and one 5,000 gallon water tanker destroyed.

17. The following statistics reflect the number of personnel security actions completed during the period. The total number of personnel security actions processed increased approximately 23% over the last reporting period.

a. CLEARANCES VALIDATED	February	March	April	TOTAL
(1) TOP SECRET:	143	116	112	371
(2) SECRET:	214	174	168	556
b. National Agency Check Requests:	49	38	44	131
c. Investigative Records Repository Checks:	190	150	172	512
d. Background Investigation Requests:	5	4	5	14

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e. CLEARANCES GRANTED	February	March	April	TOTAL
(1) Interim TOP SECRET:	74	33	37	144
(2) Interim SECRET:	78	34	38	150
(3) SECRET:	29	25	42	96
(4) CONFIDENTIAL:	3	2	4	9

f. At the end of the period, 262 clearance actions were pending.

18. (C) The following is a summary of the activities of the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment during the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969.

a. Assignment of Key Personnel:

- (1) Major F. B. Bassett, Commanding Officer.
- (2) CPT John A. Thompson, to be Officer-in-Charge, Saigon Field Office.
- (3) 2LT Anthony M. Antenaide, to be Officer-in-Charge, Pleiku Field Office.
- (4) CW3 Gary L. Busenburg, to be Informant Control Officer.
- (5) CW2 Donald L. Roberts, to be Officer-in-Charge, Long Binh Field Office.
- (6) CW2 George T. Butler, Case Control Officer.
- (7) CW2 Richard A. Long, Administration and Supply Officer.

b. Special Studies Conducted:

- (1) 672 checks of possible outlets for Subversive and/or anti-American literature.
- (2) 1,425 checks on salvage facilities and document destruction facilities for complete and proper destruction of classified information.

c. Counterintelligence Services Conducted:

- (1) 10 counterintelligence surveys.
- (2) 48 announced counterintelligence inspections.
- (3) 68 unannounced counterintelligence inspections.

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(4) 138 after duty hours counterintelligence checks.

d. Personnel Security Investigations:

(1) Number conducted: 35

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 205

e. Incident Investigations (to include Subversion Directed Against the US Army):

(1) Number conducted: 35.

(2) Number of Agent Reports submitted: 104

f. Special Interest Incident Investigation - Black Extremists in the Armed Forces. Number of Agent Reports submitted: 140

g. The counterintelligence Personal and Impersonal Card File had a total of 10,300 personalities and 760 impersonal items on file at the end of the reporting period.

h. There were 71 contacts made with installations informants during the past 90 days which produced 42 IIR's for a 59% production ratio.

i. To increase the effectiveness and establish the validity of information obtained through the unit's installation informant program, polygraph instruments have been acquired. These instruments will be utilized in assessing new informants as well as testing present sources at least semi-annually.

j. Technical countermeasures equipment has been received in the past 90 days. However, two more items of equipment are required before the unit will have the capability to perform counterintelligence technical inspections and surveys. The unit expects to receive these items within the next 30 days, and at that time priorities will be established for these counterintelligence services within 1st Logistical Command.


19. (U) February saw the continuance of the northeast monsoon in the northern half of the country characterized by many days with rain or drizzle, low ceilings and poor visibility, while the southern half of the country experienced excellent ceilings, visibility, and a minimal amount of precipitation. The northeast monsoon became very weak and by the end of the month traces of the southwest monsoon began to appear and the general flow pattern over Vietnam was weak and variable. April was the transition month between the dry air flow of the northeast monsoon and the moist air flow of the southwest monsoon which affected weather from mid-May through September.

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
ANNEX D (U) ACoS, SP&O, Force Development Division

1. (U) Program 6 Civilianization is proceeding on schedule. Of the 5653 military spaces to be civilianized by 31 May 1969, 5528 have been deleted from the 1st Logistical Command requisitioning base (see Chart 1). Spaces selected for reduction or inactivation without replacement which were lost during this reporting period are shown at Inclosure 11.
2. (U) The last of the Program 6 units scheduled for 1st Logistical Command arrived in the Republic of Vietnam during this period (see Chart 2 and Inclosure 12). These units are an integral part of 1st Logistical Command and, with minor exceptions, will be retained in the 1st Logistical Command force structure (see Inclosure 13).
3. (U) A total of ten Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) TDA were staffed at 1st Logistical Command and forwarded to USARV during the 89 day period. TDA for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, Class IV Engineer Equipment Pool, Special Services Depot, US Army Mortuary, Saigon and MTDA for US Army Mortuary, Da Nang and, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon were also submitted to USARV during this period.
4. (U) MTOE affecting 15 1st Logistical Command units were prepared and submitted to USARV between 1 February 1969 and 30 April 1969. MTOE were submitted to increase unit strengths, realign capabilities and add equipment to support unit requirements. All MTOE strength increases were provided for through space trade-offs within 1st Logistical Command assets. MTOE submitted are at Inclosure 14.
5. (U) USARPAC General Orders 190, 4 March 1969, implemented the Delta Support Package. Activated by this order were the 91st Composite Service Battalion Headquarters, the 524th Engineer Maintenance Detachment (Field Maintenance), the 440th Terminal Transfer Company, the 30th Signal Corps Detachment (Radio Repair), the 195th and 953d Quartermaster Detachments (Refrigerator Repair) and the 140th, 256th, and 563d Transportation Detachments (Crane). Inactivated by the same orders were the 58th and 529th Light Truck Companies, the 565th Terminal Service Company and the 599th Quartermaster Detachment (Refrigerator Repair). The newly activated units are located at Can Tho, providing additional support capability for the Mekong Delta.

PROGRAM 6 CIVILIANIZATION PROGRESS



PROGRAM 6 UNITS



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ANNEX E (C) ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division

1. (U) GENERAL: Although this reporting period was highlighted by several special tasks, major unit movements, projects, and operations, the main emphasis was on the continuing support provided by the 1st Logistical Command to US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces throughout Vietnam. Of particular significance was the uninterrupted support provided subsequent to the initiation of the enemy post - Tet offensive on 23 February 1969. The magnitude and complexity of daily operations, while sometimes overshadowed by the not so routine tasks, remains the single "highlight" that is continuous and most important. The management of day-to-day logistical support is still the most critical task facing the command. In addition to normal support, redeployment of several major tactical units required detailed planning and coordination. A complete study to provide justification for the retention or recommendation for redeployment of twenty-four National Guard and Army Reserve units in Vietnam was a major undertaking, as was other special tasks such as the expansion of the Project Duffel Bag facility, a study of brigade combat service support, and the realignment of the Saigon Support Command.

2. (C) Highlights of Logistical Support Changes:

a. LZ Baldy (Hill 63) LSA. The reorganization of the Americal Division, under the ROAD concept, resulted in the loss of a large number of division support personnel. It therefore became necessary to enlarge the scope of the 1st Logistical Command LSA operation at LZ Baldy (Hill 63) to provide continuous logistic support to elements of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. Prior to the division reorganization 1st Logistical Command was providing Class V and laundry and bath support at LZ Baldy. Additional support, in the form of Class I, III, and fast moving II and IV, all of which was previously handled by the Americal Division, was assumed by the United States Army Support Command, Da Nang on 1 February 1969.

b. An Khe Study. During the month of March studies were being conducted by the United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to determine to what degree the logistics effort at An Khe could be reduced, considering the impending move of the 1st Cavalry (Rear). The main units being considered for possible reduction were the 304th Supply & Service Company and the 560th Maintenance Company. Reductions in finance and Army Postal Unit detachment personnel were also being considered commensurate with the decrease in supported strength. It was envisioned that the logistical support mission being performed by these two units could be filled by a Forward Support Activity type unit of approximately 128 personnel (total current strength of both the 304th Supply & Service and 560th Light Maintenance Companies is 280). The study was terminated due to an increase in supported strength at An Khe. Three (3) battalions (2 infantry battalions and 1 tank battalion), along with a medical company, artillery battery (105mm), engineer

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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company, maintenance company (DS), Military Police platoon, signal platoon, and Military Intelligence detachment, from the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division moved into the area on 15 April 1969. The total number of personnel involved in the move was approximately 4,000. With the move of the 1st Cavalry (Rear) the overall increase at An Khe will be approximately 2,000 personnel. United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon is currently studying the logistical impact resulting from the move.

c. Reduction of Logistical Activities at Phu Hiep. Studies are being conducted by 1st Logistical Command Headquarters in conjunction with USARV to investigate the feasibility of closing out Phu Hiep. Current 1st Logistical Command strength at Phu Hiep is approximately 550 personnel. This figure reflects a reduction of approximately 350 personnel since December 1968. The supported force strength has been reduced from 14,000 troops to approximately 13,000. An additional 500 support personnel will relocate from Phu Hiep in the near future. Currently, the following actions are in progress:

(1) USARV is conferring with I Field Force Vietnam to determine which units could be relocated from Phu Hiep to other installations in II Corps Tactical Zones.

(2) 1st Logistical Command ACoFS, Ammunition is working with ACoFS, Ammunition, Qui Nhon on alternate methods of resupplying ammunition to the Army units in the Tuy Hoa area so that the ammunition supply point may be closed out and the perimeter reduced. Upon completion of the above actions, consideration will be given to the feasibility of relocating the remaining logistical activities to Tuy Hoa Air Force Base.

d. Dalat LSA. Logistical activities at Dalat have been increased from a Class III supply point to include Class I operations. A new ammunition supply point is under construction with an estimated completion date of 30 May 1969. When completed, 1st Logistical Command will assume control of the ammunition supply point operations from the 5/27 Artillery.

e. Redeployment of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear. The Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, has approved the move of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear from An Khe to Bien Hoa indicating the move would be completed by 15 May 1969. Several coordination meetings have been held with the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and other units with elements located at Bien Hoa to discuss and resolve problems associated with the move. The 1st Logistical Command has provided ten PASCOE prefab storage buildings, five to the 1st Cavalry Division and five to the 101st Airborne Division, to accommodate the move. Saigon Support Command has developed a plan to furnish the increased logistical support required by this move.

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f. Transportation Support for Tactical Units. Two tactical units, the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade have requested the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, to attach truck units directly to them. The 199th requested a light truck platoon and the 1st Air Cavalry requested a light truck company. ACofS, Transportation made a study to determine the impact such a request would have on our assets. Truck assets throughout all of South Vietnam were reviewed and it was determined that by redeploying several truck units the requests could be met. Accordingly, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command attached the 805th Light Truck Company to the 1st Air Cavalry Division and allowed the platoon of the 151st Transportation Company to remain attached to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

g. Saigon Support Command Headquarters Reorganization. The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command has authorized Saigon Support Command to employ an organizational concept within the headquarters for a 90-day period. This concept involves the direction of all supply and transportation activities by an ACofS, Distribution. In addition to requesting ideas from all elements of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, the ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations has been working directly with Headquarters, Saigon Support Command in determining criteria for evaluating this arrangement.

h. Test of Delta Wide Communications Net. A test of the Delta Wide Communications Net was conducted during the period 31 March through 5 April 1969 by a CE representative from USARPAC, Signal Officer from 1st Logistical Command and a representative from ACofS, Security, Plans and Operations, 1st Logistical Command. The evaluation team traversed the waterways in the Delta making periodic communications checks with all possible land radio stations. The team also went ashore and inspected the fixed station communications facilities. The net was considered to be operating satisfactorily in its present design although several recommendations for improvements were made by the evaluation team.

i. Battalion Headquarters for Can Tho. USARPAC General Order 190, dated 4 March 1969, activated Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 91st CS Battalion (AD). 1st Logistical Command General Order 193, dated 10 March 1969, assigned the 91st CS Battalion to Saigon Support Command. The battalion headquarters replaced the provisional headquarters at Can Tho.

j. Move of 238th Maintenance Company to Dong Tam. As the monsoon season is near, the 238th Maintenance Company base camp at Binh Duc will soon be under water, and has started relocating to Dong Tam. As of 21 April 1969, one platoon has already moved to Dong Tam and is working on the construction of its new quarters. The entire company, minus a small contact team at Vinh Long and Binh Duc, should be relocated at Dong Tam by 1 May 1969. There will be no change in status of maintenance support due to this move.

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
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k. IV Corps Supply and Maintenance Seminar. On 27 March 1969, Major General G. S. Eckhardt, Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone, hosted a Supply and Maintenance Seminar at Can Tho for all MACV Advisory Teams within IV Corps Tactical Zone. Representatives from USARV G4, CORDS, MACV J42 Supply, 1st Logistical Command ACoS, SP&O, and ACoS, Maintenance and the ACoS, Supply and ACoS, Maintenance from Saigon Support Command participated in this seminar. The purpose of the seminar was to inform advisory teams of the logistical support available to them and to discuss problem areas and their resolution. Major General Eckhardt stressed the need for command interest in the supply and maintenance program.

3. (C) Realignment of Saigon Support Command. A plan for realignment of Saigon Support Command units was submitted by Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Saigon to Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command for approval. The plan dealt basically with reorganization of the 29th and 53rd General Support Groups. The 53rd General Support Group headquarters moved from Vung Tau to Long Binh Post during the period 7-14 April 1969, and was assigned the mission of general support of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. The 29th General Support Group at Long Binh Post was assigned the mission of direct support of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Vung Tau Sub-Area Command (VTSAC) was established and assigned the mission of providing logistical support in the immediate area, and operating the Vung Tau Area R&R Center. Commanding Officer, VTSAC, has been assigned duties as Installation Commander for VTSAC. This realignment concept creates an extensive span of control for the 29th Group which is subject to further evaluation. Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command has authorized a test period ending 30 June 1969 to determine the effectiveness of the realignment.

REALIGNMENT OF SAIGON SUPPORT COMMAND



* Mission Responsibilities

4. (U) Brigade Combat Service Support Survey.

a. This command provided input to the US Army Combat Developments Command for use in a study of brigade combat service support being conducted by that agency. The purpose of the study was to assemble the complete logistical support picture from the basic divisional support of its brigades through the spectrum of organic and non-organic support extended to quasi-independent and fully independent (divisional) brigades; and on the more self-sufficient organic support involved in the combat service support of the separate brigade/regiment. The collection of data from Vietnam is the first step in determining the most effective means of providing logistical support for independent or separate brigade operations.

b. Questionnaires describing support provided by Forward Support Activities (FSA) were completed by this headquarters, the support command, general support groups which have FSAs deployed and by FSA commanders. The questions dealt with the factors necessitating the establishment of FSAs, alternatives to the establishment of FSAs, personnel and equipment for FSAs, and the transportation requirements for support of independent or separate brigades. Questionnaires were also completed by the various elements of divisions, brigades, regiments, DISCOMs and other combat service support units.

c. The questionnaires completed by elements of this command indicate general agreement in the answers to the following questions:

(1) What specific geographical, environmental, combat, or other factors made it necessary to establish the FSA(s) under your command?

ANSWER:

(a) The lack of secure land lines of communication. The threat of route interdiction by the enemy or weather and the security required to enable truck convoys to travel to and from their base camps and establish support installations necessitated stockage of the primary combat consumables (Class I, III, and V) in forward areas. In most cases the tactical units did not have the capability to handle and maintain the quantities required.

(b) The commitment of a portion of the tactical units reduced their capability to provide internal support.

(c) The requirement for the tactical units' logistical support organizations to provide support at numerous landing zones, fire support bases, and other locations. The division support commands were not designed to operate from numerous locations as required in this environment. Fragmentation reduces their efficiency and their resources are taxed. For example,

the brigade share of an infantry division support command's bath resources is one 8-head bath unit which can provide bath services at only one location.

(d) The improved Class I and service support provided to troops in forward areas. Whenever possible, troops in forward areas are provided Class "A" rations which require the storage of frozen meats, and chilled fruits and vegetables in quantities beyond the capability of the tactical units. Laundry and bath services beyond the units' capabilities are also provided by 1st Logistical Command whenever possible.

(2) What changes to a FSA(s), SOP, personnel, equipment, or organization would improve combat service support adequacy and responsiveness to the divisional brigade portion of the FSA mission?

ANSWER: At the present time this command does not have separate authorizations for the personnel and equipment required to operate FSAs although the need for such authorizations exists. Personnel and equipment are either drawn from TO&E and TDA units assigned to the parent support command or provided by the other support commands when the requirement exceeds the parent support command's capability. The initial FSA concept envisioned the organization and fielding of FDAs in support of tactical operations of short duration. Experience has shown, however, that some FSAs are required for extended periods of time resulting in a degradation of the capability of the units from which personnel and/or equipment were drawn. This situation could be remedied by the following:

(a) The authorization of personnel spaces to permit the activation of cellular teams to form the nucleus of the FSA. These teams would be trained in the management of the classes of supply (I, III, V, limited II and IV) and services normally provided by FSAs, and this would eliminate the necessity of learning the job while trying to accomplish the mission in the vital, early days of their existence. The tabular authority for such a team, to which personnel drawn from the existing units could be attached, would significantly reduce the problems currently encountered in relation to promotion, military justice, and administration.

(b) Tabular authority for equipment to provide on-call equipment for the cellular teams. The equipment would be maintained in a central location in the depots and would be maintained by the team. When required the equipment would be readily available, serviceable, and could be moved to the FSA site rapidly. The equipment would be returned upon completion or termination of the FSA mission.

(3) Could the same combat service support end result as obtained through activation of a FSA be provided in ANOTHER way,

ANSWER: When brigade-size tactical operations require additional support that cannot be provided from existing facilities or resources of the brigade or its parent unit, deployment of an FSA is the most practical method of providing the rapid reaction support required.

(4) Is there a need now or in the future, for ADPE and/or input/output devices at the level of combat service support extended to the combat brigade?

ANSWER: Due to the relatively small volume of resupply transactions between the FSA and its parent unit and the undesirable environmental conditions in Vietnam, it is not considered feasible to place ADPE and/or input/output devices at the FSA level. The limited number of line items stocked would not justify the assignment of ADPE to the typical FSA. Radio-teletype equipment should provide the required communications.

(5) Assuming there are no regulatory or organizational restrictions against this action and that your expended resources were reconstituted from fresh theater input, could your command, organize, equip, and activate a FSA or similar composite type combat service support organization that is "tailored" to the situation that exists when a FSA is required, install the unit on the ground, supervise initial operations, and then permanently or temporarily transfer assets, control, and responsibility for the organization to the major supported unit? Discuss the equipment, personnel, doctrinal, and organizational implications of such an action.

ANSWER:

(a) If expended resources were replaced, this command could organize, equip, and employ tailored FSAs or similar composite-type combat service support organizations and transfer the unit to the major supported force after the FSA becomes fully operational. 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-1 establishes procedures and requirements for planning, establishing and operating forward support activities employed in support of combat operations. This regulation also directs each support command to maintain on-call FSAs capable of rapid deployment when so directed by Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

(b) Although transfer of assets and control of the organization would be possible, it is not considered to be feasible for the following reasons:

1 This transfer would prove to be a burden to the tactical commander since more of his time and the time of his staff would have to be devoted to the supervision of logistical support activities.

2 Since the time for which FSAs would be required is not usually known, this transfer would be impractical if the assets were to be returned to this

command when they were no longer needed by the tactical unit. This command would requisition replacement personnel and equipment upon transfer of the FSA to the tactical units without knowing if or when the FSA would be returned.

3 If the personnel and equipment were permanently transferred to the tactical unit, the unit would have to have tabular authority for both in order to obtain replacements. Due to the time required to process requests for tabular authority, the FSA may no longer be required when the request is finally approved.

4 Since other units are also supported from the FSA, transfer of the FSA to the major tactical unit would give that unit an additional mission which would be the responsibility of combat service support units.

5 Experienced personnel would be lost to this command by these transfers. The turbulence caused by continued transfers to and from different commands could be expected to have a detrimental effect on the morale and efficiency of the individuals involved.

(6) What are your recommendations concerning combat service support of independent brigade operations, particularly where the capabilities of the parent division are already over-extended?

ANSWER:

(a) Logistical support beyond the capability of the tactical unit which cannot be provided from existing facilities can best be provided by the deployment of an FSA by this command when the combat operation is expected to be of short duration (90 to 180 days).

(b) When the operation is expected to be of longer duration (over 180 days) the requirement can best be met by one of the following:

1 Transfer of tailored combat service support units to the forward area to provide the support for which they are responsible on an area basis.

2 Augmentation of the tactical units' organic support units by MTOE action to enable them to provide the support for which they are responsible.

5. (U) Revision of 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-1, Establishment and operation of Forward Support Activities.

a. A complete revision of 1st Logistical Command Regulation 525-1 resulted in a comprehensive document which provides valuable guidance to those involved in the establishment, operation, and management of Forward

Support Activities (FSA). This regulation, in addition to providing basic procedures for FSA operation includes, in detail, procedures for management of the various classes of supply and services normally available through the FSA.

b. Basic policies established by this regulation include:

(1) Establishment of on-call FSAs.

(a) Each support command will establish and maintain an on-call FSA capable of supporting a brigade size force. Personnel of the highest caliber will be selected, organized, and trained to perform their tasks in the FSA. Unless it is completely impractical, a flag-bearing unit, e.g., a company headquarters, should be assigned as the nucleus of the FSA. Complete, serviceable equipment will be earmarked for use by the FSA and will be readily available for this purpose. Equipment will be identified as to its air transportability characteristics, should the need develop to deploy the FSA by air.

(b) The on-call FSA will be capable of deploying from the nearest C-130 airfield within twelve hours after notification by this headquarters. A backup FSA, with equipment, will be reconstituted within 24 hours after the on-call FSA has been deployed. Tactical operations may require deployment of several FSAs from each support command.

(c) An FSA will only be deployed when approved by the Commanding General of the Field Force, Vietnam concerned and the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) FSA layout and construction support.

(a) When the mission is received to deploy a new FSA or take over the operation of a combat unit operated Forward Support Element (FSE), an on-the-ground reconnaissance will be made prior to deployment, time and the tactical situation permitting. If ground access is not available, every effort must be made to make an aerial reconnaissance of the proposed FSA location. A location for each FSA facility must be selected with consideration for security, safety, access, and special requirements for each type of activity and a detailed FSA layout developed.

(b) An important part of the FSA planning is to determine the requirement and arrange for engineer equipment and support to prepare the site for operations. Class III and Class V areas may require extensive preparation, though other areas may also require work.

(3) Support provided by FSAs.

(a) The following types of combat service support are normally available through FSAs when required by the supported units:

1 Supply: Wholesale, bulk supply support as follows:

a Class I. "A", MCI and Long Range Patrol rations, and sundry packs, as required by supported units.

b Class II and IV. On an exception basis, to expedite supply action, requisitions for fast moving consumable II and IV items will be accepted by the FSA for transmission to the supply facility (supply point or depot) normally supporting the requesting unit. Only fast moving II and IV items will be stocked at FSAs, and close inventory control will be maintained. With the exception of fortification barrier material, general supply stocks should be kept at a minimum.

c Class III and IIIa. Bulk and packaged fuels and packaged allied products as required by supported units.

d Class V. Ammunition and related Class V items as required for the supported units.

2 Services: Laundry: As required or as determined necessary to provide support or to augment unit capability.

3 Maintenance: As required to provide direct support maintenance to non-divisional units. Back-up direct support maintenance to divisional units should be accomplished by the supporting DS unit and not by the FSA, unless physical location makes this impossible or not feasible. Support may be provided by contact teams with the supported units or at a site within the FSA or both. The scope of maintenance support provided will depend on the size and composition of the forces supported by the FSA and their organic capability.

c. The scope of the FSA operation must be continually reviewed to insure that the required support is being provided with the minimum expenditure of resources. Specific evaluations will be conducted when there are significant changes in the strength of the supported forces.

d. Stockage of FSAs.

(1) An initial balance of stocks will be developed after liaison and coordination with the supported unit. The balance must take into account the composition of the supported force, anticipated employment, terrain, weather, lines of communication and other appropriate factors. Initial balance of stocks should be small, with provisions made for rapid resupply if initial stockage proves inadequate.

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(2) Continuous evaluation of stockage objectives of all classes of supply must be made by the FSA commander and his higher headquarters to insure that stocks forwarded are kept at a minimum consistent with the support required by the supported units.

6. (U) LC Supplement 1 to AR 320-5, Dictionary of US Army Terms.

a. Logistical Command Supplement 1 to AR 320-5, which defines and standardizes logistical terminology to be used within the 1st Logistical Command, was published on 28 March 1969. This supplement was necessary in order to eliminate the misuse of several logistical terms which are peculiar to logistical support operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Definitions of some of the more important terms used within the 1st Logistical Command are:

(1) Logistical area of responsibility (LAR) - The geographic area, usually contiguous with a tactical area of interest of a field force or division, over which a logistical headquarters, i.e., a support command, group, or composite battalion, exercised logistical support responsibility. The senior 1st Logistical Command member in an area is responsible for the mission accomplishment, health, welfare and morale of all other 1st Logistical Command personnel operating in his area. Furthermore, he will insure that all functions of the 1st Logistical Command in his area are being performed in a satisfactory manner. If discrepancies are in areas which are not his direct responsibility, he will notify the responsible commander to insure that corrective action is taken.

(2) Logistical Support Activity (LSA) - A continuing activity, generally located in a fixed base camp to provide direct/general supply, maintenance and service support to military forces on an area basis. The type and number of units comprising an LSA are dependent upon the scope of the support mission. Stockage levels of all classes at an LSA are determined by the densities of personnel and equipment supported, considering replenishment capabilities. Stockage objectives for the various classes of supply will vary from 5 to 45 days depending upon the commodities being stocked.

(3) Forward Support Activity (FSA).

(a) A provisional organization, temporary in nature, deployed in the vicinity of a supported tactical units' forward operating base to provide direct supply, maintenance and service support. It is deployed to support a specific tactical operation when the tactical units' organic support capability is not sufficient to provide the support required. Upon completion of the operation, it is withdrawn from the area of operations and assets returned to their parent unit or the activity will be

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redesignated as described below. Personnel and equipment comprising the FSA are drawn from TO&E and TDA units assigned to the parent support command. FSAs may stock Class I, III, V, and limited, fast moving Class II and IV if the tactical unit is unable to provide their own support or if throughput is not possible. Stockage levels are set at a minimum level consistent with operational requirements (based on troop and equipment densities, resupply rates, capacity and consumption experience). Throughput is used to the maximum extent possible to replace stocks consumed at FSAs. Maintenance and services are provided as required depending upon the supported unit's organic capabilities, tactical deployment, densities, etc.

(b) If an FSA becomes a continuing activity, it will be redesignated as a Logistical Support Activity. Normally, FSAs which continue operations over 6 months will be redesignated as LSAs.

7. (C) Airdrop Operations.

a. Airdrop activity was limited to three emergency missions during the period. This continuing decline in airdrop emergency resupply is indicative of the increasing use of land lines of communication, airland operations, and rotary wing aircraft to move supplies into forward and isolated areas.

b. All three missions were executed during February. Approximately 90 short tons of Class I, IV, and III supplies were delivered in six sorties by C-130 aircraft. The drops were made at Ha Tan and Tien Phuoc in I CTZ, and at Ben Het in norther II CTZ, all Special Forces Camps.


c. The Ben Het drop was the only one in which the Container Delivery System was used. The C-130 crew in this case put the load squarely on the target while dropping by the light of a flare shortly after midnight. The other two drops were made using the 1528 Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). All sorties were successful but one; the first sortie of the month resulted in a total malfunction and loss of the loads. As the aircraft made its first pass over the drop zone, the loads failed to extract from the aircraft. When it began its ascent for a second approach, the loads left the aircraft at an altitude of about 200 feet when the restraining locks failed.

d. The experience with LAPES has again demonstrated the need for joint acceptance of the system if LAPES is going to be made an integral part of the airdrop system. The lack of standard rigging procedures frequently results in adjustments to the load at the departure airfield thus causing aircraft loading to be delayed. Joint service acceptance of any system should be accomplished prior to placing the system in actual use.

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e. The dearth of airdrop missions during the past several months has resulted in a recognized need for training missions to keep aircrews and parachute riggers at a high level of proficiency. Headquarters, MACV is currently developing a program to conduct airdrop missions every two weeks towards this end, as well as to exercise the airdrop emergency request channels. Requests will follow emergency channels, but the time requirement will be relaxed to a twenty-four hour period to permit training of staff personnel and operators at all levels. These airdrops are to be conducted using the Container Delivery System.



SOURCE: ACofS, SP&O, 1st Logistical Command

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8. (C) Special Airlift Missions 1 February through 30 April 1969.

a. During this reporting period a total of 50 Special Airlift Missions were flown. Twenty-three missions transported Class V (Ammunition) and of these, four missions were classified as Emergency Resupply. Also during the period, two SEA Combat Essentials moved 1,264,000 pounds of cargo.

b. With the increase of enemy activity commencing on 23 February 1969, there was an increase of special mission airlift. From 23 February thru 5 March 1969, 19 special airlift missions were flown. Of these missions 11 were Class V (Ammunition); 2 were Class III (Petroleum); and 6 were for other classes of supplies. All missions were flown within the established time frames and all were successfully completed. A total of 36 aircraft sorties were flown to accomplish the 19 special mission requests.

SPECIAL AIRLIFT MISSIONS

	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
1	BNH	PNV	200 Illum 4.2 Mortars	8,400	23 Feb	1
2	BNH	TNH	105mm Smoke Primers	10,800	23 Feb	1
3	QNH	PLU	MOGAS	159,000	24 Feb	6
4	CRB	TNH	Fuses 4,600	20,286	24 Feb	1
5	CRB	PHT	40mm 81mm Illum	22,972	25 Feb	1
6	QNH	KTM	4500 Gal JP-4	288,000	25 Feb	11
7	CRB	ENI	90mm 5.50 Ball 7.62 Link	37,500	25 Feb	2
8	QNH	PHT	30 - 500 Gal (Donuts)	22,000	25 Feb	1
9	CRB	PLU	Parachute Flares	12,730	25 Feb	1
10	DNG	LBN	4,400 White Star Sig	3,140	26 Feb	1
11	CRB	LBN	Radios, Wire, M-14 Mags	2,326	27 Feb	1
12	VNT	LBN	600 Rolls Barbed Tape	8,800	27 Feb	1
13	BNH	VNT	972 Flares, 4000 Grenades	10,271	28 Feb	1
14	QNH	CHI	15KW Generator	4,500	1 Mar	1
15	CRB	PHT	Parachute Flares	13,500	4 Mar	1

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	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
16	CRB	KTM	90mm H.E.	33,096	3 Mar	1
17	QNH	KTM	10m Fuel Tank	1,450	5 Mar	1
18	QNH	KTM	100 GPM Pump	320	5 Mar	1
19	VNT	PLU	1000 Rounds 90mm H.E.	66,000	5 Mar	2

9. (C) Project Duffel Bag.

a. Project Duffel Bag is a Department of Defense sponsored program involving the use of various electronic devices to detect enemy movements. These devices, commonly called "sensors", are employed in a variety of places including defense perimeters, along trails, in the vicinity of logistical installations, and other areas where enemy troops are likely to be encountered. Signals received from the sensors can result in artillery fire, air strikes, and other means of destroying the target.

b. The 1st Logistical Command operates the in-country facility for receipt, issue, maintenance, and evacuation of sensors in the II, III, and IV CTZs. During the reporting period, Headquarters, USARV tasked the command to support a 400% increase in the mission of Project Duffel Bag. As a result, the facility at Cam Ranh Bay required enlargement, more equipment was needed, and personnel strength requirements had to be modified to meet the increase in mission. An additional 200% increase in mission which had been proposed by MACV in April has been disapproved and will not materialize.

c. Construction to enlarge the facility approximately four times its original size began on 7 April 1969. The request for construction was submitted to the 1st Logistical Command by the US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay on 7 March 1969. It was forwarded to Headquarters, USARV on 16 March 1969. The emphasis and priority being given the program is apparent from the speed in which this request was approved and construction begun.

d. The buildings are to be completed by 15 May 1969, and the air-conditioning installed not later than 15 June 1969. Included in the new structure will be 4,000 square feet of environmentally conditioned test, assembly and maintenance space and 4,000 square feet of environmentally conditioned storage space.

e. Production by the facility has continued at an increasing rate. In March the volume was above the level for which it had been originally designed. To compensate for cramped facilities, the operation has been moving towards a two shift schedule until the new buildings are completed.

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f. Personnel were levied from within 1st Logistical Command to provide initial support for the expanding production volume. In addition, incoming personnel are being diverted to the facility to increase strength commensurate with the increasing mission.

g. The MTOE which requested 19 spaces and operating equipment for the original facility was approved during April 1969. It had been prepared and submitted based on the initial mission in July of 1968. A new MTOE to meet the expanding mission is being prepared by the 128th Signal Company at the present time; it will request about 100 personnel spaces and the appropriate operating equipment.

10. (U) Justification for Retention of National Guard/US Army Reserve Units scheduled for redeployment to CONUS. USARV CONF msg 98873, DTG 020615Z March 1969 requested 1st Logistical Command reaffirm the requirement to retain specific National Guard/US Army Reserve units in the US Army Vietnam force structure. 1st Logistical Command CONFIDENTIAL message 374C, DTG 161200Z March 1969 complied with this request by justifying retention of all National Guard/US Army Reserve units presently assigned to 1st Logistical Command. In addition to the justifications submitted to USARV; Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command requested additional statistical information concerning these National Guard/US Army Reserve units. A file was compiled and submitted to Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command with detailed statistical justifications. Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command then directed that the 1st Logistical Command Resources Review Board take up each case, have the appropriate ACofS or directorate present their cases, and after review, make recommendations. The Resources Review Board is scheduled to convene on 7 May 1969.

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ANNEX F (C) ACoFS, SP&O, Training Division

1. (C) Operation Buddy is an on-the-job training (OJT) program for Army, Vietnam (ARVN) personnel with 1st Logistical Command units. The program is designed to assist in the improvement and modernization of the ARVN logistical forces and system. Although each support command has prepared supporting plans for Operation Buddy and has conducted some informal OJT for ARVN personnel, only one formal program is currently in progress. Ten ARVN Aspirants began training as tug boat masters with the 4th Transportation Command on 1 April 1969, and 16 ARVN personnel of various ranks began training in heavy boat, floating machine shop, and harbormaster operations with the 159th Transportation Battalion on 10 April 1969. This specific program will expand for ARVN Transportation Corps personnel until approximately 200 ARVN personnel are involved. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) has not yet provided overall ARVN logistical training requirements to initiate full implementation of the program.

2. (C) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program is designed to upgrade the military capabilities of RVNAF both in quality and quantity. 1st Logistical Command has been charged with providing supply, maintenance, and technical inspection assistance to the program. In February, an Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer) began transferring its equipment to Army, Vietnam (ARVN) on a unit-to-unit basis. This operation was approximately 98 percent complete by 30 April 1969. In March, a second Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer) began its equipment transfer, and a unit and depot draw down was begun to obtain the equipment for two ARVN Engineer Construction Battalions. The Artillery Battalion transfer was approximately 25 percent complete, and the engineer transfer was approximately 50 percent complete by 30 April 1969. In April, a unit and depot draw down was begun to obtain the equipment for an ARVN Engineer Heavy Equipment Company. This transfer was approximately 15 percent complete by 30 April 1969. The program will eventually include transportation and maintenance units.

3. (U) The 1st Logistical Command SKILLS I Program was implemented on 15 February 1969 to orient command personnel on policies, procedures, and management programs, to train specialists and supervisors and to give MOS training in areas where shortages existed. The program was expanded in early March to include US combat units and Free World Military Assistance Forces personnel. The program is multi-phased and consists of ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE phases. ALPHA is concerned with giving newly assigned personnel an overview of 1st Logistical Command operations, BRAVO with training specialists and supervisors, and CHARLIE with formal on-the-job training of personnel. The results for March, which is the first reporting month, shows command-wide personnel trained in ALPHA to be 241, BRAVO 1221, and CHARLIE 238. The program is receiving intensive command interest and these monthly totals will expand greatly. The reporting cut-off date for the April figures is 10 May 1969, consequently, the above figures include only March 1969 statistics.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX G (C) USAICCV/ACofS, SUPPLY

1. (U) During the 89 day reporting period many projects initiated during Phase I of the Command and Control Improvement Program were continued and several new projects were introduced as part of Phase III of that program. These projects along with the implementation of the Standard supply System Vietnam (SSVN) have resulted in a marked improvement in the overall logistical posture. The IBM 360/50G Computer and auxiliary equipment which will be operational on or about 15 May 1969, will increase the responsiveness of the USAICCV Computer system to data demands on the supply system. The addition of new baking facilities has resulted in an increase in bakery production and a decrease in local bread procurement. Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&Cs) have been prepared and submitted for approval for necessary contractual services required in FY70. Vigorous action is continuing under the current cycle of the Excess Program to eliminate excess lines from in-country stocks. On 15 February 1969, the DSU/GSU Liaison Office was transferred from ACofS, Supply to the operational control of the ACofS, Maintenance. These and other significant activities will be discussed in this report.

2. (C) Enemy action against petroleum installations and facilities was substantial during the quarter, especially during the February-March Communist offensive. The 9th Division Class III supply point at Dong Tam was heavily damaged on the eve of the offensive of 23 February, resulting in the loss of one 3,000 bbl diesel tank and damage to three other 3,000 bbl tanks. Another rocket attack on Dong Tam on 9 March completely destroyed all but one of the remaining 3,000 bbl tanks, which was damaged. Collapsible storage tanks are in use pending reconstruction of the steel storage tanks. Tank Farm #2 at Qui Nhon was attacked by sappers on 20 March, resulting in the loss of three 10,000 bbl tanks, two 3,000 bbl tanks, over 500,000 gallons of fuel, and a considerable number of drums of oils and lubricants. The 250,000 bbl Vung Tau POL terminal was attacked by rockets on 21 March, resulting in the loss of one 10,000 bbl tank. The loss of these nine tanks, representing 3.5% of all Army steel tankage in Vietnam, will not significantly degrade the petroleum supply capability although it will limit the degree of flexibility of operations.

3. (U) The 13,000 bbl Army Tank Farm at Phu Hiep was placed in service on 9 March 1969 with manifolding into the Vung Ro Bay - Tuy Hoa pipeline. During April two 500 bbl tanks were erected at Cam Ly Airfield at Dalat and one 3,000 bbl tank was re-erected at Phan Thiet.

4. (U) Operation of Qui Nhon POL terminal was assumed by a Korean contractor, Tong Shin Enterprise, on 1 March 1969, thereby alleviating personnel shortages within the 240th Quartermaster Battalion (Petrol Opn) resulting from Program 6 Civilianization conversions.

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5. (C) Petroleum resupply in Qui Nhon Support Command was adversely affected in February by January destruction of the critical over-the-shore discharge pipeline feeding the Qui Nhon POL terminal and its vast distribution system to the interior of northern II CTZ. While engineer efforts proceeded toward the completion of a new 8" buried welded pipeline from T-2 jetty to the terminal, several emergency methods were employed to transfer fuel from inbound ocean tankers to the petroleum terminal and inland customers. However, continuous use of all alternate methods barely kept pace with the total consumption in northern II CTZ. Maximum continuous use of all alternate means included the constant availability of a commercial tanker on the POL jetty pumping continuously on the restricted "G" line, the availability of a shallow-draft petroleum vessel to discharge into the terminal through the two small submarine lines in the outer harbor, and the use of the Esso terminal to load military tank trucks for direct line haul deliveries. The first 8" welded discharge line became operational on 15 February and the Qui Nhon supply status has improved steadily since that date. By the end of March, stock status throughout the Qui Nhon Support Command was back to normal levels.

6. (U) During the month of April, speciality items were requisitioned for the 1969 Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday meals. The Thanksgiving items were requisitioned to arrive 15 October 1969, with the Christmas items arriving 15 November 1969. Special codes were utilized on the requisitions of the speciality type items to enable ready identification as holiday items. Additionally the CONUS supply source was requested to ship items by Sea-Van. A revised non-refrigerated subsistence forecast to meet RVN feeding requirements in II, III and IV CTZs during FY 70 was submitted to the U. S. Army Support Command, Chicago, Illinois. The revised forecast will be utilized in establishing firm budgetary, procurement and storage planning.

7. (U) To preclude the bunching up of CONUS reefer vessels at ports of call in RVN due to the close arrival of vessels under an eight day interval schedule, 1st Logistical Command revised delivery schedules which resulted in a ten day interval between vessels and extended the time in-country from 23 to 27 days. Changes in quantities requisitioned coincided with the new reefer schedule in March 1969.

8. (U) The requisitioning and management of refrigerated subsistence under the inventory in motion concept was implemented. This concept of inventory in motion of refrigerated subsistence involves a basic principle that there is an optimum stock level between the stockage objective (which is really never reached) and the safety level (below which you never go). This optimum level is known as the management level. Thus, the inventory is constantly in motion and turning over at a rapid rate

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if receipts and issues remain in balance. Basically, the following has been initiated:

a. Eggs will be requisitioned in a manner that results in a decrease of on-hand quantities to a six day supply prior to receipt of replenishment stocks (12 days) at depot level.

b. No stockage objective will be maintained at depot level on those items which appear but once during the 28 day cyclic menu. Troop issue requirements will be requisitioned to arrive 10 days prior to the period during which they will be consumed. A 15 day depot safety level for those items to meet resale requirements will be maintained.

c. Other refrigerated items consisting of frozen vegetables and juices, daily products, meats and poultry which appear more than once during the 28 day cyclic menu will be requisitioned using a 15 day depot safety level.

9. (U) A wall-to-wall physical inventory of Class I items on-hand in 1st Logistical Command depots and supply points was conducted during March 1969.

10. (U) New equipment was installed at the Chu Lai bakery during February. Within I Corps Tactical Zone, the Army operated bakeries located at Phu Bai and Chu Lai, while operational control of Quang Tri bakery was given to the Marines.

11. (U) The Long Binh bakery, damaged by fire in December, became fully operational during March. An increase from three to five ovens has increased production allowing a decrease in local procurement of bread.

12. (U) During March, six bakery ovens were received in-country to be utilized within Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands.

13. (U) On 15 February 1969, the DSU/GSU Liaison Office was transferred from the ACofS, Supply to the ACofS, Maintenance. Personnel from the ACofS, Supply operated the Instruct/Inspect Team (redesignated Instruct/Advise Team in early May 1969) throughout Vietnam. Team members made many significant contributions to improvement of maintenance and supply operations at all levels of the Command.

14. (U) On 21 February 1969, the USAICGV published the first in a series of 1st Logistical Command Direct Support Unit Bulletins. These Bulletins identify problem areas encountered by the Instruct/Inspect Teams and emphasize operational changes announced by 1st Logistical


Command and higher headquarters. These Bulletins have aided DSUs in improving operations, have ensured uniformity of operations throughout the Command and have contributed considerably to enhance maintenance and supply support to the combat soldier in the field.

15. (U) In February the Catalog Division began distribution of Recordak Model PS-1 Microfilm Readers to Theater activities requiring them. These activities included Support Commands, Depots, DSUs, the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam, and the Army Aviation Maintenance Center, Tan Son Nhut. Of 124 readers received, 92 have been distributed to units requiring them.


16. (U) Reference Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1 Nov 1968 - 31 Jan 69, Annex G, ACoS, Supply, paragraph 31 (3). Of the 42,000 stock numbers which were recorded on the Availability Balance File (ABF), but not on the Army Master Data File (AMDF) Skeleton as of 31 January 1969, 21,000 have been processed by Catalog Division of the Support Operations Directorate. Processed records were corrected if necessary and re-posted to the ABF. All 21,000 records have been posted to the AMDF Skeleton.



17. (U) The charts below relate the following: Red Ball requisitions activity shows the number of Red Ball requisitions processed compared with the number passed; redistribution of supplies reflects the cumulative lines and dollar value of supplies distributed among the in-country depots; depot tonnage Class II & IX shows the tonnage on-hand, shipped and received; depot tonnage Class IV shows tonnage on-hand, shipped and received.

RED BALL REQUISITION ACTIVITY



REDISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES





18. (U) The new IBM Computer 360/50G was received on 27 April 1969. Installation of the equipment is in progress with a completion target date of 15 May 1969. Courses of instruction on the new equipment were presented by IBM representatives for programmers and operators. Teams of operators and programmers are being sent to Sattahip Thailand Depot for "hands on" training on a similar computer configuration. These same teams are also providing production jobs and systems tests that can not be accomplished on the over saturated 7010 computer system. After the 360/50 is fully operational a noticeable reduction in delays in the supply system will be realized due to the increase in data capability. The USAICCV data center will be more responsive to the demands on the supply system.

19. (U) The Vietnamese data processing intern program has proven so successful with the first group that it has been expanded from five to eleven students. The new group of six students is progressing in Phase I. The original group of five students continues in Phase III (systems analysis).

20. (U) The Command Excess Program continued through the reporting period.

a. Movement of excess stock from 1st Logistical Command Depots was accelerated in December 1967, when command attention was directed and maintained throughout a six phased program. This program categorized depot excesses by line item, dollar value and whether the item qualified for stockage or was an immediate candidate for excessing action by virtue of being fringe. Results of the six phase program to date is indicated by shipment out-of-country of 59,088 line items.

b. Completion of wall-to-wall inventories by all depots in January 1969 uncovered additional excess stock. This, along with the shipment of stocks to Vietnam that the USAICCV considered cancelled and a change in stock retention levels from three times the requisitioning objective to 1.8 of the requisitioning objective, left a considerable volume of excess depot stock yet to be moved out-of-country. Retrograde/disposal of depot excesses is a viable program, tailored to fit current conditions and the capacity of depots to properly store and issue stocks to customers. Excessing procedures and actions are keyed to prompt removal of depot excesses from storage areas. Bulk of depot excesses are retrograded to 2d Log Comd, with certain items shipped to designated storage sites in CONUS. Formal reporting under AR 755-1 has been waived for USARV.

c. Vigorous action is continuing under the current cycle and clean sweep Excess Program to eliminate excess lines from in-country stocks.

A cyclic excess run has been accomplished in April resulting in 18,944 documents being forwarded to the Depots for action with a dollar value of \$144,061,635.

21. (U) Operation Stop/See was initiated in September 1968 to expand Project Stop. It was designed as a program for the selection, cancellation and frustration of certain commodities being received in Vietnam beyond current requirements or the ability of USARV and 1st Log Command to handle and store.

a. The items involved in this operation are such categories as office and billet furniture, office supplies, paper and mess products, and many items of Engineer Class IV commodities; bulky, "space eating" commodities; "nice to have" items, non-essential to the furtherance of the war effort and additionally, bulk items not currently needed nor needed in the immediate future.

b. When the lists are compiled they are distributed to all major support and transportation headquarters in CONUS and the support commands in Vietnam. The CONUS headquarters are instructed to cancel all requisitions and frustrate all shipments on the Stop/See list. Support commands are instructed to inspect all incoming shipments for Stop/See items and return them without unloading if possible, if not, to stage them at the port for immediate retrograde.

c. As of 30 April 1969 the Stop/See list was comprised of 165,658 federal stock numbers (FSNs) and the following actions had been effected: Confirmed cancellations, \$56,087,573; frustrations, \$9,554,302; diversions/transshipments, \$4,966,072.

22. (U) It was observed that a direct line of communication from major commanders to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, was needed to facilitate coordination of supply and technical data and detect supply system faults at all echelons of supply. The Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) was implemented by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 1 September 1968 to effect this coordination. The purpose of the CCIL is to have each major commander identify and report those items of supply or services which are adversely affecting the accomplishment of the unit's mission or which will become a problem of serious consequence in the near future. Once identified and reported to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, these items are thoroughly reviewed by the appropriate staff elements, or the respective item managers in the case of supply problems, and a report rendered outlining what supply or service actions will be needed to get the supplies to the unit. For those supply items identified by the item managers as critical theater-wide, command channel messages are dispatched

to the respective CONUS supply source requesting assistance and expedited actions. Currently of the 26 units solicited, 23 are participating. While still new, this program has produced outstanding results in providing the best combat service support to the tactical units within USARV. As of 30 April 1969, 1,161 items have been reported under the CCIL program. The total lines in process are expected to stabilize near this level. Part of the program is a periodic reconciliation with reporting organizations to delete those items no longer critical. The percent of fill for completed actions thus far is approximately 77 percent. Through this program the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, is able to review those supplies and services which adversely effect the accomplishment of the tactical commander's mission and initiate appropriate command level actions.

23. (U) Certain items of equipment and supplies vital to combat or combat support operations in Vietnam were frequently in short supply at in-country DSU/GSUs and depots on a recurring basis. Project Fill was implemented in October 1968 to inform CONUS of these items of equipment and supplies, and to correct this short supply problem. The procedure is for the DSU/GSUs and 1st Logistical Command depots to identify and report to the USAICCV those PLL and ASL items which continuously reflect a zero balance and for which there is a high frequency of Red Ball or other high priority demands. Lists are consolidated by the USAICCV and forwarded to AMC, DSA, LCO-P and the NICPs on an accelerated basis. Currently 3,300 lines are on the Fill list. On 2 December 1968, LC Regulation 760-27, "Project Fill - Reduction of Zero Balances for Critical Items (RCS AVCA GL-48)" was published which established policies and procedures for the specification and reporting of critical items. Through intensive management, this project will result in fewer high priority requisitions and will reduce zero balances due to improved supply status for the items on the list.

24. (U) Excesses were being identified and shipped from forward units at the cost of considerable handling by the depots. Project Thru-Put was implemented on 23 October 1968 to reduce the handling of excess items being retrograded. 1st Logistical Command message 38308, subject: "Retrograde of Excesses" was sent to all subordinate commands and outlined the requirements for the retrograde of depot excesses and a procedure for the moving of excesses from all forward units direct to point of destination. The procedure established is for all forward units having excesses to notify the area support command and request assistance for identification and transportation of the excesses. Upon notification, the support commands furnish a special team to assist the units, and after an on-site review, support command representatives arrange for the delivery of critical supplies within the support command. For the supplies not required at the support command DSUs, a request is forwarded direct to the USAICCV for

for disposition instructions.

a. Authority to provide disposition instructions for items with extended line item value of less than \$25.00 has been delegated to support command commanders. Excess list continue to be received in a variety of formats based on capability of the individual units. DSUs equipped with NCR-500 equipment normally submit list prepared on that equipment. Units with key punch capabilities normally submit listings printed on IBM-1005 equipment available in the area. Other units submit typewritten or hand written lists.

b. The following indicates the number of lines submitted by DSU/GSUs and processed by IECV since January 1969:

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr (thru 21st)
1st Log Units	*	*	*	6,419
Div Units	*	*	*	<u>4,099</u>
Total	6,111	9,150	3,353	10,518

* Lines reported were not recorded separately by 1st Log Units and Division Units prior to 1 April 1969.

25. (U) During the period September 1968 through January 1969, the 1st Logistical Command executed Project COUNT; a complete inventory of all stocks on-hand at all supply echelons within the command. The updating of all supply records within the command was a first, and succeeded in reducing warehouse denial rates and increasing customer satisfaction throughout the theater. Project COUNT II is a program for maintaining and further improving the results of Project COUNT, and was begun at all command depots and DSU's/GSU's during the month of February.

a. The concept of Project COUNT II requires an accelerated 100 percent cyclic inventory to be conducted throughout the command every six months. The first of these is scheduled for completion by 31 July this year. The program is designed to permit centralized control and reporting. All depots will be inventorying FSCs in the same order throughout the period. With the lessons learned from Project COUNT, and the present improved data base, Project COUNT II will insure that all supply data and records are current and accurate. Further reduction of excesses, supply pipelines, and number of high-priority requisition can also be expected.

b. The first month of the Project as utilized for the implementation of new inventory computer programs, limited rewarehousing and the conducting of complete locator surveys with service tape updating at all command depots. The presence of three AMC inventory advisors, one at each US Army Depot, assisted immeasurably during the months of March and April in the areas of: initial implementation of the count, OJT of personnel, revision of inventory policies and procedures, and dissemination of inventory-oriented logistical intelligence to appropriate personnel, to include the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. As of the middle of April, nineteen cyclic reports had been received from command depots, with a total of approximately 90,000 lines counted thus far. During this same period, approximately 73,000 lines had been counted at the command's DSU/GSU.

c. Those stocks inventoried thus far fall mainly into one or more of the following categories:

- (1) Likely candidates for retrograde (primarily excesses).
- (2) Bulk space-consuming supplies (mainly in outside storage).
- (3) "Hard-to-inventory" stocks.

d. These stocks above encompass the great volume of supplies, but not however, the bulk of federal stock numbers.

26. (U) During Project Count, it was ascertained that a large percentage of the stock on-hand at the depots was in less than condition A or in unclassified condition. Project Condition was initiated in December 1968 to place a more systematic emphasis on the condition coding of these supplies, and to purify condition data of materiel assets at each depot. Project Condition consists of two basic phases. The first phase is closely associated with Project Count II, the continuation of the effort to further purify and update all supply records, and will be implemented by Count II personnel during the physical count of supplies in storage. The task involved will be the separation of all stock counted into two categories; those which are obviously Condition Code A items and all others which will be designated as Code J. Phase II will consist of the condition coding of all incoming depot stocks as either Code A or Code K; Code K being all receipts which are obviously not condition Code A. Quality control technicians will inspect all J and K coded materiel to determine the correct condition code of the materiel. Materiel thus inspected and coded will be reviewed by stock control personnel to determine requirements and to recommend priorities for Care and Preservation.

Materiel not immediately required by depot customers will be reported to the USAICCV, which will collate all data thus received and make determination of priorities for the theater wide Care and Preservation program. The Project was implemented on 1 Feb 69 and data is presently being collected.

27. (U) Variations in depot procedures and the need to standardize resulted in the publication and implementation of seven regulations governing the various depot functions. Project Same, initiated in August 1968, has the intent of providing detailed guidance for standardization of depot operational procedures. The regulations published apply to all US Army Depots in the Republic of Vietnam and effect the USAICCV operations. They will be transferred into a chapter of the manual. Regulations published during the period were:

a. DA 740-4, "Care and Preservation of Supplies and Equipment". This regulation implements TM 38-230 and TM 743-200 and provides basic instructions, policies, and responsibilities for the establishment and implementation of a standard care, preservation and maintenance program of supplies in storage, to assure that supplies are maintained in a serviceable condition. It further provides instructions for packing, marking and utilization of general supplies for shipment.

b. DA 740-5 "Locator Systems/Procedures". This regulation prescribes the policies, responsibilities, and procedures for standard stock location system. The system is designed to effect accelerated selection of stock for shipment; accurate, efficient, and rapid storage of receipts; and to insure that data on location records and stocks in storage locations are in constant agreement.

c. DA 740-6, "Dry Batteries - Testing, Storage and Distribution". This regulation prescribes policies and procedures for testing, storage and distribution of dry batteries (FSC 6135).

28. (U) Project Orange Ball has been implemented to provide a more economical and efficient means of delivering dry Batteries to the user. The initial efforts of the project were directed toward developing a system for delivering dry batteries directly from Japan to the using unit or supporting DSU in special refrigerated containers. After two test runs, the direct delivery system appeared to be logistically unsound for South Vietnam due to the lack of flexibility. The system now implemented requires a low volume high velocity supply line passing through Class I channels from the Command Depots to the using units. Refrigeration requirements will be minimized by the high velocity feature of the system since only the safety level of 15 days

of supply at Command Depots would require refrigeration.

29. (u) During the months of February, March and April the Support Commands submitted Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&C) to cover contractual services required in FY 70.

a. The following PR&C's have been staffed within 1st Logistical Command and have been forwarded to HQ, USARV for approval:

(1) Engineer Construction Material Yard, Care and Preservation Facility, and Motor Vehicle Park at Cam Ranh Bay Depot.

(2) Engineer Construction Material Yard, Long Binh Depot.

(3) Care and Preservation Facility, Qui Nhon Depot.

b. The following PR&C's have been received, processed by the AGOIS, Supply and are in various stages of staffing within 1st Logistical Command:

(1) Care and Preservation Facility, Long Binh Depot.

(2) Engineer Construction Material Yard, Qui Nhon Depot.

c. A decision was made to phase out, effective 30 June 1969, the contractor operated Non-Standard Repair Parts Warehouse and have the operation of this facility be assumed by Long Binh Depot.

d. Following a review of the performance of the Engineer Construction Material Yard operated by Philco Ford at Qui Nhon it was determined by the 1st Logistical Command Contract Performance Board of Review that:

(1) The contractor (Philco Ford) operating the Engineer Construction Material Yard should perform all the material handling operations inside the yard.

(2) The Government should attempt to furnish all equipment needed in the operation of the yard, but if after checking the Army supply system and determining that the equipment is unavailable, the contracting officer should authorize the contractor to purchase the equipment for the Government account.

e. A decision was made to limit the operation of the Engineer Construction Material Yard at Vung Tau to a storage area for bulky,

high tonnage Class IV supplies for FY 70. Vung Tau will operate as a storage location of Long Binh ECMI with the stock control function for both areas being handled by Long Binh Depot.

30. (U) Army Field Stock Record Support to United States Army, Vietnam Direct Support/General Support Units (DSU/GSU) was successfully implemented in April 1969. DSU/GSUs are furnished catalog changes, additions and/or deletions to their Authorized Stockage List's (ASL) on a monthly basis. File inserts and pre-punched requisition cards on each current ASL item are given to units having manual system. All DSU/GSUs will receive a complete ASL listing with interchangeable and substitute data quarterly. Semi-annual broadcasts of a unit's entire ASL will be made using title inserts for manual systems and response cards for mechanized systems.

31. (U) Standard Supply System, Vietnam (3SVN) was modified to recognize the use of purpose/subpurpose codes other than General Issue Stock (AAA) and condition codes other than Serviceable and Issuable to all Customers Without Limitation (A).

32. (U) Demand analysis and RO computation programs were run for the first time since implementation of 3SVN. An evaluation of the results of this program has not been accomplished but will be during the next reporting period.

33. (U) Development of the Depot Stock Status Report (AR 711-80) was completed during the month of April. Because of a shortage of computer time the programs were taken to Cam Ranh Bay for production of the report.

34. (U) In order to establish controls upon the accountability of unserviceable assets within Vietnam, Project Asset Control was established. Prior to the establishment of this program, there was no provision in the supply system for taking unserviceable, reparable equipment into account as theater assets. The project provides for the recording of reparable end items and components on the Availability Balance File (ABF) and allows the items to be managed at the USAICCV much as serviceable items are managed. The end items are accounted for throughout their evacuation. When the item arrives at the CC&S activity, it is recorded on the depot ABF and, through the normal system, is reported to the USAICCV. Here the commodity manager determines disposition of the item. He is able to take such things as theater stockage position and maintenance repair or rebuild capability into account in reaching this determination. This procedure applies to all economically reparable items, including reparable components and parts recovered from Code H (condemned) end items, except Closed Loop and Automatic Return items.

35. (U) There was a significant problem in managing those items which could not be identified readily to a specific Material Category (Mat Cat). To alleviate this problem, a separate branch was created within the USAICCV whose sole function is to manage these nonstandard items. The Nonstandard Items Branch will manage an item until it is identified to a specific Mat Cat, at which time it will be assigned to the appropriate commodity manager. The types of items most involved are PSYOPS peculiar items, special services items, and those items of repair parts which are peculiar to engineer construction equipment. In addition, the current contractor operated Nonstandard Repair Parts Depot will be closed out as of 30 June and stocks will be transferred to the US Army Depot at Long Binh, which has been designated as the key depot for nonstandard items. The management of these repair parts will be the responsibility of the Nonstandard Items Branch. It is anticipated that the branch will be responsible for managing some 23,000 line items at the beginning of FY 70.

36. (U) Project LEVELS was initiated during February 1969, to determine actual OST between DSU and depot. If the actual OST proved to be less than the 15 days currently authorized it would be reduced accordingly. Such a reduction would decrease the RO, and consequently reduce on-hand stocks to the quantity required to provide support.

a. Two DSUs from each support command were selected as test units. Each test unit computed the OST for each receipt during the 30 day test period, and submitted this information to the 1st Logistical Command for analysis.

b. Analysis of the data revealed that actual OST was greater than the 15 days authorized. Further study is underway to determine the feasibility of either increasing OST across the board or authorizing each DSU to use an OST equivalent to the actual OST they experience.

37 (U) Project CASTLES & FLAGS was initiated in November 1968. The purpose of the project is twofold: To reduce on-hand stocks of construction material to the quantity required, and to prevent unauthorized requisitioning of construction materials. These objectives are being accomplished by the following means:

a. Construction material requirements are reviewed at the USAICCV to assure necessary cancellation action when requirements have been modified or no longer exist.

b. Construction material requisitions, which must be passed out-of-country, are intensively reviewed by USAIDCV commodity managers to assure validity of requirements. If questions surrounding the requisitions cannot be resolved, the requisitions are passed to a disinterested senior officer. If the requisitions cannot be justified at this level, they are passed to the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

c. Requisitions for construction material, at all levels of supply, will bear the signature of the installation engineer or appropriate individual at the supporting engineer agency, whichever is applicable.

d. USARV will soon publish a regulation establishing guidelines for CASTLES & FLAGS. This regulation will be implemented by a 1st Logistical Command Regulation.

38. (U) The original Project Clean (Section I, Annex G, para 3d of the ORLL for the period 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 69) was significantly successful to the extent that it was decided to establish the project on a cyclic basis. On a cyclic basis the accuracy of the NCR 500 ledger cards at the DSU/GSUs can be assured. Under this program, a 100 percent manual review of the ledger cards will be accomplished quarterly, with any necessary reconciliations made as a result of the review. The first cyclic review is to be completed at the end of the 4th quarter, FY 69. The theater results of the project at the end of this reporting period are:

Cards Reviewed	109,188
Total Errors Detected	31,963
No. Requisitions Cancelled	37,277
Value of Requisitions Cancelled	\$19,004,831
No. Requisitions Initiated	8,739
Value of Requisitions Initiated	\$ 1,672,264
Value of Excess Generated	\$ 4,176,675

39. (U) The Demand Analysis Program (Section I, Annex G, para 3. b. of the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69) has been continued. Based on additional analysis, the depot

stockage criteria was increased to five demands in 360 days. Future planning calls for the increase of the stockage criteria to six demands in 360 days. This increase will take place at the beginning of FY 70 if further study warrants it.

40. (U) Strength authorization of the USAICCV was modified to reflect 12 Program 6 civilization spaces under TDA P5 W2ZYAA01 dated 18 December 1968, effective 1 February 1969. There are currently authorized 70 Officers, 6 Warrant Officers, 297 Enlisted Personnel, 184 Department of the Army Civilians and 110 Local Nationals.

a. Actual strength: Currently the assigned strength is: 70 Officers, 5 Warrant Officers, 307 Enlisted Personnel, 169 Department of the Army civilians and 24 additional TDY DAC for periods ranging from 90 to 180 days TDY, and 107 Local Nationals.

b. The figures presented above reflect a true picture of overall strength; however, the current shortage of 6 Programmers in the Directorate of Data Processing imposes a heavy work load on the personnel presently assigned to that Directorate. Continued emphasis should be placed on the recruitment of qualified DAC Programmers for one year tour assignments.

41. (U) A complete 100% Physical Inventory of the U. S. Army Inventory Control Center was started on 1 February 1969, and completed in mid-March 1969. All property not reflected on the Property Book was picked up, hand receipts up-dated and all excesses returned to supply channels. USAICCV Regulation 735-36 was drafted and published to provide a standardized procedure for supply transactions in relation to physical property. In addition, the following significant events took place:

a. An overall increase in the quality and variety of food served in the Mess Hall was experienced.

b. A project of interior re-modeling was started the first week of March 1969, to improve the operation and attractiveness of the Mess Hall.

c. All Kitchen Police were put on the Civilian Personnel Office Payroll, eliminating the need for monthly collections from the enlisted men.

d. The appearance and mechanical condition of the vehicles organic to the Inventory Control Center has improved by the addition of a wash rack, a Technical Inspection Station, a three-bay work area, and a grease rack.

e. The period of the Post-Tet Offensive in February, demonstrated the heavy dependency on Local Nationals, and the need to maintain rosters in the event access to Long Binh Post is denied Local Nationals.

f. The Physical Security of the Inventory Control Center is adequate, and during daylight hours the security force can be reduced 75 - 80% to release people for work or rest, as appropriate.

g. A complete re-modeling of the barracks was started on 1 February 1969, to eliminate individual and odd-sized rooms. Officer Platoon Leaders were appointed to maintain better control of the various platoons and sections.


h. At the present time, the barracks are being organized by duty sections to provide firmer control and bring the Non-Commissioned Officers in the duty sections closer to his men in their living environment.

i. A Soldier of the Month Board has been started to provide recognition to outstanding soldiers in this unit, and to provide better unit morale by recognition of our better soldiers. The Soldier of the Month from the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam receives a \$10.00 check from the Central Post Fund and a three-day pass to the in-country recreation center at Vung Tau.


j. In March 1969, a project was started to improve the appearance and safety of the Company Area to further improve the Health, Welfare and Morale of the enlisted members of this organization.

ANNEX E (U) ACoS, MAINTENANCE

1. (U) During the 89 day period from 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969, certain items such as tanks, personnel carriers, self-propelled and towed artillery achieved a very high level of operational readiness (See graphs in Section 1, part 1). However, the operational readiness rates of some items of equipment did not attain this same level of excellence. Dead-line rates fell below the MACV standards in a number of areas due to constant usage, poor climatic conditions and overage equipment. To alleviate this situation, several programs were initiated to improve the operational readiness of the equipment in the hands of the tactical units. Below are the operational readiness rates for rough terrain and commercial forklifts, 20 ton cranes, full tracked tractors, tactical wheeled vehicles and generators:




EQUIPMENT FULL TRACKED TRACTOR




FOR	17	14	17	18	21	20	19	18	17	20		
O.S	4	3	5	7	11	11	9	10	8	9		
FOR	13	11	12	11	10	9	10	8	9	11		

EQUIPMENT WHEELED TRACTOR




FOR	13	14	16	13	19	20	20	19	20	20		
O.S	3	4	4	5	11	11	9	9	9	9		
FOR	10	10	12	8	8	9	11	10	11	11		


EQUIPMENT TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES




EQUIPMENT GENERATOR, 5KV A-D OVER




EQUIPMENT COMMERCIAL FORKLIFT



EQUIPMENT ROUGH TERRAIN & TRUCK MOUNTED CRANE, 20 TON






2. (U) Repair and Return (R&R) Maintenance Support for M107/110 Artillery Weapons:

a. The R&R concept calls for the evacuation of a weapon to one of the 12 R&R centers for one week of intensified maintenance on a quarterly basis. The artillery crew will accompany the weapon and perform the service. Direct support unit personnel will advise, assist and train the weapon crew. All necessary support maintenance will also be performed during this week.

b. During the past quarter the R&R program serviced 56 weapons and trained 392 personnel.

c. Cumulative totals of production in the R&R program show that since the program was initiated in November 1968, 131 weapons have been serviced and 917 personnel have been trained.

ARTILLERY REPAIR AND RETURN PROGRAM



————— Programmed
 - - - - - Completed

3. (U) M107/110 Phase II Product Improvement Program.

a. The Phase II program consists of 23 modifications to the existing M107/110 configuration. Included in these modifications are a new access door to the fuel filters, an improved air filter access door, a surge tank for the coolant system and a positive ramming modification on the loader rammer.

b. A training team from the M107/110 Project Manager's Office gave training classes to teams from the four support commands and the US Marine Corps at Long Binh, RVN. These classes started on 21 April and lasted until 1 May. Two M107/110 chassis were completely modified during the training period.

c. The personnel trained to perform the modification have returned to their units. They will begin their own modification program as soon as the modification kits are received from CONUS. Current plans call for this command to modify approximately half of the M107/110 vehicles in-country. The remaining vehicles will be modified during CONUS rebuild.

4. (U) XM 706, Armored Car.

a. The first shipment of armored cars arrived in-country in March. Twenty of these vehicles were in the initial issue. Seventeen were issued to the 720th MP Battalion and three to the 25th MP Company. This is new equipment for which no new equipment training was provided.

b. Action was taken to familiarize supervisory personnel and a field maintenance technician with the new equipment. On receipt of the armored cars, the field maintenance technician gave assistance to personnel at the deprocessing points. Further assistance was provided to the receiving units. A trip was made to the 704th Maintenance Battalion to discuss problems they had encountered with the version (V-100) they have on loan from ARVN. As a result of the coordination, few problems, other than repair parts supply, have been encountered.

5. (U) A generator operator training and maintenance program was initiated by USARV direction on 6 February 1969.

a. Several factors led up to this requirement.

(1) Operating conditions in Vietnam have dictated a high generator usage.

(2) Many generator sets are old and have exceeded the time between overhaul (TBO).

(3) The demand for generators has exceeded supply capabilities.

(4) Inexperienced, improperly trained, or inadequately supervised operators have contributed to many generator failures.

b. Each support command was tasked with developing a training program tailored to their specific needs, and actual commencement of training started on 25 February 1969.

c. Technical representatives from the Customer Assistance Office, Vietnam are aiding the support commands in both lesson preparation and actual instruction.

d. Criteria for measuring the success of this program will be deadline rates as reflected in the USAFV Weekly Command Deadline Report. Conclusive evidence of improvement has not yet been noted.

6. (U) A training program for 6,000 and 10,000 pound, rough terrain (RT) forklift operators was initiated on 8 February 1969.

a. The above training program was initiated because of the lack of experienced operators for RT forklifts in the Republic of Vietnam. This training also covers operator maintenance procedures. The training program was necessitated by the low operational readiness (OR) rates of forklifts throughout the 1st Logistical Command.

b. An operator's guide (pocket size) was developed by Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and has been distributed to all support commands. This guide was locally reproduced in the quantity required by each support command.

c. A series of classes on maintenance and operation of the 6,000 and 10,000 pound RT forklifts is being conducted. Local National personnel who are employed to operate these forklifts are also given this training. The effect of this program on the OR rate of this command has not been determined, although increased interest and emphasis on operation and maintenance of this equipment is evident.

7. (U) The XM3, aircraft mounted personnel detector was introduced into the country during April 1969.

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Maintenance was responsible for initiated and monitoring a maintenance program for this equipment.

b. The 578th Light Maintenance Company (LEM Co) was assigned maintenance responsibilities in I and II Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The 147th LEM Co assumed responsibilities in the III and IV CTZ.

c. A one year supply of repair parts was furnished with the equipment. These repair parts are being stored at and used by the LEM companies.

Since the required repair parts are already on hand in the LEM companies, the need for passing action is eliminated. With no passing action between US units in Vietnam and CONUS depots, requirements for future repair parts procurement could not be determined. For this reason, a report was established to inform CONUS depots of parts consumption data so that procurement action can be initiated for future requirements.

d. It should be possible to utilize normal requisitioning procedures within a year of introduction of the personnel detector.

8. (U) An Ad Hoc committee was formed in April to study problems which may be encountered in the support of D7E full tracked tractors.

a. USARV Engineer supply and maintenance personnel and 1st Logistical Command supply and maintenance personnel will study the support problem from a standpoint of supply and maintenance, determine inadequacies, make recommendations and take necessary actions to alleviate any unsatisfactory conditions encountered.

b. Failure to properly requisition non-standard parts, incomplete demand data on many parts, cannibalization in lieu of requisitioning and failure to record demand data on Closed Loop Support assemblies prompted the formation of the Ad Hoc committee.

c. The first phase of this program is under way. A message has been sent to using and support units requesting that action be taken to reconstruct demand data on critical parts for the last three months. This reconstruction data will then be used by supply to set up more realistic requisition objectives.

9. (U) Introduction of Jiffy Bags.

a. The Jiffy Bag concept of mailing electronic modules to CONUS for repair was introduced to the field during the last ORILL period.

b. This method has been well received in the field and is now a proven procedure in the recovery of expensive electronic modules.

c. The Jiffy Bag has expedited the return of the electronic modules to CONUS because the bag is pre-printed and an individual module may be shipped immediately without waiting for an accumulation of items for a bulk shipment.

d. Although there is no method to determine the dollar value to measure the effectiveness of this program versus the conventional method of shipment, field reports by technical assistance personnel estimate a 30% increase in module return to CONUS.

10. (U) AN/PPS-5 Radar Set Modification Program.

a. US Army Electronics Command has developed an MWO which will prevent pin damage to the connectors on the Remote Control Cable and the B Scanner assemblage.

b. There are approximately 200 sets to be modified and due to man-hour requirements and the recommended maintenance environmental conditions the MWO will be performed in CONUS.

c. 1st Logistical Command, in coordination with USARV, has established an MWO program to commence in June 1969. The rate of exchange and the time required to complete the program depend on ECOMs new input of modified radar sets. The new input of radar sets will be credited against TO&E shortages upon completion of the MWO program.

d. This modification should eliminate approximately 45% of the AN/PPS-5 malfunctions.


11. (U) AN/GRC-106 Radio Set Series Modification Program.

a. The US Army Electronics Command has developed and approved nine modifications to be installed in the RT662 Receiver/Transmitter and AM 3349 Amplifier.

b. Policies and procedures for accomplishing the MWO program are being developed now in coordination with USARV and ECOM. Plans will be finalized during a conference currently scheduled for 12 - 16 May at Sacramento Army Depot.

c. The modification of approximately 2000 sets will commence during the second quarter of FY 70.

d. This modification should reduce the percentage of deadlined sets.



12. (U) Radar Chronograph, M-36 Technical Assistance.

a. The radar chronograph was introduced in USAFV in September 1968. At that time the New Equipment Introductory Team provided briefings, operator and maintenance training. However, this trained base was depleted through normal rotation of personnel to CONUS and the deadline rate was increasing at an abnormal and unacceptable rate. Under the provisions of technical assistance regulations a request for assistance was submitted through channels to USAFECOM to provide a knowledgeable technician capable of providing operator and maintenance training. Mr. Samuel Scalzo arrived in Vietnam on 16 February 1969.

b. This technical assistance visit has provided the following benefits:

(1) The deadline trend has reversed and has now reached an acceptable level.

(2) Operator personnel were trained informally at fire support bases through demonstrations in employing the chronograph and the actual calibration of weapons.

(3) Maintenance personnel were given refresher training in repair techniques and assistance with chronograph deadlined in the shops.

c. A requirement is being established for complete technical assistance on a fiscal year basis for the operation and support of this equipment until trained operator and maintenance personnel can be provided from USACONARC schools.

13. (U) Marine Maintenance Activities. The procurement of repair parts from CONUS continues to be a major problem. It has been alleviated somewhat by the assignment of a bulk fund to San Francisco Procurement Agency (SFPA) for the purchase of repair parts when parts are not available through normal supply channels. USARV vessels are equipped with obsolete machinery for which, in most cases, repair parts are no longer manufactured and are not in the government supply system. Some of these parts can be purchased from vendors in CONUS or removed from vessels in storage and shipped to complete the repair of tugs in shipyards. Some parts are being manufactured locally to expedite the repairs and removal from deadline status. US Army Materiel Command is presently making a study to expedite the procurement and shipment of parts required for deadlined vessels. USAMECOM message dated 20 March 1969 requested hull numbers of vessels in shipyards past required delivery date and the reason for delay. This information is being furnished so action can be taken to expedite supply response.

14. (U) Command Maintenance Management Inspections. During the reporting period the 1st Logistical Command Command Maintenance Management Inspection Teams accomplished 71 annual inspections. Fifty-four inspections (76%) were rated satisfactory and 17 inspections (24%) were rated unsatisfactory. The primary contributors to the unsatisfactory ratings were the areas of maintenance management and operations.


15. (U) Command Maintenance Management Reinspections. A total of 27 Command Maintenance Management Reinspections were accomplished during the reporting period. Twenty five units received a satisfactory rating for the reinspection. Two units failed the reinspection.

16. (U) Roadside Spot Check Inspections. During the period of February, March and April a total of 863 roadside spot check inspections were accomplished. Of the vehicles inspected, 392 (45%) were satisfactory. Vehicles rated as unsatisfactory were found lacking in operator and organizational maintenance.

ANNEX I (U) ACofS, TRANSPORTATION


1. (U) During the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969, 1st Logistical Command transportation units handled an average of 1,118,153 STONs of cargo per month.



Total Cargo Handled by 1st Logistical Ports
Thousands STONs



The above tonnages include military discharge and outload, Sea-Land discharge and outload, and USAID cargo. Project STOP SEE continued to influence the amount of tonnage arriving in-country which accounts for the general downward trend of cargo handled beginning in November 1968. Average monthly performance by highway in this reporting period totaled 749,371 STONs of cargo, 51,917 passengers, and 25,22,470 gallons of POL. The percentage of cargo transported by the military in line haul, local haul and port and beach clearance follows:

(%) Line Haul





2. (U) Port Operations

a. During the reporting period maximum effort was exerted to raise the throughput capability of the Cat Lai ammunition system. Throughput improvements have been attributed to redistribution of MHE at Cat Lai ammunition system barge sites and the 3rd Ord Depot, completion of Bien Hoa barge site, flexible barge input into the system, establishment of ammunition management levels at each site, and realignment of personnel to insure maximum supervision of operations. As throughput capability was increased, vessel turnaround time decreased, until in March the average was 7.2 days as compared to 9.3 days during the last quarterly reporting period (November 1968 to January 1969).

b. Several port construction projects were begun during the reporting period which will improve port efficiency. They are as follows:

(1) On 8 April 1969, construction began on a buoy renovation project at Cat Lai. The three buoys presently located at Cat Lai will be completely renovated and a 4th buoy will be added. Barge buoys will be

renovated and increased from 3 to 5. Completion of this project in August 1969 will increase the discharge capability of Cat Lai to 2350 STONS per day.

(2) In March construction began on renovation of two barge sites at Cogido. The project is scheduled to be completed in June and will increase Cogido capability to 1850 STONS per day. Included in this project is the addition of 5 barge buoys which will increase the management level of barges at Cogido to meet expanded discharge capability of the site.

(3) Maintenance and turning basin dredging began at Newport during April. With the completion of this dredging, O/A 1 June, Newport will have the capability of handling C/4 type vessels up to 600 feet in length and deep draft pier number 1 will be able to accommodate vessels with 30 feet of draft. Before the initiation of the turning basin project, vessels longer than 520 feet were restricted from calling at Newport. Silting and sedimentation has reduced the water depth at Newport deep draft pier #1 to 18 feet. The ability of Newport to handle C/4 type vessels will reduce the requirement for berthing these vessels at Saigon commercial piers and will reduce discharge costs in that vessels can be discharged at pier side rather than to barges which require towing and double handling at Newport.

(4) The repair and renovation of the military piers at Saigon port will increase the work area and increase port capability to handle a greater volume of truck traffic engaged in port clearance.

c. By applying intensive management practices and cargo handling principles, the port of Cam Ranh Bay was able to reduce vessel turnaround time from 11.5 days in November to a low of 2.2 days in March. As a result, vessels held in Subic Bay were virtually eliminated.

d. No outstanding problems were experienced by 1st Logistical Command ports during the Tet holidays or during the ensuing post Tet offensive.

3. (U) Rail:

a. The Vietnam Railway System (VNRS) transported 68,481.2 STONS of military cargo in support of U.S. and FWMAF during the 89 day period from 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969. The Chop Chai/Tuy Hoa passenger service transported a monthly average of 87,333.3 passengers in support of Tuy Hoa AFB.

b. There were no major restoration projects during this reporting period, however, 173 working days of a possible 267 were spent repairing damage caused by enemy interdiction. A total of 53 incidents occurred this reporting period compared to 69 the last reporting period. There was an increase from 14 to 24 incidents in the large tonnage division from Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa/Phu Hiep area. An increase in PCI pipeline fires adjacent to the Qui Nhon/Phu Cat line critically reduced the tonnage transported by rail in support of Phu Cat Air Force Base.

c. The ARVN Rail Security Battalions have now reached their authorized strength in officers and 95% of their authorized enlisted strength. The new officers are inexperienced and will require training and exposure.

d. A passenger service for Local National employees at Long Binh Post scheduled to start on 1 May 1969, has been delayed for 30 days. A passenger service for RMK employees will begin on 5 May 1969, from Saigon to Thu Duc and will transport approximately 1500 passengers a day. This service was established following a poll of the employees and the official sanction of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and Three Corps Tactical Zone Commander.

e. In March 1969, "Operation Flying Flat Car" was initiated as a two phase operation to air lift 25 land locked flat cars from Muong Man to Nha Trang. Phase One succeeded in removing five and one half cars in a two day operation using CH54 flying cranes and a barge grounded off the coast of Phan Thiet (to make the rail car air transportable, it was necessary to disassemble the cars and carry the trucks in one lift and the remaining components in the second lift). In April, Phase Two removed the remaining rolling stock using CH54's and an LST hull. Four cars which were too heavy to be air lifted were evacuated by highway to Phan Thiet. All cars are presently operational and in service in the II CTZ.

4. (U) Highway:

a. An average of 448,218 STONs of cargo per month was hauled by 1st Logistical Command military truck units, and an average of 502,638 STONs per month was transported by contractor operated vehicles. Of total dry cargo hauled by the military, 40.8% was in port and beach clearance, 32.3% was in local haul, and 26.9% was in line haul operations. The contractor operated vehicles hauled 40.2% port and beach clearance, 55.7% local haul and 4.1% in line haul operations.

b. The 57th Transportation Battalion was relocated from Quang Tri to Chu Lai, to provide command and control for company and detachment sized units supporting the Americal Division. An excess in highway capability became apparent in USASUPCOM, Da Nang during the 3rd quarter of

FY 69. Based on this excess capability, the 446th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) was reassigned from USASUPCOM, Da Nang to USASUPCOM, Saigon to meet increasing transportation requirements in III CTZ. Saigon Support Command's 805th Transportation Company (Light Truck) 2½ Ton, has been given the prime mission of providing transportation support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Any capability that exists above the needs of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), will be used to provide CULT in III CTZ.

5. (U) Sea-Land:

a. Sea-Land containership service encountered mechanical problems which interfered with ship schedules. Two vessels arrived within four days - the Panama on 28 January and the Oakland on 2 February. Again, a similar situation occurred in April, with the Long Beach arriving on 11 April and the Trenton on 13 April. Normally vessels are scheduled to arrive every 12 days. Vessels arriving at such short intervals created congestion, but reasonable van turnaround times were maintained. As usual, one C2 type ship (226 container capacity) provided shuttle service from Cam Ranh Bay to Saigon and Qui Nhon. The following is a summary of the tonnage and number of containers received during the period along with the subsequent container distribution to the three support commands.

	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>CONTAINER INPUT</u>	<u>AVG PER</u> <u>SAILING</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>SHORT TONS</u>	<u>AVG STON PER</u> <u>SAILING</u>
	5046 (921)	631 (115)	71497	8937
	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>			
SGN	2848 (456)	356 (57)	39625	4955
CRB	1198 (263)	150 (33)	16875	2109
QNH	1000 (202)	125 (25)	14997	1875

() Indicates number of reefer vans.

b. Seventy containers (66 dry, 4 reefer) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay aboard the Long Beach on 11 April consigned to Da Nang. Normally service to Da Nang is direct from CONUS west coast ports. Sea-Land will be able to route the shuttle ship to Da Nang in early May to effect delivery of these containers. This Headquarters requested that action be taken on the west coast to prevent this from happening again.

c. A fourth C4J vessel, the SS Trenton, was added to the CONUS-CRB routing. The addition of the fourth vessel has reduced the time frame between vessel arrivals at CRB from 15 to 12 days and will increase the

number of sailings from 24 per year to 30. Expected increase in containers input during a one year period, based on past experience, is approximately 3,750 containers with a subsequent distribution as follows: SGN - 1850, CRB - 900, QNH - 950. The SS Irenton's first arrival at CRB was on 7 January 1969.

d. An amendment to the Sea-Land contract made two additional services available with the containership service.

(1) Extended delivery service beyond 30 statute mile limit from the containership pier: Negotiations between MSIS contracting officer and Sea-Land has resulted in the contractor agreeing to perform delivery of CONUS inbound containers to Dong Tam and Vung Tau from Newport, and Phan Rang and Nha Trang from Cam Ranh Bay.

(2) Restuffing of inbound containers: The amendment to the contract permitting extended delivery does not specify authority to partially restuff containers with RVN generated cargo for extended delivery/second destination deliveries; however, the Vietnam Sea-Land manager stated this was the intent of the amendment and that they were prepared to provide this service. Containers are being partially unstuffed at first destination (generally depots) and restuffed with RVN generated cargo for delivery to a second destination. This is especially advantageous with reefer containers because a better mix of cargo can be provided to Class I supply points, which in many cases, cannot consume entire container loads of one commodity before expiration of shelf life.

e. This Command initiated a program in August to augment limited reefer storage space at Class I supply points by using Sea-Land reefer vans. It was determined that, by establishing small parking lots with power banks adjacent to Class I supply points, Sea-Land reefer vans could be parked and hooked up at these locations and Class I supplies could be issued directly from the vans. Since there is a 15 day free period for unstuffing vans, this program can be carried out without any demurrage being incurred. Parking lots have been scheduled for construction in ten (10) locations. The parking lot at Nha Trang is partially complete and is operational. The parking lot at Cam Ranh Bay Class I is complete and is operational. Action is being taken within each support command to construct the parking lots at the remaining locations.

6. (U) RO/RO Service: The Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) service between Okinawa and RVN ports has increased as a result of a request in September 1968, but it has been fluctuating above and below support command receiving/shipping capability. A request for a regularly scheduled RO/RO service has been forwarded to appropriate authorities pointing out the following advantages:

- a. The number of trailers received/shipped on each vessel would remain relatively constant which would facilitate advanced planning at ports.
- b. Elimination of damage to trailer landing gear experienced when moving trailers by LST.
- c. Improved management and control of in-country trailer inventory.
- d. The RO/RO program could be improved by stabilizing the number of available trailers.
- e. Elimination of current "peaks and valleys" in RO/RO service.
- f. Eliminate the problems caused by using Seatrain and general cargo vessels for RO/RO service.

The Commanding Officer of MACV-TMA has recommended a conference be held in Saigon from 5-6 May 1969 to discuss the RO/RO service with personnel of MSTC Office, Vietnam.

7. (U) CONEX Control Program: Prior to November 1968, emphasis was placed on returning as many containers as possible to CONUS to ensure continued use of the containers in the transportation system; however, this has been changed by a Department of the Army directive authorizing stockpiling of CONEX's for Freighter Cargo requirements. As a result of the change in the CONEX program objectives, USARV established the CONEX Operating Levels for Essential Storage (COLES) Program. The COLES Program assigns levels of CONEX that USARV major commands/separate units may have on hand for essential storage purposes. Every command is required to reduce their on hand assets by returning serviceable containers to their support command. The containers are then stockpiled in designated areas. The COLES Program was designed to accomplish the following:

- a. Establish desired operating levels by major commands.
- b. Provide a gradual reduction of containers over a six month period.
- c. Provide a goal for major commands.
- d. Delete the requirement for requesting retention of CONEXs for essential storage.
- e. Provide for a more realistic evaluation of unit participation in the program.

f. Provide for the release of approximately 20,000 containers currently held by Army units.

g. Allow re-evaluation of the program at any time dependent upon container requirements and/or completion of permanent storage facilities.

h. Provide for an even flow of containers returning to the transportation system to prevent marshalling area congestion and to provide for effective utilization of transportation assets.

The COLES Program and the stockpiling of CONEX has not been as effective as desired. Figures compiled half-way through the six month period show only 1250 CONEXs have been stockpiled compared to the program goal of 7500. The main factor causing the shortfall has been the retention of CONEX for storage in RVN. An increased effort is being made through command monitorship and interest at all levels to enhance the effectiveness of the CONEX Program.

8. (U) MILVAN: A new Military Containership Service, similar to the commercial containership service, will provide service from CONUS west coast ports to the ports of Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay beginning June - July 1969. The final MILVAN OPLAN has been received from the Army Materiel Command. Facilities required at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay have been requested, approved and funded. The construction at Qui Nhon should begin around 25 May. A date for the constructions to start at Cam Ranh Bay will be available O/A 20 May. A 1st Logistical Command regulation governing the MILVAN operation is being prepared and will be disseminated to the support commands prior to program implementation.

9. (U) Air:

a. During the report period this Command continued to utilize SAAM for retrograde to CONUS. Those aircraft not used by 34th Group were utilized by this Headquarters.

b. Five SAAM's were utilized to ship a total of 168,000 pounds of retrograde to CONUS.

10. (U) Troop Movements:

a. During the period no US Army Personnel arrived by troop ship at 1st Log Comd ports, however, the USNS Barrett arrived at Nha Trang carrying ROK troops.

b. From 1 February - 30 April 1969, 1618 troops arrived by air as part of unit advance parties, main bodies and rear detachments.

11. (U) Retrograde: The increasing retrograde program has caused a reevaluation of certain procedures.

a. The standards of cleanliness for retrograde cargo has been a matter of concern. US Department of Agriculture was consulted and certain guide lines were discussed. Based on these guide lines the command established standards of cleanliness for retrograde cargo.

b. A team of advisors was requested from the US Department of Agriculture and US Public Health Service to assist in the instruction of personnel responsible for cleaning and certification of retrograde cargo.

c. Improvements were made in documentation of retrograde cargo. Required certification in accordance with AR 740-20 is now shown on the cargo manifest.

d. During the period command retrograde goals and performance were as follows:

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Performance</u>
* February	62,100	59,802
March	61,500	66,934
April	74,000	58,650

* All figures in STONs.

12. (U) Movements Management Program: In the month of March a movements regulation (LC Reg 55-4) was published and disseminated to all major USARV shippers. This regulation provides guidance and policies relative to the movement of cargo and passengers within RVN. The regulation will enable all Army shippers to be cognizant of transportation procedures thus insuring more efficient use of the transportation system.

a. Project Logmove - Support Command recommendations for Movement Control Centers have been received and validated. From Support Command recommendations, MTOE's for each MCC were prepared and submitted to ACofS, SP&O. Pending reallocation of personnel spaces within the Command, MTOE's will be forwarded to higher headquarters for approval. A valid requisition base for personnel will be established 60 days subsequent to USARV approval and forwarding of proposed MTOE's to DA.

b. Project Flow - Phase II of Project Flow has the ultimate goal of specific item identification. To accomplish this goal cargo manifests are received in transceiver punch card format from WAMTMTS, EAMTMTS and those WESTPAC POE's with transceiver capability. ADP programs are being developed which will provide punch card data in a more usable format and on or about 1 June 1969, 1st Logistical Command is scheduled to implement a USARPAC 3S procedure which will result in a "supply manifest." The supply manifest, as compared to an ocean cargo manifest, will provide all essential elements of supply and transportation data in one document.

c. Project Intransit - In March MACV reduced transportation delivery times for in-country shipment of cargo. This reduction was a direct result of a proposal initiated by this Command in October 1968. A comparison of the old delivery times (per MACV Dir 55-4) and the new delivery times are as follows:

<u>PRI</u>	<u>OLD</u>	<u>Revised</u>	<u>PREFERRED MODE</u>
1	5	4	Air
2	8	6	Air
2	N/A	14	Surface
3	20	17	Surface
4	30	21	Surface

NOTE: A delivery time of 14 days for TP2 by surface was established.

It was determined that a separate delivery time was required in order to provide a more realistic standard for surface movements. It is believed that reduction in transportation delivery times can result in a reduction of in-country stockage levels of DSUs with a resultant savings in OMA fund requirements. Additionally, a reduction in stockage levels will reduce the tonnage required to be moved in support of Freighter Cargo.

d. Project Challenge - To effectively monitor the progress and effectiveness of Project Challenge procedures, a project challenge report was initiated. In this monthly report, support commands submit:

- (1) Cargo offerings (STONs).
- (2) Total STONs downgraded (i.e., priority changed, RDD adjusted).
- (3) Total STONs stopped as a result of challenging.

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ANNEX J (C) ACoFS, AMMUNITION

1. (C) Ammunition Activity -- General: Inventory in Motion: The quarterly Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 outlined actions taken to reduce in-country stock levels. These actions have been further refined and are now conceptually termed "Inventory in Motion." This concept simply stated is the alignment of assets with requirements. Ideally, it amounts to living off the pipeline where input equals output but yet maintaining an adequate safety level on the ground. The success of the inventory in motion program depends on the timely arrival with each vessel carrying a wide range of different items which will permit the diversion of any given vessel to any port or ports, according to existing priorities. During the Post-TET Offensive of February and March 1969, this concept was put to a critical test. For example, although 9,000 short tons (STON) of ammunition were lost due to one enemy action, reconstitution of depot stocks was achieved in a matter of days by diverting such a vessel to the appropriate port. Additionally, the enemy action proved that under this concept, with lesser stocks on the ground, the possibility of sustaining large losses is reduced. For example, stocks on hand at Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot at the time it was attacked were only 19,000 STON, versus 55,000 STON three months previously. Greater dispersion in the storage plan also reduced the quantity which otherwise would have been destroyed. The floating inventory offers the flexibility to effect resupply actions not normally available with on-the-ground stocks and with less stock on the ground, maintenance requirements and losses due to deterioration which accompanies long storage in the severe climatic conditions prevalent in Vietnam, are reduced.

2. (U) Surveillance Activities

a. The third course for Ammunition Technical Inspectors, MOS 55X, terminated on 27 February 1969. The course was programmed against requirements for 69 students in three classes and upon completion, support commands were queried as to whether the training served its purpose; was there a need for continued classes at this headquarters and could training be conducted at support command level with the assistance of assigned DAC Surveillance personnel. Support command response indicated that the training definitely served its purpose and resulted in improved effectiveness of the surveillance program. All concurred that the course should be continued but on a quarterly basis or once every six months. The cooperation by all agencies that led to establishing the Surveillance course has contributed immeasurably to the success of the program. As a result of the training, unserviceable stocks have decreased due to the retrograde program and better maintenance; both are functions of surveillance and the overall On-the-Job Training (OJT) at each ammunition installation has been enhanced.

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
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b. Eleven Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) surveillance personnel arrived in country, 12 February - 18 March 1969. Assignment included: one to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command; four to United States Army Support Command (USASUPCOM) - Saigon; two to USASUPCOM - Cam Ranh Bay; two to USASUPCOM - Qui Nhon, and four to USASUPCOM - Da Nang. Significant improvements in handling, storing, safety, and control of suspended ammunition have already been noted.

3. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Activities

a. EOD personnel responded to 6,133 incidents throughout Vietnam, made 1,618 liaison visits to supported units, and trained a total of 17,818 personnel during 441 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance classes. A graphic representation of CY 68 and CY 69 EOD incidents is shown below.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES



b. Due to the increased enemy activity in the III Corps Tactical Zone and the subsequent increased incident rate, it became necessary for the 44th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), located at Cu Chi and Dau Tieng, to activate a second on-site team at Dau Tieng to provide EOD support to the 25th Infantry Division. As a result of operating three full time on-site teams with a total of ten men, an augmentation of two additional EOD enlisted men was necessary. This was accomplished without degradation to other detachments.

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
4. (C) Supply Activities

a. Total issues for the period of 24 January through 24 April 1969 were 237,252 short tons (STON), a dollar value of \$514,125,084. Total receipts were 191,396 STON equal to \$414,755,132. Total issues, receipts and balances on hand were as follows:

	<u>RECEIPTS</u>	<u>ISSUES</u>	<u>BALANCE ON HAND</u>
FEBRUARY	49,383	80,173	158,452
MARCH	71,265	83,340	140,589
APRIL	70,748	73,739	137,104

The balances on hand were lower than desired. The management level, which is the desired quantity of stocks on hand in-country, has been established as 175,000 STON, or approximately 20,000 STON less than the stockage objective. The decrease is due primarily to heavy issue activity in February through March 1969, the combat loss of over 12,600 STON and the late arrival of a significant number of vessels during February and March 1969. The problem of vessel slippage was the subject of a meeting held in the latter part of April 1969 between representatives of Department of the Army; Headquarters Army Materiel Command; United States Army Munitions Command; Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency; Headquarters, United States Army Pacific; Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, and Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. Results of the meeting are not available at this time. The graph below shows ammunition receipt and issue activity.

CLASS V RECEIPT AND ISSUE ACTIVITY



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b. Enemy action throughout the theater resulted in the following combat loss of Class V, since the post-Tet Offensive started:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>STON</u>
Qui Nhon Depot	23 February 69	\$ 10,317,857.00	8,378.79
Da Nang ASP	28 February 69	384,533.00	185.40
Quan Loi FSA	1 March 69	122,070.67	45.70
Qui Nhon Depot	10 March 69	3,208,113.00	1,728.89
Quan Loi FSA	22 March 69	38,804.54	26.50
Qui Nhon Depot	23 March 69	1,437,204.00	1,327.00
Dong Tam ASP	23 March 69	<u>2,065,463.13</u>	<u>934.30</u>
		\$ 17,575,052.34	12,626.58

c. Certain preplanning actions were taken prior to the enemy threat to achieve the best possible posture to render required support, with the following results:

(1) All in-coming vessels were carefully reviewed for cargo carried and destined ports. Plans for possible diversions were made. By knowing what was due in, what was most critical to the various areas, and by monitoring issue reports twice daily instead of the normal once per day, ship diversion for maximum throughput was optimized.

(2) Alert messages were dispatched to Okinawa and Japan offshore reserve locations requesting minimum response time on selected items. The calling forth of critical items was enhanced by the alert messages. The proof of this planning and subsequent execution was the smoothness with which the air delivery of cartridge, 81mm illumination, called forward after combat loss of this item at Qui Nhon, was accomplished. Ten thousand rounds were delivered in country within five days after they were called forward.

(3) Anticipating possible attacks against the storage locations as well as increased expenditures by tactical units, a Rolling Ammunition Supply Point (RASP) of balanced stocks was constituted and dispersed at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon Support Commands. Trailers were loaded under the complete round concept and contained those items most likely to be required by the tactical units. Complete documentation was prepared in advance, requiring only insertion of the drawing unit to maintain accountability. One hundred and eight 12-ton trailers were committed to

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
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provide fast resupply to any area that required it. Sixty-two trailers containing 521 STON were positioned at Can Ranh Bay while the remaining trailers containing 562 STON, were positioned in Saigon Support Command area. This action resulted in stock dispersal and added flexibility in response to requirements.

(4) A Command Post Exercise (CPX) of contingency plans was performed. Plans were reviewed and various resupply methods from different locations were considered. An extension of this exercise included assuming combat losses and extremely fast drawdowns in various locations.

d. A continuing program is underway to identify and retrograde all serviceable excess and unserviceable ammunition which is beyond in-country repair capability. In accordance with the overall objectives of the Command Control Improvement program instituted at 1st Logistical Command Headquarters, the retrograde program was divided into three phases as shown in graph below:



(1) Phase I was to retrograde 14,800 STON from 1 September to 31 December 1968. This objective was exceeded by 1,167 STON for a total of 15,967 STON.

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(2) Phase II began on 1 Jan 69 with an objective of 35,000 STON to be retrograded by 28 February 1969. A total of 33,568 STON were credited towards this program, for 96 percent accomplishment of the objective.

(3) Phase III covers the period 1 March to 30 June 1969. The objective of Phase III is to retrograde 2,500 STON per month during this time for a total of 10,000 STON.

5. (C) Ammunition Operations

a. On 23 March 1969, Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot, operated by the 3d Ordnance Battalion, came under rocket attack. One round impacted in a pad containing 2.75 inch White Phosphorus rockets. Another round impacted in a gully causing a brush fire. Minutes later, fire fighting teams were on the scene and within 45 minutes all fires were extinguished. Personnel operating forklifts and bulldozers separated and removed burning pallets and bulldozed dirt over the ground fires. Surveillance personnel, water trucks and bulldozers were left at the scene of the fires after they had been extinguished and the area was repeatedly wet down to prevent fire from re-igniting. At the same time other pads with critical items were examined by surveillance and security personnel for enemy exposure to ground attack. During the attack guard personnel remained at their posts, alert for possible ground probes. Total value of the ammunition on the pad receiving one round was \$446,000. Although detonation did not occur, fire was initiated. Through several actions beyond the call of duty, the fires were quickly extinguished. There is no doubt that if the fires had not been extinguished and detonation had occurred, twelve surrounding pads would have been subject to destruction. Certain preparations and precautions were taken by the 3d Ordnance Battalion prior to the attack:

(1) A fire truck, manned 24-hours a day by experienced firefighting personnel, was ready for dispatch.

(2) Three 1½-ton trailers were prepositioned in each of the three sub-depots, preloaded with foam, shovels, picks, and other firefighting equipment.

(3) Bulldozers on lowboys were also located in each sub-depot ready for dispatch.

(4) Frequent rehearsals were conducted to train personnel to perform emergency actions in the minimum amount of time. The key to the success of the above actions was the quick response during the first few minutes by deploying to pre-planned positions, with a defined mission, in a minimum amount of time.

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b. During the period 23 February to 23 March 1969, the Ammunition Base Depot at Qui Nhon sustained indirect fire and two sapper attacks by unknown size hostile forces. The attacks were all detected by an explosion in the depot area and contact was never made with a hostile force in the depot area. As a result of these attacks the 184th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) received the following casualties: Three missing in action and presumed dead; 48 wounded. A total of 23 pads and one small arms area were destroyed and one additional pad was damaged in the three attacks.

(1) On 23 February 1969, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot was attacked by indirect enemy fire. Pads 92, 95, and 103, in the north-east area of the depot, were struck by unknown type enemy rounds. The three pads contained 105mm High Explosive (HE) rounds. The fire which resulted from the explosions flared up and rounds on the pads began cooking off within several minutes before sufficient manpower and firefighting equipment could be brought to effectively fight the fires. The major efforts of personnel in the area were to search the pads in the immediate area, rescue the security personnel from the perimeter towers, and fight fires which were spreading from the burning pads to adjacent pads. As the fires became more intense the firefighting personnel were ordered to withdraw to the western area of the depot. The personnel sweeping the pads and the security reaction force were then withdrawn and a perimeter was established inside the depot, a short distance from the burning pads. The area of the ammunition fire was entered continually throughout the night, even though additional pads had begun to burn and detonate and the fragmentation was intense, in attempts to determine if firefighting efforts could be effectively taken without excessive hazards. The ammunition fire which resulted from the initial three explosions destroyed 16 pads and one small arms area within 16 hours. The 105mm WP rounds were still smoldering and detonating in certain areas as late as 10 days after the initial explosions. The disregard for personal safety in their efforts to rescue wounded and stranded personnel, fighting the violent ammunition fires and continually entering an area of excessive danger to determine what action could be taken, earned the following awards for members of the command: Twelve Bronze Star Medals with "V" Device; 17 Army Commendation Medals with "V" Device; 18 Army Commendation Medals; five Certificates of Achievement; and three Purple Hearts. These awards were presented by Major General Joseph M. Haizer Jr. on 1 March 1969.

(2) On 10 March 1969, the Qui Nhon Ammunition Base Depot was attacked a second time by a sapper unit. The unit entered the depot in the northeastern area of the perimeter, placed satchel charges on three pads and left the depot area without being detected. The first explosion was on Pad 84, which contained 105mm illumination rounds. Approximately eight people arrived at the pad within 60-90 seconds after the explosion.

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These people, equipped with axes and five-gallon hand pump water fire extinguishers, exhibited extraordinary courage and were able to successfully contain the fire. A water truck arrived approximately three minutes later and the fire on this pad was completely extinguished within ten minutes. At approximately the same time that the fire was put out on pad 89, pads 28 and 90 exploded in quick succession. These pads both began burning violently and before personnel could get close enough to fight the fires, the rounds on the pads began detonating. Pad 28 contained 81mm HE mortar ammunition and pad 90 contained 2.75 inch rockets. Security and ordnance personnel began searching the pads in the immediate areas and all nonessential personnel were ordered to evacuate the depot area. A satchel charge, found on pad 29, was thrown over the back berm of the pad where it detonated a few seconds later. Within a few minutes after, nonessential personnel had been ordered to evacuate the depot, pad 28 mass detonated. The fireball from this mass detonation was from 100-150 feet high and contained 81mm rounds which were scattered over the entire western area of the depot; many detonated in the air or upon impact. Due to the violence of the detonations at pad 20 and the possibility that other pads might be detonated by the rounds being blown off pad 28, a decision was made to evacuate the depot area and secure the surrounding area to prevent personnel from being trapped in the depot if the ammunition fires spread. The violence of the explosions subsided at approximately 0400 hours and the essential security and ordnance personnel entered the depot area. Sometime during the night, pads 88, 83, and 84 were ignited by hot fragments from pads 28 and 90. At approximately 0600 hours the depot was again evacuated as pad 68 was observed burning violently. Pad 68 contained 155mm HE projectiles. At 0700 hours pad 68 mass detonated. The blast from this detonation seemed to have extinguished the fires which had been burning in the depot area. As in the first attack, the personnel of the command ignored normal considerations for their personal safety and placed themselves in extremely hazardous situations in an attempt to contain the fires, rescue wounded and stranded personnel, and to enter hazardous areas to evaluate and determine what actions could be taken to best fight the raging ammunition fires. For their valorous efforts these personnel were recommended for the following awards: Eighteen Bronze Star Medals with "V" Device; 35 Army Commendation Medals with "V" Device; three Army Commendation Medals, and eight Purple Hearts.

(3) On 23 March 1969, a sapper unit again entered the depot and placed satchel charges on pads 76 and 64. When the explosion and resultant fire was reported the ordnance personnel in the immediate area were able to reach the fire on pad 76 and contain the blaze until a water truck arrived. The fire was extinguished within approximately ten minutes after the explosion occurred. Upon extinguishing the fire on pad 76, the personnel dispersed to search the pads in the immediate area. Approximately three minutes after the fire had been extinguished, a satchel charge went off on pad 64, and mass detonated. This pad contained 155mm HE projectiles. As there were a large number of personnel in the area searching pads, a large number of casualties resulted from this detonation.

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Three personnel who were last seen in the vicinity of this pad are missing and presumed dead. Thirty-four other personnel in the area sustained minor fragmentation wounds and ear injuries. The heat of the blast or hot fragments re-ignited pad 76 and rounds began detonating almost immediately. Priority was given to searching the remaining pads in the immediate area, removing hot fragments and rounds from the adjacent pads, and evacuating the wounded. Many wounded personnel were evacuated from an area within 50 meters of pads 64 and 76, and several personnel were taken off pad 76 by personnel from the battalion even though there were fires and rounds detonating throughout the entire area. Because of the large number of fires and detonations and the heavy smoke, it was believed that as many as five pads had been destroyed. However, when the intensity of the fires and detonations subsided, the search teams returned to the area and found that all pads were intact except for the two pads originally reported. A large number of personnel of the Battalion entered and returned to the areas around affected pads to evacuate wounded, search pads, and evaluate the situation so a course of action could be determined. These actions were considered necessary and were made with complete disregard for personal safety by members of this battalion. Decorations recommended for personnel who continually exposed themselves to the hazards of fragmentation and possible mass detonations to evacuate wounded or contain the fires were as follows: Fourteen Bronze Star Medals with "V" Device; 7 Army Commendation Medals; 29 Certificates of Achievement; and 37 Purple Hearts.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command conducted a one-day Ammunition Seminar for key ammunition personnel on 20 March 1969. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss the technical aspects of ammunition support operations with emphasis on passive defense measures and immediate actions when defense measures have been breached or bypassed. Included in the discussions were operational lessons learned subsequent to a number of enemy attacks directed at ammunition installations. As a result of the seminar guidance was given as follows:

- (1) To the maximum extent possible, Classes 4 and 5 will be stored on the outer periphery of the sub-depot complex; Class 7 will be centrally stored; and Class 2 will be used as a buffer between Class 7 and Classes 4 and 5.
- (2) Net explosive weight per pad will not exceed 100,000 pounds.
- (3) Within a pad of Class 7, there will be no less than two stacks separated by 50 inches with the net explosive weight per stack not to exceed 15,000 pounds.
- (4) Storage is to be limited to pallets stacked two-high.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command, is establishing a training program for Ammunition Stock Record Clerks. The purpose is to provide refresher and supplemental training to newly assigned

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personnel in MOS 76M, grades E-5 and below, to orient these individuals in stock control procedures, problems and peculiarities encountered in Vietnam. The course is part of Project Skills I, being implemented in the 1st Logistical Command. The United States Army Missile and Munitions Center and School has provided 1st Logistical Command a complete 44-hour training packet.

e. An Equipment Specialist, DAC GS-12, has been assigned to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Ammunition, 1st Logistical Command, to revitalize the ammunition maintenance program. Present emphasis is being placed on bringing all existing maintenance facilities into an operational status.

f. The 59th Ordnance Company (Ammunition), located at Cam Ranh Bay, has been redesignated the 46th Ordnance Company (Ammunition).

g. USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, assumed responsibility to operate an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at Da Lat, bringing the total number of 1st Logistical Command Class V installations to 28.

h. The technical inspection program is continuing and is proving to be one of the most valuable tools to the overall Ammunition Management Program in Vietnam. This team through detailed inspections and objective evaluation on a quarterly basis, has been instrumental in providing supervisors at every level with a complete and comprehensive picture of service support operations and existing problem areas that do not always come to light through normal correspondence channels. Based on observations, evaluations and recommendations of the team, a strong link has been welded in the technical and information chain commencing at Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command down to the smallest, but equally important, Forward Support Area (FSA). Notable improvements, innovations, and individual initiative are documented with every visit and disseminated to all other Class V activities so that they might share in the incorporation of new ideas and methods with the ultimate objective of providing the best possible support, safely and economically. Of significant importance to the manager at the highest level is the fact that when a problem exists in one particular support command, it can be eliminated immediately and be addressed at the highest level necessary. An offshoot to staying abreast of a particular problem in one particular location is the fact that all commands can be forewarned that similar situations may exist, or are potential. Information reported by the technical inspection team during this period revealed that many of the programs and policies initiated in previous months are paying dividends.

(1) First-in/First-out (FIFO): The FIFO principle of issuing first, that which is received first is being utilized and resulting in a marked decrease in the volume of unserviceable on-hand stocks, to include a noticeable lack of deteriorated containers.

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(2) Reduction in Line Items: The emphasis on issue of authorized substitute items in lieu of prime items has resulted in a decrease in the number of lines stocked. This decrease results in better storage plans, less records to maintain, and increased accuracy of inventory records.

(3) Call Forward From Off-Shore: The accessibility to stocks located off-shore and the minimum response time has allowed in-country ammunition support to maintain its inventory in motion concept, freeing much needed space in all ammunition installations.

(4) In-House Technical Inspections: Da Nang Support Command has instituted a similar technical inspection team. All ammunition activities are inspected on a monthly basis and plaques are awarded to the best ASPs. The competition generated from this program has resulted in marked improvement in storage and accounting procedures.

A side light that is also noteworthy is the fact that the technical inspection team also serves as an assistance team. Members of the team qualified in storage, operations, surveillance and accounting procedures have on numerous occasions provided technical guidance in the form of on-the-spot corrections.

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ANNEX K (C) ACofS, SERVICES

1. (U) Significant structural reorganizations have occurred in the ACofS, Services since the last reporting period. On 1 Mar 69, ACofS, Services was given the staff responsibility for those activities normally performed by Direct Support Supply and Service units, excluding classes I, III and V. To perform these functions, a Direct Support Supply Division was created and three spaces were requested (1 LTC, 1 MAJ, 1 E-8). To date only the E-8 space has been filled. In addition, this section requested spaces for two Instruct and Inspect teams for the division; however, the need for such spaces was not recognized. Due to the lack of personnel, it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of this division. ACofS, Services also reorganized the Food Services, Laundry and Bath, and Graves Registration divisions into a single division - the General Services Division. The former Laundry and Bath and the Graves Registration divisions became the Personal Services Branch of the new division, and the functions previously performed by these divisions incorporated therein. The Food Services Division became the Food Services Branch and its functions retained. All other divisions of the ACofS, Services remained intact.

2. (U) During the reporting period, approximately 20 units in 14 locations throughout RVN were visited by the Installations Management Division for the purpose of evaluating their overall internal support. Of these 20 units, 10 were Forward Support Activities (FSA) or Logistical Support Activities (LSA). The purpose of these visits was to determine the adequacy of support received from agencies outside the FSA/LSA, and the effectiveness of the FSA/LSA internal management. This support and the internal management was found to be generally adequate with two exceptions: Engineer Support and Mission type supplies. Engineer support, particularly Repairs and Utilities (R&U) and construction, was not responsive at times. Due to many FSA/LSAs not operating under tabular authority, certain particular problems resulted. Sophisticated supply/stock records for supplies used internally and maintenance of PLL were found to be in need of improvement. The problem of mission type supplies was solved in many cases by outside agencies supplying the FSA/LSA direct with resupply based on quantities issued.

3. (U) A study of the fire prevention and protection procedures at POL and ammunition storage areas was made by the Installations Management Division in coordination with the Dir of POL; ACofS, Ammo; USAECV; and PA&E. This study revealed that fire protection and prevention procedures, as well as fire fighting measures, were inadequate at these locations. In many cases it was noted that sophisticated fire fighting equipment was available to the POL units and not to the local fire department. However, personnel working at these areas were either not familiar with the equipment or were unaware of its availability. Further, there

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existed a lack of coordination between the units and the local fire fighting department. It was determined that the SPCOMs should inventory all fire fighting assets and coordinate with the local fire department on a periodic basis. USAECV has been furnished a list of facilities in order of priority. PA&E will send a team of fire chiefs to inspect these facilities and submit a report of recommendations to improve the fire prevention and protection posture.

4. (U) A major problem experienced by units in RVN has been complications caused by dust, both natural dust and dust created by use of equipment. Due to many units being located in areas with loose soil, the resulting dust adversely affects unit operations. For instance, at Ban Me Thuot the dust severely hampered support operations, especially in areas around helicopter landing sites. Through liaison visits, coordination with PA&E, and the support of the 18th Engineer Brigade, a program is now underway to seed approximately 60 acres of land in order to suppress the dust in that area. Perimeter roads will be surfaced or at least peneprimed. In other areas where natural dust is a problem, the Installations Management Division has coordinated with the Installation Engineer and given assistance in the proper procedures for using peneprime and rock for dust suppression. In Vung Tau the re-crushing of rock in cantonment areas and the off-loading of crushed rock in the port area created a large amount of dust hampering operations in the area. At present, plans are underway to have the re-crushing site moved to another area and to take measures to suppress the dust in both the re-crushing and loading areas.

5. (U) Petroleum storage and distribution facilities construction under MCA projects contain certain PEMA-funded items of equipment, notably pumps and storage tanks. No tabular authority exists for replacing these PEMA-funded components which are damaged by enemy action or wear out through normal fair wear and tear. This lack of tabular authority caused requisitions for replacement components to be rejected by USAICCV. Representatives of USAICCV, D4 of POL, and ACofS, Services met with representatives of USARV and USAECV in order to solve the problem. As a result of this meeting USARV requested special authority from USARPAC to requisition the components. The action is still pending.

6. (U) The realignment of construction priorities by MACV, as outlined in last quarter's report, and the continued effort being expended by engineer troops on high priority tasks, especially the upgrading of lines of communications (LOC) had a great impact on the availability of construction effort for the 1st Logistical Command. Urgently needed projects were deferred as effort was directed toward operational support missions and LOC upgrade. Consequently, logistical commanders were required to request operational support status for urgently required construction. These requests for operational support, which are sub-

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mitted directly to the supporting engineer brigade, where initiated for several projects which would not proceed under the base construction priority. For example, the upgrading of several berms in the Long Binh ASD was carried out on a priority basis as an operational support mission. The construction of a protective fence around the Emergency Logistical Operations Control Center was likewise constructed as an operational support project.

7. (U) The increase of enemy hostilities directed against logistical installations during February and March increased the need for engineer operational support in the construction of defensive and protective works. Especially hard hit were petroleum storage facilities. This headquarters directed the immediate construction of protective structures around petroleum tank farms. The US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECV) was requested to furnish a design for such a structure. The reacted quickly and designed a cage-like structure built of utility poles, cables, and chain-link fencing. Engineer troops are currently engaged in the construction of this stand off protection which will reduce the vulnerability of petroleum tanks to indirect fire and sapper attacks. Engineer effort was also directed toward increased security of ammunition storage areas, another target of the increased enemy activities. Work was done in the relocation and strengthening of perimeter defenses at the Phu Tai ammunition base depot near Qui Nhon; fields of fire were improved in that area; and work has begun on the relocation of the ASP in Quan Loi.

8. (U) The POL pipeline between Qui Nhon and An Khe and between Qui Nhon and Phu Cat presented a significant engineering problem. The lines in question are unburied, coupled pipelines lying, in general, along highways QL-1 and QL-19. In the past, considerable product was lost from the lines as a result of pilferage, vandalism and enemy action. In addition to the loss of product, the leaking of the damaged lines led to the destruction of crops and to fires. An examination of the history of incidents showed three critical portions of line along which the majority of the incidents occurred. The command requested that an engineering study be made by US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam to determine the feasibility of burying selected portions of the coupled line. The initial phase of the study was completed; it recommended that two of the critical portions be buried. The recommendation for the third portion is awaiting completion of the next phase of the study. Based upon this study, an operational support request was approved by USARV and engineer troops were directed to bury one two-mile section of coupled line and one seven-mile section. Actual work is expected to commence in the near future.

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9. (U) During January 1969, the 497th Engineer Company (Port Construction) was transferred from Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) to Long Binh to commence work on bridge pier protection systems in the III Corps Zone. These bridge protection projects were given a high priority by MACV in order to get as much as possible accomplished prior to the anticipated enemy spring offensive. With this port construction unit gone from CRB and no contractor in the area mobilized for port-type work, this major port was left with no waterfront engineer construction or maintenance capability. Unfinished projects at CRB at time of departure included: (1) repair of the Alaska Barge & Transport Company's wharf; (2) repair of the bulkhead at piers 1 and 4; (3) extension of the drydock seawall; (4) placing of the T-5 FOL jetty dolphins; (5) construction of a finger pier at the LST ramps; and (6) placing of the deep-draft mooring buoys. These projects are in the process of being transferred from troops to contractor. The contractor has been re-mobilized and is currently working on an operational support project to repair the T-2 dolphin on or about 31 May 69. Upon completion of this repair project, the contractor will commence work on the above listed projects.

10. (U) The concern of the command with regard to the detection and detonation or deactivation of enemy mines along logistical lines of communications (LOC), and the action taken to initiate a USARV-sponsored program to design, fabricate, and test a field expedient mine roller were reported in the last quarter. Fabrication of four test rollers was carried out during this quarter by engineer units and maintenance units of the 1st Logistical Command. Four models were tested and each successive model incorporated modifications based on the prior tests. The fourth model is currently under operational testing by the 25th Infantry Division and USARV is planning to send a request to the 1st Logistical Command for the construction of six additional rollers of this design. The latest model has been tested over 120 kilometers of road in the 25th Infantry Division AOR. However, its value in long distance high-speed logistical convoys has yet to be proven. This headquarters will continue to monitor the progress of the mine roller project.

11. (C) The 128th Signal Maintenance Company at Cam Ranh Bay has the mission of receiving, storing, maintaining, and issuing Duffelbag items. In mid-March the Engineering Services Division was called upon to provide assistance and technical guidance for the rapid expansion of their facility at Cam Ranh Bay and to expedite the submission and approval of the construction request. The additions to the facility included a 12,000 square foot maintenance shop and 3,000 square feet of covered storage, with 8,000 square feet of the maintenance shop requiring strict environmental controls (temperature and relative humidity). In order to assume the expanded mission in the time frame dictated by the Defense Communications Planning Group, the 128th Signal Company requested completion of the buildings not later

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than 15 May 1969 and installation of the environmental control systems not later than 15 June 1969. Submission of the construction request was expedited by this headquarters and by USARV. It was approved by USARV on 24 March 1969 and construction by the contractor started on 7 April 1969; construction is proceeding on schedule. The expediting of the construction was made possible by accomplishing the design on site concurrently with the initial phases of construction.

12. (U) During the early part of the reporting quarter, the 1st Logistical Command announced the initiation of Project SKILLS I. This project provides for the orientation, indoctrination and on-the-job training of military personnel. In line with the general philosophy of the project the Engineering Services Division, in conjunction with the Installations Management Division, sponsored a series of conferences at the headquarters. Identical conferences, run on several successive weekends, enabled all key engineer personnel of the support commands - both officers and NCO's - to attend. The conferences, conducted in seminar fashion, covered policies, procedural matters and problem areas concerning engineer construction, base development planning, engineer R&U support, and other engineer items of interest. These seminars enabled the support command engineers to get an insight into the many facets of the engineer construction and R&U programs, allowed them to freely discuss problem areas, and provided an excellent opportunity for the free interchange of ideas. It is envisioned that follow-on seminars will be scheduled in the future.

13. (U) In April the 1st Logistical Command initiated Project EQUITABLE STANDARDS, a program established to upgrade the living conditions of 1st Logistical Command personnel to a common high standard. Living conditions vary widely throughout Vietnam; in some areas the troops live relatively well, in other areas the housing and facilities can at best be considered marginal. To achieve the goal of Project EQUITABLE STANDARDS a two-phase program is envisioned. Under Phase I, with a 31 December 1969 completion goal, commanders have been asked to examine their present conditions and to take steps to upgrade their facilities so that 1st Logistical Command soldiers are living as well as other personnel in the same general location. Where action to achieve this can be taken locally, that action will be initiated. Where construction requests must be submitted, they are to be prepared and submitted as a complete package. Upon completion of the first phase, the second phase will commence. The goal of Phase II will be the upgrading of standards to provide equitable living conditions for all 1st Logistical Command soldiers throughout Vietnam.

14. (C) The FY 71 Military Construction Program for 1st Logistical Command was compiled and submitted to USARV during this reporting quarter. Funds for this program, if appropriated, are expected to become available in November 1970. In accordance with guidance from USARV,

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each project was categorized to indicate its necessity for the support of current operations or one of several post-T-Day residual force structures. Based on USARV guidance, a total figure of \$40 million was used in developing the program. A review was made at this headquarters of previously submitted projects in support of current and T-Day contingency planning. Projects required to support T-Day requirements had already been identified and submitted during the early part of the quarter. Essentially all operationally required projects of 1st Logistical Command interest had been requested under previous programs. A total of 39 projects were submitted for inclusion in the FY 71 program. A large percentage of these fall in the USARV-defined Category B, i.e., projects required to improve current operational conditions and efficiency or required to meet future scheduled requirements. Based on USARV guidance, category C projects (construction required to improve current non-operational health or welfare conditions) were not submitted as part of the FY 71 program. It is anticipated that a package of these category C projects will be developed by USARV and submitted separately.

15. (U) For the past three months, the Project Disposal program has continued toward its goal of reducing the tonnage of the O/H foreign excess personal property in Vietnam. During the reporting period 1 February through 30 April 1969, the Foreign Excess Sales Office conducted 20 sales on usable property with an acquisition cost of \$12,141,022 and 118,602.8 short tons of scrap and waste. Total proceeds for the US Government during the quarter amounted to \$3,680,935.67. During the same period the command-wide inventory dropped for the second consecutive quarter from 74.7 thousand short tons at the end of January to 59.7 short tons currently on hand. The largest single contribution to the growing backlog currently taking place in the property disposal yards is the generation of scrap, which comprises about 80% of the total on-hand tonnage in command-wide property disposal facilities. The command-wide total in usable property amounts to \$28.0 million. Increased emphasis is being placed on reducing the amount of inactive usable property on hand. Inactive inventory is that portion of the inventory on which no action has been taken. Active inventory, on the other hand, is property sold pending removal, reported for sale, reported for reutilization screening, or frozen for authorized recipients such as MAP or USAID. The goal in this area is to have no more than 10% to 20% of the ending usable inventory in an inactive status. Using this as the established criteria, the command total of inactive usable inventory averaged 44% during the period February 1968 through March 1969. Command emphasis has been placed on reporting usable property for sale. To assist the disposal officers in this regard, a 3-day class was conducted by the Foreign Excess Sales Office with enlisted personnel from each support command PDO in attendance. This training consisted of both formalized instruction, as well as OJT at Long Binh property disposal yard. The entire effort of the class was devoted to merchandising and reporting usable property for sale. As a result of this

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class, the command-wide inactive inventory has decreased from 47% in March to 36% at the end of April.

16. (U) Another area growing in importance as a factor in the reduction of the on-hand inventory in the Vietnam Property Disposal yards is the emphasis currently being placed on the MAPEX program. From 19 to 21 March, a representative of 1st Logistical Command attended a conference called by CINCPAC at 2nd Log Comd on Okinawa for the purpose of defining the MAPEX program. Procedures were worked out in an attempt to make the program a more effective operation, and a draft procedure was formulated. On 21 April a follow-up conference to refine the points brought out during the first meeting was held at USARV with the CINCPAC representative monitoring. The chief points that came out of this meeting are: MAG's can request only materials on the account of the PDO; once a release has been granted requests for the same material from another country will be denied; and no agreements may be made between two MAG teams in regard to the disposition of US excess. Recently MAPEX releases have been obtained for OICC excess thus alleviating the problem of space to accommodate these materials. Since the beginning of February 2,885.7 short tons of foreign excess personal property has been released under the MAP program.

ANNEX L (U) ACoS, PERSONNEL, Plans and Programs Division

1. (U) Program Six Civilianization.

a. The Civilianization Program was initiated on 1 June 1968 with the objective of replacing 3,336 1st Logistical Command military spaces with 4,580 Local National spaces. By month, the projected number of military spaces to be lost and civilian spaces to be gained (cumulative) was as follows:

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
Civilian Spaces Gained	560	1052	1456	1871	2425	3018
Military Spaces Lost	403	764	1062	1358	1759	2149

	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
Civilian Spaces Gained	3441	3756	4044	4273	4412	4580
Military Spaces Lost	2465	2705	2907	3094	3201	3336

b. During the period 1 February 1969 through 20 April 1969, 989 Local National civilians were hired under this program, increasing the number hired to 4,502 or 98 percent of the 4,580 total objective. Part of this shortfall may be attributed to a freeze on the hiring of Local Nationals which went into effect on 28 March.

c. In addition to the hiring freeze, problems encountered in the Civilianization Program were the national draft, competition for available personnel, and the widespread lack of basic skills. The use of female employees in positions normally considered as male positions has been encouraged and has helped alleviate the shortage of personnel. Project SKILLS II, a training program for Local Nationals, has also been implemented to provide employees with basic skills and a fundamental knowledge of English language.

2. (U) Project SKILLS II.

a. The scheduled monthly civilianization of military spaces under Program Six necessitated the establishment of a Local National in-house training program to supplement the varied courses being offered in the Saigon-Long Binh area by the Central Training Institute (CTI), Office of the Civilian Personnel Director. Accordingly, Project SKILLS II was initiated on 2 October 1968.

b. Initially, the program was designed to teach those basic courses necessary for job accomplishment such as Conversational English, Basic Typing, and Materials Handling Equipment Operation. During February,

however, Project SKILLS II A, a phase of Project SKILLS II directed toward the training and promotion of qualified Local Nationals into higher skill and supervisory type positions, was initiated. Both Project SKILLS II and Project SKILLS II A are joint efforts utilizing the combined resources of the support commands and the Central Training Institute.

c. As of 31 March 1969, 1,109 Local National employees have received formal training in eleven different subjects under Project SKILLS II and thirty-six have received training under the SKILLS II A program. In addition to these formal programs, extensive OJT programs are in progress throughout the command.

3. (U) Recruitment of DA Civilians.

a. This command is currently authorized to recruit for 687 Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) personnel of which 480, or approximately 70 percent, are presently assigned. Broken out by career program, DAC positions presently under recruitment are as follows (the numbers in parentheses represent the number of positions which have been committed):

<u>Career Program</u>	<u>Number of Positions Under Recruitment</u>
Comptroller	3 (1)
Safety	4 (1)
Supply Management	75 (15)
Procurement	12 (4)
Quality Control & Inspection	12 (2)
Equipment Specialists	2 (1)
Engineer & Scientist	17 (2)
Librarian	37 (2)
Non-career	75 (9)

b. Although there are a large number of non-career vacancies in the special services area, the most critical area of recruitment lies in the Supply Management field. In this area, 15 of 75 positions have been committed but 59 of the 75 recruiting actions are over 90 days old. These positions are primarily in the supervisory grades and consequently have an adverse effect on supply operations in the depots.

ANNEX M (U) ACOFS, PERSONNEL, Personnel Management Division

1. (U) Infusion.

a. From September to November 1968 the 1st Logistical Command received 25 Reserve/National Guard units with approximately 4,000 assigned personnel. In order to preclude personnel from these units leaving en masse as they had arrived, an infusion program was established. The personnel of these units had to be infused in such a manner that each unit's mission capability was not affected and that the units to be infused with would not have any rotational humps. The effect of infusion on the morale of the Reserve/National Guard units also was taken into consideration.

b. A tailored unit infusion plan was developed by the infusion officers of the support commands in conjunction with the 1st Logistical Command infusion officer and the ACOFS, Personnel. This plan was designed to meet the problems involved with infusing the Reserve/National Guard units. To maintain each unit's mission capability the key personnel will be infused as late as possible. To help negate the effect on morale, an exception was granted by Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam to their policy of 50% infusion by the end of the unit's sixth month in country. Also, a plan has been suggested whereby all Reserve/National Guard personnel would be returned to their original units for rotation. Careful attention was given to the selection of units to infuse with and, in some cases, units from outside the support command were selected to prevent rotational humps from developing.

c. A separate infusion plan was developed for each unit to insure maximum control of the infusion process and to maintain unit integrity as long as possible.

d. The 1st Logistical Command's tailored infusion plan took effect on 15 January 1969. As of 30 April 1969, twenty-five percent of each unit's strength had been infused. The command infusion officer will monitor the program carefully to insure success.

2. (U) Identifying Experienced Personnel in Manpower Management.

a. This command is presently authorized a total of six personnel in the Manpower Branches of this headquarters and the headquarters of the four support commands. However, none of these positions have been filled from the replacement stream by an individual who has had prior experience in the manpower field. To get qualified personnel, this command must screen the records of personnel assigned to this command and request that Headquarters, USARV screen the records on a Vietnam-wide basis to identify personnel with manpower experience. So far, this command has not been able to obtain sufficient personnel to fill all of the manpower positions.

b. Screening personnel records would not be required if a method of identification was available and control initiated at the 22nd and 90th Replacement Battalions to insure that these personnel are assigned to positions where their experience could be fully utilized.

c. The MOS 2265 identifies a Manpower Control Officer. However, there isn't any MOS which can identify enlisted personnel with manpower experience. The majority of enlisted personnel with this experience will have an MOS of 71H40 (Personnel Management Supervisor) or 76Z50 (Senior Supply Sergeant).

d. The lack of experienced personnel in this headquarters and in the subordinate commands has resulted in TDA's being returned numerous times for corrections. It has taken up to one year from the time a TDA was submitted by a unit until it was forwarded by USARV to USARPAC. It is assumed that this problem is prevalent in other overseas areas.

e. It has been recommended that a suffix be designated for the enlisted MOS which could be awarded to qualified personnel. This suffix would be utilized by the two replacement battalions to insure that the United States Army, Vietnam obtain maximum use of these highly technical personnel.

3. (U) Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP).

a. Continuing emphasis is being placed on designation of Noncommissioned Officers Logistics Program (NCOLP) positions and to encourage eligible noncommissioned officers to apply for entrance into the NCOLP.

b. In order to stress the importance of this program, the Commanding General sent letters to all commanders and staff officers on 18 April 1969 directing that they review all key positions within their commands or staff sections to insure that all noncommissioned officer positions which meet the basic Department of the Army requirements are recommended for designation as NCOLP positions.

c. This command now has 108 NCOLP positions approved by the Department of the Army. There are twelve positions presently pending approval at Department of the Army level for entrance into this program. In his recent letter, the Commanding General termed this small number "unacceptable" considering the size of this command and the variety of logistical functions being performed that meet the basic requirements for NCOLP designation as set forth by the Department of the Army. The Adjutant General has and will continue to requisition personnel for the approved NCOLP positions.

ANNEX N (U) ACoFS, PERSONNEL, Personnel Services Division

1. (U) Army Education Program.

a. During the reporting period the Army program for General Educational Development (GED) increased significantly to the point where approximately 22% of the assigned strength of the 1st Logistical Command was actually participating in some kind of educational activity that required visits to the Army Education Center or attendance at classes or testing sessions. The largest group participating in educational opportunities are the enlisted men, not only because they are in greatest number but also because they need the services being offered for advancement, retention, and self-improvement.

b. Services being offered cover the full range of activities normally available at Army Education Centers in CONUS. They include counseling, testing, resident college classes, off-duty group study classwork, MOS-related instruction, language courses, correspondence course registration, and high school completion. Emphasis at the ten 1st Logistical Command centers is directed at those men who have not finished high school or who need help in reading, writing, and mathematics so they can be upgraded in their MOS's. High school completion involves one of the stated goals of the Army program and increased emphasis is used to reach all men who are eligible for both classwork and testing needed to complete high school. Unit commanders are urged to identify these men, to counsel them on the advantages of completing their schooling, and to advise them to visit the education center for counseling and guidance. These personnel first take an achievement test to determine how much of their early schooling has been retained. If they satisfactorily pass these tests they are then scheduled to start the high school GED tests and complete them. If they need refresher work, it is done prior to GED testing. Once they have passed the GED test battery they have a high school equivalency acceptable to Army standards and this item is posted in their records. Since all but a few states allow for state or local certificates based on these same test results, the man is assisted in his application for his state or local high school diploma. This plan is the very heart of the Army GED program and is very effective within the 1st Logistical Command.

c. Problems involve the failure of unit commanders to appoint Unit Education Officers and Unit Education NCOs as required by current directives. Many commanders feel they do not have time to devote to this function and allow the presence in their area of an Army Education Center to become their means of shifting their responsibility. Some enterprising commanders have their unit personnel records screened to reveal men with less than high school educations. These men are then called in and counseled by appointed members of the unit and referred to local education centers for remedial work and testing.

d. During the reporting period one Army Education Center was temporarily closed due to a lack of assigned personnel to be serviced by that center. Although there were sufficient numbers of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in the area, there were not enough 1st Logistical Command personnel to justify its retention when other areas needed assistance. The stated policy of the 1st Logistical Command is to create an Army Education Center utilizing 1st Logistical Command manpower, materials, and funds whenever there are sufficient 1st Logistical Command personnel to justify this action. Whenever this number falls below that authorized in the regulations, however, the existence of the center is re-evaluated. The fact that other U.S. Armed Forces personnel are in the area doesn't create a requirement that can be justified by the 1st Logistical Command. At one other location this same policy was applied with Headquarters, USARV asking that the center remain in operation to service tactical units located nearby. USARV implied that they required established centers to remain open whenever sufficient U.S. Armed Forces personnel were located in the local area of operation. USARV was silent on how manpower and facilities authorization would be processed in such cases.

e. The staffing of the education centers and the Office of the Education Director, this headquarters, remains a problem in that qualified Education Services Officers will not volunteer to undertake a tour of duty in Vietnam under the conditions presently found here. They object to the hardships and lack of proper facilities found at the 1st Logistical Command sites and the inducements we offer are not sufficient to cause them to volunteer for duty in Vietnam. Those who do accept our offer are usually looking towards advancement in grade or for the increased pay allowable to them after their return to CONUS.

f. Transportation of Education Services Officers at 1st Logistical Command sites is a problem in that they are unable to maintain control over off-duty classes when transportation is not available from their quarters to classroom locations. Also, they are unable to visit units located outside the compound or at some distance from their offices. When they have transportation they can do much to assist unit commanders in contacting men at work to ascertain their educational needs. Without this personal contact very little success is discernible in some of the units. In an attempt to correct this deficiency, fifteen vehicles were requested from the Central Welfare Fund (CWF) after being rejected by local Central Post Fund Councils. CWF initially approved the request with some modification. However, the recall of all CWF monies on 31 December 1968 postponed the implementation of this request. This condition is expected to be alleviated during the final quarter of fiscal year 1969 so that vehicles can be purchased and issued to education officers.

2. (U) Project Smart.

a. Publicity and other direct support during this reporting period have increased participation in the Project Smart program to the extent that over 500 ideas were processed. March was declared Project Smart Month. Following the request of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel for input to the program, a noticeable flow of ideas emanated from the staff directorates and greater effort was put forth to evaluate ideas passed to them by the Recorder.

b. Project Smart causes some problems having to do with its overlap into the other areas concerning ideas submitted under the Army Suggestion Program, Project Maconomy, Cost Reduction, and Zero Defects. Normally ideas concerning complaints, housekeeping, and compliance with regulations do not qualify under any of these more formal plans. Ideas of great significance in logistics improvement may appear in Project Smart but should be quickly re-routed to the appropriate system for immediate review, evaluation, and possible adoption. Project Smart may be the cause of a good idea being sidetracked but, at worst, it would cause only a few weeks delay in a more formal submission. There also is concern from the Incentive Awards Committee that Project Smart might be causing good ideas to flow to Project Smart and away from the other plans. It was explained that Project Smart was interested in creating ideas, regardless of type or source, so that the science of logistics as practiced in the 1st Logistical Command could be improved. Also, each idea submitted under Project Smart is routed through the office having primary responsibility over the subject. The routing document includes a request that the idea be considered under these other reporting systems while being reviewed and evaluated under Project Smart criteria.

3. (U) Local Nation Safety Program "AN TOAN".

a. As a result of an extremely large number of Local National becoming casualties or fatalities, a Local National safety program has been initiated. This program has been given the name "AN TOAN" which means "SAFETY" in Vietnamese.

b. The following actions were implemented to reverse this unfavorable trend:

(1) The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was requested to support the "AN TOAN" program.

(2) A safety education program in elementary schools has been implemented.

(3) Spot safety announcements are broadcast on the local radio stations.

(4) The Provost Marshal, the local police, and the 1st Logistical Command have made a concentrated effort in the area of traffic safety.

(5) Visits were made to the mayors of local towns and villages to gain their support for the "AN TOAN" program.

(6) Authorization has been obtained from United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) for six Local National safety officers to be used in the program.

(7) A safety survey has been conducted in each support command to locate hazardous or unsafe conditions. Conditions that were revealed are now being corrected.

(8) Safety patrols have been established to locate and alleviate possible highway safety hazards.

(9) The support commands have been advised that appropriations for the training of adult safety supervisors are available through direct hire funds.

(10) A Local National Safety Poster Program is now being conducted. These posters are drawn by a Local National safety officer and reproduced at this headquarters.

c. The greatest problem in this program is the language barrier plus the high illiteracy rate among the Local Nationals. Therefore, the "AN TOAN" program is directed at the school children who in turn can relate to the older members of their families the lessons they have been taught concerning traffic safety.

4. (U) Accident Reduction.

a. A review of the 1st Logistical Command's accident statistics for the third quarter FY 69 shows a downward trend. If all units continue to implement the safety measures recommended by this headquarters, the goal set forth by the command can be attained.

b. The following actions are being implemented to meet the goal:

(1) Publication of command letters reflecting accident statistics and reduction goals and directing strong emphasis on all aspects of safety.

(2) Safety Bulletins and Lessons Learned are continually distributed to all subordinate units.

(3) Increased distribution of safety posters and educational material.

(4) Safety directors have been directed to report to this headquarters actions they have taken to reduce accidents. These reports are given careful consideration with a view to dissemination of information concerning programs or ideas which merit command-wide application.

5. (U) Pride 1st (Ten Trong) Program.

a. 1st Logistical Command Circular 11-1 was published 12 March 1969 implementing the Pride 1st Program. The program has as its objectives:

(1) To improve the morale, discipline, and esprit de corps of all personnel in the 1st Logistical Command and to inculcate new personnel with the concept of the necessity of comradeship.

(2) To motivate individuals to protect themselves by protecting each other from hazards, which confront every soldier involved in counterinsurgency warfare.

(3) In the Pride 1st Program it is everyone's responsibility, from commanders to the lowest ranking individual, to work as a team in achieving the highest level of personal readiness. The Pride 1st Program is aimed at making each individual think before he acts, with the goal of helping each other, thereby eliminating or drastically reducing the waste of human resources and financial losses resulting from courts martial and non-judicial punishment.

(4) The Pride 1st Program is an individual, group, unit, and command effort to give all 1st Logistical Command personnel a better opportunity to use their full resources as members of our team. Conscientious effort by all concerned will reduce offenses, primarily those "foolish" offenses which prove costly to the individual, his family, this Command, and the United States Army.

(5) Pride 1st is the image portrayed by every serviceman, which in turn reflects the image of his unit, this Command, and the United States Army in Vietnam. We have reason to be proud as American soldiers and every soldier will be encouraged to display his pride through camaraderie and esprit de corps.

b. Responsibilities.

(1) The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, through the Personnel Activities Review Board and the ACofS, Personnel, is responsible for:

(a) Supervision of the Pride 1st Program.

(b) Implementing all phases of the program and furnishing plans to assure continuation and effectiveness of the program.

(c) Programming, coordinating, and monitoring progress reports received from subordinate commands.

(d) Implementing new plans and techniques as required.

(2) The Information Officer, this headquarters, will provide continuous publicity of the Pride 1st Program through all available news media.

(3) Staff section chiefs and commanders of units and activities will expend maximum effort and publicity to insure the success of this program. Company/detachment, battalion, group and support command commanders will submit monthly reports as required by Circular 11-1.

(4) Battalion commanders will be responsible for determining the unit within their battalion with the lowest percentage of offenses and designating that unit as the Pride 1st unit for the next month.

(5) Each military member of this Command will endeavor to attain the objectives outlined in paragraph 3 above and the Pride 1st Code of Conduct.

c. Procedures.

(1) When a soldier is assigned to a unit of the 1st Logistical Command, he is given an initial orientation on the Pride 1st Program.

(2) Each company-size unit of the command will construct a Pride 1st Board showing its "mean" and "foolish" offenses by percentage, monthly.

(3) Each battalion will award a Pride 1st streamer monthly to its company with the lowest percentage of incidents.

(4) Pride 1st Code of Conduct cards will be distributed throughout the entire command so that each soldier of the 1st Logistical Command will carry one.

(5) A continuing Pride 1st poster campaign is being conducted emphasizing pride in unit and self.

(6) Command letters are being published emphasizing lessons learned when soldiers fail to follow the principles of the Pride 1st Program.

(7) Staff visits are periodically made to companies of the command to discuss the Pride 1st Program and seek improvements in reaching every soldier.

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ANNEX C (C) ACofS, PERSONNEL, Civil Affairs Division

1. (U) The civil affairs activities of the 1st Logistical Command are designed to provide technical and material support for the people of Vietnam, and to assist the GVN in its efforts of nation-building. The activities are designed to improve the living conditions of the populace and to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people for their government. Civil affairs activities include both civic action and community relations type programs. The initial objective of this command is to develop high-impact, short-term projects which are desired and needed by the people. Primarily, these programs are designed to encourage the Vietnamese people to "help themselves". Several of the programs which the command has initiated are discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. (U) The program developed to assist Vietnamese Scouting is continuing to develop as a large number of Vietnamese youths are being reached. The objectives of this program are as follows: to promote the development of leadership, national identity, and social consciousness amongst the Vietnamese youths; to encourage cooperation and mutual understanding between the Government of South Vietnam and the youth of the nation; and to assist in the development and strengthening of the Vietnamese Boy Scout Association while encouraging its participation in construction, social action, and nation-building activities. The Vietnamese Scout Association provides an excellent opportunity to assist the nation in establishing a stable future through the development of its youth. Presently there are 44 Explorer, Boy, Girl, and Cub Scout Troops being supported or assisted by this command. The support of scouting, as well as other youth activities, is an area in which this command can lend significant assistance due to the large number of military personnel with scouting and youth activity backgrounds and because of the stabilized locations of the logistical base areas.

3. (U) Another project which this command has developed is that of support for the Vietnamese Animal Husbandry Program. In the past, when foodstuff was condemned by the veterinarian food inspectors, it was taken to the sanitary fill and destroyed. In many instances, the food was fit for human consumption. However, due to its storage, the taste and appearance had reached a point where it no longer met the requirements established in AR 40-656. The Animal Husbandry Program consists of donating condemned foodstuffs from the ports and edible waste from the mess halls to the Vietnamese for animal consumption. The Vietnamese are presently establishing ARVN military farms which will provide protein supplement to the soldier's diet. The main reason for the success and growth of this program is that the logistical base areas have a continuous supply of condemned foodstuff, as well as large quantities of edible garbage from its numerous mess halls. Thus the command is in a position to contribute significantly to the

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development of the Animal Husbandry Program. Assistance is not only provided to the ARVN farms, but also to numerous small farm cooperatives and institutions which are engaged in small-scale animal raising.

4. (U) The Long Binh Post People-to-People Program, which was implemented in September 1967, has continued to progress as planned. US Army Support Command, Saigon, is responsible for 48 hamlets with a population of 153,000 people in the Cong Thanh and Duc Tu districts of Bien Hoa Province. The program, designed to create a friendly buffer around the Long Binh area, involves weekly hamlet visits and the conducting of intensive civic action programs in the districts adjacent to Long Binh Post.

5. (C) As an outgrowth of the success of the Long Binh People-to-People Program, this headquarters has developed a similar program for the major logistical base areas throughout the country. This plan, which was implemented in USARV OPLAN 81-68 (Campaign Plan) and LC OPLAN 1-68, gives responsibility to this headquarters for the coordination of all military civic action conducted by subordinate commands and other USARV units located within major logistical base areas. This includes support commands, sub-area commands, and contiguous population centers within a minimum radius of 11,000 meters. The program was put into effect on 1 May 1968 and has continued to progress well. The program has reduced duplication of effort and waste of resources, two of the main problems in the past.

6. (U) The development of Project "Better Relations" grew out of the need to improve the US image and to better the relationship between the Vietnamese populace and 1st Logistical Command personnel. The project is characterized by: the development of a program to help improve the sanitation conditions of the cities in which the support commands are located; the development of a safety program which will involve both US personnel and the Vietnamese populace, as traffic accidents have been a continuous deterrent to US-Vietnamese relations; the development of a program to educate US personnel on the culture, customs, and traditions of Vietnam; and, the project includes a program which will improve the Vietnamese recreational areas, playgrounds, school yards, and parks.

7. (U) The command civil affairs statistics for the period were as follows:

a. Total number of man-days (10 Hours) applied to civic action activities: 8,836.

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b. Cost of civic action projects:

(1) Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects: 16,378,511 \$VN

(2) Expenditures from the US/FWMAF Civic Action PSYWAR Fund: 881,303 \$VN.

c. Voluntary contributions:

(1) Collections: 1,708,731 \$VN

(2) Expenditures in support of civic action: 1,536,800 \$VN.

d. Percent of US Military Civic Action activities conducted jointly with:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Other FWMAF	8%	14%	13%	0%
RVNAF	13%	11%	22%	0%
US Civilian Voluntary Agencies	4%	12%	6%	5%

e. Average percent of self-help contributed by the people:

	<u>SGN</u>	<u>CRB</u>	<u>QNH</u>	<u>DNG</u>
Self-help labor	15%	5%	11%	5%
Materials furnished	85%	84%	72%	90%

f. Major Civic Action Programs:

	<u>MAN-DAYS</u>	<u>\$VN</u>
Economic	1,007	5,984,170
Education	622	1,260,900
Social Welfare	3,111	8,598,408
Transportation	488	361,861
Refugee Assistance Support	1,911	8,642,890

g. Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period:

(1) Schools	191
(2) Hospitals/Dispensaries	69
(3) Orphanages	112
(4) Seminaries	3
(5) Scout Troops	44

h. Construction Projects:

	<u>BUILT</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>
(1) Dwellings	54	546
(2) Roads (km)	2	6
(3) Churches	1	29
(4) Hospitals	2	52
(5) Dispensaries	3	20
(6) Market Places	4	7
(7) Schools	8	29
(8) Bridges	2	2
(9) Hamlet Offices	0	2
(10) Playgrounds	1	0
(11) Water Towers	0	1
(12) Wells	1	0

i. Educational Efforts:

<u>TYPE CLASS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF CLASSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>
(1) English Language	154	1,504
(2) Forklift Operator	1	15
(3) Typing	1	17
(4) Card-O-Punch	1	5
(5) Sanitation	1	35

j. Training:

<u>TYPE TRAINING</u>	<u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u>
(1) Nurses Aide	13
(2) Machine Operator	67
(3) Husbandry	13
(4) Interpreter	6
(5) Kitchen Helper	14
(6) Cook	4
(7) Carpenter	10
(8) Laborer	44
(9) Painter	2
(10) Maintenance Personnel	43
(11) Health Technidian	2

k. Commodities Distributed:

(1) Cement (lbs)	559,670
(2) Tin Sheets (ea)	6,791

(3) Lumber (bd ft)	1,026,856
(4) Paint (gal)	536
(5) Firewood (lbs)	10,000
(6) Metal Grate (lbs)	100
(7) Bricks (ea)	55,300
(8) Sand (cu mtr)	376
(9) Nails (lbs)	2,171
(10) Rebar (ft)	5,244
(11) Barbed Wire	20
(12) Poles (ea)	40
(13) PSP (ea)	1,000
(14) Gravel (lbs)	30,000
(15) Sandbags (ea)	1,000
l. Kits distributed (health, school and refugee)	1,306
m. Food donated	214,500
n. Clothing distributed (lbs)	19,530
o. Health items (soap, toothpaste, etc)	182,828
p. Agricultural tools donated	159
q. Milk donated (gal)	17,000
r. Edible garbage (lbs)	2,124,200
s. Salvage water trailer donated	1

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ANNEX P (C) ADJUTANT GENERAL

1.(U) Technical inspections of thirteen postal units were completed to determine whether operations were being conducted in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and directives. A special inspection was conducted of all postal units to determine the following:

a. If proper procedures for the selling of money orders were being adhered to.

b. That documents in the form of MACV Forms 385 and commander's certificates were being used. Data concerning these inspections are at Inclosure two.

2.(U) Special emphasis has been placed on the control and issuance of postal money orders to prevent money order manipulation by Army postal clerks. This is a special item of interest during all postal inspections by the support commands, this headquarters and USARV.

3.(U) The requirement to closely monitor MACV Form 385 (Currency Control Form) on a daily basis has been given to postal officers at all units and activities.

4.(U) On 3 March 1969, as directed by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, operational control of 1st Logistical Command postal activities reverted to the support commands. This headquarters continues to perform technical inspections and provides staff supervision.

5.(U) APO 96309 (MACV Annex) and APO 96243 (Cholon) became operational on 13 and 16 March respectively.

6.(C) Rotational losses data is attached at Inclosure three.

7.(C) The command strength report is at Inclosure four.

8.(U) The command enlisted promotion statistics are at Inclosure five.

9.(U) Reenlistment data are attached at Inclosure six.

10.(U) Command casualty figures are attached at Inclosure seven.

11.(U) Command awards and decoration figures are attached at Inclosure eight.

12.(U) Command morale and welfare programs are attached at Inclosure nine.

13.(U) Command critical MOS's are attached as Inclosure ten.

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
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ANNEX Q (U) ACoFS, PROCUREMENT

1. (U) Purchase Requests and Commitments (PR&Cs) Received.

a. PR&Cs for both FY 69 and FY 70 have been received during the current reporting period. On 1 February 1969 PR&Cs for FY 69 numbered 1157, and were valued at \$275.5 million. By 30 April 1969 the total number of PR&Cs received for FY 69 had increased to 1580, valued at \$299.1 million. On 1 February 1969 PR&Cs for FY 70 numbered 15, with a value of \$2.1 million. On 30 April 1969 FY 70 PR&Cs totaling 64 had been received, with a combined dollar value of \$84.9 million. Analysis revealed that 423 FY 69 PR&Cs valued at \$23.6 million were received during this period, while FY 70 PR&Cs increased by 49, with a combined dollar value of \$82.8 million.

b. It is anticipated that the number of PR&Cs received for FY 69 will fall short of the number received during FY 68. During FY 68 PR&Cs destined from the Inventory Control Center VN (ICCV) to San Francisco Procurement Agency were routed through this agency; now, such PR&Cs are routed directly from the ICCV to San Francisco. The following chart shows the Purchase Requests and Commitments received activity for FY 67 - FY 69.




2. (U) Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) Distribution. The 423 PR&Cs valued at \$23.6 million received during this reporting period were distributed by this agency as follows:

a. 116 PR&Cs valued at \$300,000 were forwarded to other WESTPAC agencies towards the purchase of fresh fruits and vegetables, tugs, barges and buses.

b. 117 PR&Cs valued at \$300,000 were forwarded to CONUS, to be used in the purchase of small dollar value supply type items.

c. 190 PR&Cs valued at \$23.0 million were retained by this agency and applied to satisfy requirements concerning repairs and utilities, stevedoring, trucking and maintenance services. Purchase Request and Commitment distribution for FY 69 and FY 70 is shown graphically below.

PURCHASE REQUEST & COMMITMENT DISTRIBUTION



3. (U) Distribution of Requirements. The value of requirements received for 1 February - 30 April 1969 was \$23.6 million, distributed as follows:

a. Repairs and Utilities required \$15.5 million, bringing its FY 69 total to \$119.8 million.

b. Transportation - \$300,000 was required, bringing FY 69 totals to \$82.6 million.

c. Supplies - needed \$700,000, with FY 69 requirements reaching \$29.8 million.

d. Subsistence - Requirements were \$1.1 million, with FY 69 total \$32.6 million.


e. Maintenance - Required \$1.2 million, with FY 69 total as of 30 April 1969 \$15.7 million.

f. Services - Required \$1.4 million, bringing its FY 69 total to \$11.3 million.


g. POL - Yearly requirements remained static at \$2.7 million for FY 69.

h. Miscellaneous - \$1.0 million worth of requirements were received in this area, bringing FY 69 totals to \$4.6 million. The distribution of requirements for FY 69 & 70 is graphically represented in the following charts.

DISTRIBUTION OF REQUIREMENTS
FY 69



DISTRIBUTION OF REQUIREMENTS, FY 70



4. (U) Contracts under administration.


a. Total contracts presently under administration number 241, with a value of \$592.5 million. The downward trend in contracts administered since July is attributable to the retirement of 195 inactive contracts. Sixteen contracts were retired during the past three months.

b. Of the 241 contracts presently under administration, 170 valued at \$278.2 million are classified as active, with the remaining 71 valued at \$314.3 million considered inactive. Inactive contracts are those where the contractor has completed performance but the contract has not been closed out because of some pending administrative action such as payment of final invoices, negotiation of final overhead or settlement of disputes.


c. Those active contracts presently under administration consist of three types: firm fixed price, fixed price indefinite quantity, and cost plus fixed fee. Net active firm fixed price contracts under administration

have increased by 10 this reporting period, for a total of 51 valued at \$9.6 million, while net active firm fixed price indefinite quantity contracts have increased by 5, for a total of 107 valued at \$90.5 million. The number of active cost plus fixed fee contracts has remained constant at 12, with a value of \$278.2 million. This last includes all the large requirements for repairs and utilities.


d. Purchase orders rose by 19, for a FY 69 total of 203 valued at \$300,000. Twenty three delivery orders were received, bringing the total to 212 with a value of \$1.1 million. Blanket purchase agreements increased by 34 to bring the total for FY 69 to 202 valued at \$6.4 million. Contract administration activity is shown graphically in the following charts.




CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION ACTIVE VS INACTIVE



CONTRACTS UNDER ADMINISTRATION ACTIVE




5. (U) US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam Advanced Procurement Planning. Fifty one Advance Procurement Plans were developed to cover all known requirements over \$100,000. It is hoped that the bulk of the PR&Cs would arrive prior to the end of April, so as to allow agency personnel a full two months to secure competition and lower contract prices. While a goal of 51 requirements was set for the end of April, a mere 26 were received. This shortfall is partially attributable to various review and approval actions added to the requirement review process since the beginning of the fiscal year. It should be noted that until PR&Cs reach the agency, no procurement action can be initiated. Advanced Procurement Planning performance is graphically shown on the following chart.



6. (U) Decommittments. Decommittments, graphically shown on the following chart, during the reporting period totaled \$24.0 million, bringing FY 69 totals to \$35.7 million.

DECOMMITMENTS - FY-1969



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ANNEX R (C) T-DAY PLANNING

1. (C) Technical assistance required to support T-Day/R-Day has been identified and a request submitted to higher headquarters. This technical assistance package requested 1482 personnel from the various commodity commands.
2. (C) The 1st Logistical Command has been tasked with the operation of staging areas at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Saigon and Vung Tau. The purpose of establishing staging areas is to provide units being deployed with an area where transport equipment may be cleaned, preserved and packaged for shipment. Facilities to support the staging operation have been identified, and work projects for improvement of these facilities have been submitted to USAFV.
3. (U) Two hydro jet pumps were received in the command and are presently undergoing tests at Saigon Support Command to determine suitability for post T-Day operations. This stainless steel pump with its stainless steel pistons and check valves uses 3.2 gallons for water per minute at 10,000 p.s.i.
4. (U) A packaging and preservation team from Army Material Command visited the command in February 1969. The purpose of their visit was to standardize packing and preservation materials required for retrograde of cargo during the T-Day/R-Day period. As a result of their visit this command has requested necessary materials and special tools required to support redeployment operations.
5. (U) Staff sections within Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command have identified major tasks and specific tasks that must be accomplished to effectively execute T-Day/R-Day operations. Modified Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) type charts have been developed to monitor progress.

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ANNEX S (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. (U) Inspector General assistance was extended to 408 members of the command. Approximately 61% of the requests for assistance received concerned dissatisfaction with assignment, disciplinary matters, promotion and pay. Of the 79 complaints processed, 32 were justified. There were 95 Annual General Inspections conducted. A total of 3 units received a rating of unsatisfactory. Supply, maintenance, training and security continued to be major areas of interest.

2. (U) Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated:

IG, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 266th Supply & Service Battalion (DS)	20 February 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 29th General Support Group	21 February 1969
670th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	5 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 36th Transportation Battalion	6-7 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 124th Transportation Command (Tml)	9-10 April 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 159th Transportation Battalion	18-19 April 1969
538th Transportation Company (Med Trk)(Petrol)	22 April 1969
512th Quartermaster Company (Petrol Oper)	23 April 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 64th Quartermaster Battalion (Petrol Oper)	24 April 1969

IG, USASUPCOM, SAIGON

231st Transportation Company	14-15 February 1969
544th Transportation Company	17-18 February 1969

19th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	1 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 4th Transportation Command	3-4 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 125th Transportation Command	5-6 March 1969
US Army Terminal, Newport	7 March 1969
94th Maintenance Company (Div)(DS)	11 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 7th Transportation Battalion	14-15 March 1969
Personnel Services Center	18-20 March 1969
590th Maintenance Support Company (DS)	21 March 1969
Headquarters & Main Support Company 185th Combat Support Battalion	25-26 March 1969
US Army Mortuary, Vietnam	28 March 1969
Saigon Logistical Support Activity (Prov)	29 March 1969
54th Ordnance Company (Ammo)	1-2 April 1969
47th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	4-5 April 1969
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 71st Transportation Battalion	7 April 1969
154th Transportation Company (TS)	8-9 April 1969
368th Transportation Company (TS)	9-10 April 1969
402d Transportation Company (TT)	11-12 April 1969
551st Transportation Company (TS)	14-15 April 1969
372d Transportation Company (TT)	15-16 April 1969
567th Transportation Company (TS)	17-18 April 1969
624th Supply and Service Company	21-22 April 1969

534th Transportation Company (Med Trk)	24-25 April 1969
483d Field Service Company (GS)	28-29 April 1969

IG, USASUPCOM, CAM RANH BAY

Headquarters & Headquarters Company 36th Transportation Battalion (Pre AGI)	3-4 February 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 54th General Support Group	10-11 February 1969
148th Supply and Service Company	12 February 1969
50th Army Postal Unit	13 February 1969
22d Finance Section	13 February 1969
129th Main Support Company	14 February 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 124th Transportation Command (Pre AGI)	27-28 February 1969
442d Transportation Company	11 March 1969
172d Transportation Company	12 March 1969
US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay (Pre AGI)	14-18 April 1969

IG, USASUPCOM, QUI NHON

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 27th Transportation Battalion	6 February 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 8th Transportation Group	11 February 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 240th Quartermaster Battalion	19 February 1969
647th Quartermaster Company	26 February 1969
514th Quartermaster Company	5 March 1969
669th Transportation Company	6 March 1969
854th Transportation Company	15 March 1969

40th Army Postal Unit	19 March 1969
560th Light Equipment Maintenance Company	20 March 1969
An Khe Detachment (Prov)	28 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 86th Maintenance Battalion	28 March 1969
Company A, US Army Depot QNH, Troop Comd	2 April 1969
Company B, US Army Depot QNH, Troop Comd	3 April 1969
264th Transportation Company	4 April 1969
Headquarters, JS Army Depot QNH, Troop Comd	8 April 1969
523d Transportation Company	16 April 1969
512th Transportation Company	17 April 1969
448th Army Postal Unit	18 April 1969

IG, USASUPCOM, DA NANG

29th Civil Affairs Company	3 February 1969
384th Quartermaster Detachment	17 February 1969
571st Ordnance Company	24 February 1969
625th Supply and Service Company	25 February 1969
126th Supply and Service Company	10 March 1969
737th Transportation Company	11 March 1969
Headquarters & Headquarters Company 336th Ordnance Battalion	24 March 1969
452d CS Company (DS)	26 March 1969
173d Quartermaster Company	7 April 1969
630th Transportation Company	8 April 1969

Headquarters and Main Support Company
513th Combat Support Battalion

21 April 1969

Headquarters and Headquarters
259th Quartermaster Battalion

22 April 1969

3. (U) The following is a summary of complaints and request for assistance received by Inspectors General, 1st Logistical Command, during the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969, computed on the basis of the rate per 1,000 troops per month.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMPLAINTS</u>		<u>REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE</u>
	<u>JUSTIFIABLE</u>	<u>UNJUSTIFIABLE</u>	
HQ, 1st Logistical Command	0.8	0.5	5.0
USASC, Saigon	0.2	0.3	2.4
USASC, Qui Nhon	0.2	0.4	3.2
USASC, Da Nang	0.2	0.4	0.9
USASC, Cam Ranh Bay	0.1	0.2	3.7
Command Wide	0.2	0.3	2.6

ANNEX T (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) The amount paid for claims within this command during the past quarter showed a increase over the previous quarter. A total of \$28,402.40 was paid for personal property claims of United States military personnel and civilians. In addition, judge advocates throughout the command handled 5868 legal assistance cases, including the preparation of correspondence and legal instruments.

2. (U) Court-martial rates (per 1000) changed as follows from the previous quarter: Summary court-martial rates increased from 1.04 to 1.14; special court-martial rates increased from 3.09 to 3.41; and general court-martial rates decreased from .07 to .06. Article 15 rates increased from 23.63 to 25.84 per 1000. Confinement rates decreased the last quarter over the previous quarter from 103 in confinement on 31 January 1969 to 44 in confinement on 30 April 1969.

3. (U) Nonjudicial punishment: The following figures represent the number of Article 15 actions imposed by commander's during the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969.

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	5	16	14	35
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	546	686	632	1864
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	212	257	187	656
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	357	368	320	1045
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>144</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>484</u>
Totals	1264	1501	1319	4084

4. (U) Supervisory review of inferior courts-martial: During the past quarter this office reviewed 610 inferior courts-martial cases received from subordinate units for correctness in law and fact:

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Special Courts-Martial	156	127	175	458
Summary Courts-Martial	<u>43</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>152</u>
Totals	199	185	226	610

5. (U) Courts-Martial: The following is breakdown of cases tried by courts-martial during the past quarter:

a. <u>General Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	2	0	4	6
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	0	0	1	1
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	0	1	1	2
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2	1	6	9
b. <u>Special Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	54	44	45	143
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	36	32	34	102
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	53	75	89	217
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>67</u>
Totals	155	166	208	529
c. <u>Summary Courts-Martial</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
HQ 1ST LOG COMD	0	0	0	0
USASUPCOM - SAIGON	35	39	31	105
USASUPCOM - CAM RANH BAY	11	13	13	37
USASUPCOM - QUI NHON	8	14	9	31
USASUPCOM - DA NANG	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
Totals	59	68	53	180

6. (U) Courts-martial rates per 1000 military personnel are furnished for the fiscal year as indicated:

	<u>1st Log Comd</u> (3d qtr, FY 69)	<u>USARV</u> (3d qtr, FY 69)	<u>Army Wide</u> (2d qtr, FY 69)
General Courts-Martial	.05	.09	.13
Special Courts-Martial	3.03	2.00	3.16
Summary Courts-Martial	1.18	.59	.72

7. (U) The following figures represent claims paid to members of this command for property lost, destroyed, or damaged incident to service under the provisions of AR 27-21 and AR 27-29:

	<u>FEB 69</u>	<u>MAR 69</u>	<u>APR 69</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Number of Claims Paid	44	52	48	144
Amount Claimed	\$10,251.30	\$12,577.40	\$12,543.76	\$35,372.46
Amount Paid	\$ 9,200.11	\$ 8,203.10	\$10,999.19	\$28,402.40

8. (U) Legal Assistance: The following is a breakdown of legal assistance problems handled during the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969.

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Adoption and Change of Name	74	13	87
Citizenship Immigration & Passports	134	34	168
Civil Rights	152	5	157
Domestic Relations & Paternity	565	187	752
Nonsupport	38	9	47
Personal Finances & Debts	251	99	350
Personal Property, Auto, Etc.	122	70	192
Powers of Attorney	579	658	1,237
Real Property, Sale, Lease, Etc.	67	39	106
Taxation	568	168	736

	<u>Interviews</u>	<u>Instruments Prepared</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Torts	8	3	11
Wills and Estates	112	119	231
Miscellaneous	<u>1,276</u>	<u>518</u>	<u>1,794</u>
Totals	3,946	1,922	5,868

ANNEX U (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (U) On 28 October 1968, the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, directed that closer controls of weapons be implemented throughout the command. Numerous regulations, messages and letters have been published requiring security and control of privately-owned and government-owned weapons, and war trophies. Weapons violations continued to be one of the primary causes for increases in serious incidents with ninety four such violations reported within the past six months. On 7 April 1969, the Commanding General released a message to all support commands and units assigned to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, inviting all personnel in the command to participate in a one-time voluntary turn-in of weapons not on record within the units. Subsequent possession of unauthorized weapons would be considered a violation of a lawful standing order. The campaign resulted in a voluntary turn-in of 885 assorted weapons. After the voluntary turn-in was completed, unit shakedown inspections revealed an additional 110 weapons. The success of the campaign lies in the fact that the program was directed to each and every individual to use his common sense. This campaign will be continued with the performance of regular shakedown inspections.

2. (U) On 12 April 1969, a program to reduce the number of serious incidents was initiated. The basic concept behind this program was to generate interest and leadership traits in the noncommissioned officers of the command by having them adopt ad hoc committees for the purpose of determining the underlying causes of serious incidents and solutions to the problem. The program to reduce serious incidents is monitored by Command Sergeants Major under the direction of the Commanding General and the Provost Marshal, 1st Logistical Command. Active participation with noncommissioned officers at unit level is expected to bring good results.

3. (U) On 15 March 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-1, Diversion of Petroleum Products, was published to alert commanders to current techniques being employed to pilfer petroleum products.

4. (U) On 19 April 1969, Physical Security Bulletin 69-2, Control of Local National Personnel, was published to advise commanders of common deficiencies noted in gate control and pass system enforcement and recommended corrective actions.

ANNEX V (U) STAFF CHAPLAIN

1. (U) Religious Services:

a. Attendance at religious services throughout 1st Logistical Command totaled 150,890. This is an increase of 23% over the previous reporting period. The percentage of the command attending services was 22.7% which exceeded the command goal of 20%. On 25 April, the Commanding General established a goal of 30% to be met by the end of June, 40% by the end of September and a further goal of 50% to be attained by 30 December.

b. The overall increase in attendance this quarter springs from a combination of two factors: Lent and Easter seasons falling during the reporting period and secondly, the implementation of Project "Chit Chat" and Project "Street Corner". Chaplains spent more time with their troops and more opportunities for attending religious services were made available. Emphasis was placed on religious services being conducted in places and at times convenient to the working schedule.

c. Each chaplain in this command conducted an average of 6.6 services per week and at least 50% of his time was spent outside his office in areas where troops were working. Project "Prayer" was initiated in March. Emphasis was placed on tying this activity with the "Know Your Men" Project. Results can not be quantified, but a number of tasks accomplished can be described. A Commander's Letter was distributed which pointed up the dignity of the individual soldier and the importance of relating well to other soldiers. By way of follow-up, the practical implications of this message were reviewed in Character Guidance classes and discussion groups.

2. (U) Personnel: As of 30 April, this command had 74 authorized TOE/TD spaces for chaplains. Seventy (70) chaplains were present for duty of which one(1) was Jewish, fifteen (15) were Catholic and fifty-four (54) were Protestant. 92 chaplain assistants were present for duty.

3. (U) Training of Chaplains: In addition to the normal monthly chaplain training conference held in the Support Commands each Support Command Staff Chaplain conducted a four hour workshop for his chaplains on the use of narcotics and drug addiction. Assistance was given by criminal investigators and by medical doctors assigned to the 44th Medical Brigade. Together, they formed a team presenting effectively some of the legal, physiological, and psychological aspects of drug addiction. Workshops on this subject are timely because chaplains must be familiar with such basic data to serve well as advisors. Chaplains

must be familiar with the legal and medical aspects of this problem to function effectively as counselors.

4. (U) Civic Action: Chapel offerings to community relations projects amounted to 2,464,414 RVN\$. The following breakdown is submitted:

	Churches	Schools & Orphanages	Misc	Total
February	283,518	242,072	195,464	721,054
March	249,588	286,422	377,410	913,420
April	150,848	423,254	255,838	829,940
TOTAL	<u>683,954</u>	<u>951,748</u>	<u>828,712</u>	<u>2,464,414</u>

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ANNEX X (C) SIGNAL OFFICE

1. (C) The Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminal facilities for Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and Cam Ranh Bay Support Command remain fully installed and operational. The terminal facility at Qui Nhon Support Command is fully installed and is waiting cutover to the Secure Switchboard (SECORD) in the Qui Nhon Area. The terminal facility at Da Nang Support Command is installed and waiting connection to the SECORD in the Da Nang Area. USAF communications personnel at Da Nang were working on the connecting circuit during the week of 20-26 April 1969, and the circuit is expected to be operational shortly. An AUTOSEVOCOM terminal facility for Saigon Support Command is being programmed for Phase II, AUTOSEVOCOM, however planning is not sufficiently advanced to give a schedule for installation. AUTOSEVOCOM provides secure voice communications throughout Vietnam and the world-wide network.

2. (U) The 1st Logistical Command Communications Center (CommCenter) cut over a 100wpm full duplex teletype circuit to the Long Binh Area CommCenter on 5 February 1969. This circuit gives Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command world-wide routing capabilities. Since the CommCenter became operational in November 1968 there has been a 700% increase in message volume. Total traffic volume of ten thousand messages per month is anticipated by 30 April 1969.

3. (FOUO) Inspections of secure facilities and procedures were conducted within the 1st Logistical Command CommCenter on following dates.

- a. 13 March 1969 - 524th MI Det, no deficiencies noted.
- b. 21 March 1969 - 101st Radio Research Company, no deficiencies noted.
- c. 14 April 1969 - 525th MI Gp, Technical Inspection of facility.

4. (C) Over the past several months 101st Radio Research Company has monitored 1st Logistical Command Telephone circuits, and radio nets. This monitoring reveals a continuing weakness in communications security. Several serious transmission security violations have been disclosed. The most common violations noted were:

- a. Disclosing unit strengths and locations over unsecure telephones.
- b. Disclosing frequencies, call signs, unit designations, and locations over radio.

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command continues an active program to remind all personnel of this command of their responsibility to enforce communications discipline and reduce violations of this type.

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GROUP-1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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5. (U) The Delta communications project has been brought to a successful conclusion. As a result of concerted efforts by personnel from Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, USARV-CE, and Saigon Support Command Signal Office, an effective Delta wide FM radio net was designed and placed in operation by the 159th Transportation Battalion. The last station was placed in operation in early March after the final items of equipment were obtained and delivered. The Battalion notified this Headquarters that the net was operational about the middle of March. The Signal Officer then arranged to have a team, composed of himself, and personnel from Security, Plans and Operations, and USARV-CE, to conduct an operational test of the system. The team travelled the Delta for a period of 4 days to determine if the net would provide adequate, efficient communications. The findings of the team disclosed that although several minor problems still existed, the FM radio net is in fact operational and is capable of providing adequate command and control communications for the 159th Transportation Battalion throughout the Mekong Delta.

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ANNEX Y (U) COMBAT SECURITY

1. (U) On 2 April 1969, five infantry Lieutenant Colonels were assigned to the 1st Logistical Command as Special Assistants to the Commanding General for Combat Security (SACS). One officer was assigned to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command and one to each of the four support command headquarters.

2. (U) These officers provide advice to the respective commanders on matters relating to combat security within the command to include defense of logistical installations and activities, convoy and pipeline security, coordination with tactical elements, training of security guards, development of SOPs and directives concerning security, and other duties in the area of combat security as directed by the Commanding General. The area of interest of these officers will encompass all aspects of combat security; however, their duties will in this way relieve other staff sections of their security functions. The SACS will work with all echelons of command on a cooperative basis with the objective of making immediate improvements on the ground. Actions to be taken based on SACS reports will be handled through normal staff and command channels.

SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED:
OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (U) PERSONNEL

1. (U) Labor Pool Concept for Vinnell Contracts at Cam Ranh Bay.

a. OBSERVATION: Since April 1966 the Vinnell Corporation has provided numerous logistical services at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) in the support of US and Free World Forces. Due to the high degree of uncertainty of a year's requirements as a result of a constantly changing tactical situation, these services are performed under a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract. Under a CPFF contract all allowable and allocable costs incurred in performance of the contract are reimbursed the contractor. In addition, the Government agrees to pay a fixed fee to the contractor for managing and doing the work. Manning ceilings are established for each operation using as a guide technical evaluations of the contractor's proposed manner of performing the task. When the contract is negotiated and finally awarded, these manning ceilings are stated as totals for each line item or task in the contract. Manning levels have in the past been held by the Government and the contractor as absolute limits beyond which staffing of the individual line items is not authorized. Under this concept, fluctuations of work load among the line items did not permit adjustment of the work force beyond the manning ceiling established for each line item.

b. EVALUATION: The problem described above was discussed during a 1st Logistical Command Contract Performance Board of Review (CPBR) in November 1968. As a result of this meeting a labor pool concept was developed. The Government's position was that personnel ceilings established for each of the services did not require mandatory hiring to meet the ceiling regardless of whether there was work to be done, nor did it restrict cross utilization of the total work force as work requirements dictated. On 25 February 1969 a formal supplemental agreement was entered into, making the labor pool concept a formal requirement of the contract. Good management practice dictates full utilization of available manpower. Careful and continuous matching of available manpower with current job requirements results in quicker service and possible monetary savings.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Procurement)

2. (U) Implementation of Military Justice Act of 1968.

a. OBSERVATION: The Military Justice Act of 1968, effective 1 August 1969, requires that the accused be represented at a special court-martial by lawyer counsel certified as competent to perform such duties by the Judge Advocate General of the Army under Article 27(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice. Currently there are insufficient numbers of JAGC officers available to perform such duties.

b. EVALUATION: During the quarter, this headquarters, at the request of The Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, has conducted a survey of all non-JAG lawyers within the command. A number of these officers

was recommended to the Judge Advocate General of the Army as being qualified to be certified as trial and defense counsel pursuant to Article 27(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice. Classes and other forms of instruction will be held in order to train these non-JAG lawyers as counsel for special courts-martial. In addition, the list of non-JAG lawyers who were not recommended for certification is being reviewed and it is anticipated that in the future that they, too, may have to be utilized in legal and quasi-legal duties in the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968. Personnel records of officers arriving in this command are being screened for lawyer qualifications. However, a shortage of officer-lawyers exists. Additionally, a study is under way to consider various ways of implementing the Military Justice Act of 1968 within the command when it becomes effective on 1 August 1969.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Non-JAGC officers who are members of the bar be identified upon arrival in Vietnam for assignment to commands exercising general court-martial jurisdiction on an equitable basis according to assigned personnel strengths. (Staff Judge Advocate)

3. (U) Employment of ARVN Personnel on Ships.

a. OBSERVATION: ARVN personnel in Operation BUDDY are filling actual working vacancies in the ships.

b. EVALUATION: This method of operation is beneficial from two standpoints; first, it allows more rapid assimilation of the ARVN personnel into the crew which in turn facilitates their OJT, and second, limited working and living quarters on the ships necessitates this method of operation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

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B. (C) OPERATIONS

1. (C) Briefing and Graphic Display System Established for the Underground Logistics Operations Control Center (ULOCC).

a. OBSERVATION: Commencing of the evening of 22 February 1969, the Underground LOCC was opened to serve as the Command Center for the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command. This action was prompted by intelligence reports on probable increased enemy activity throughout Vietnam and particularly at Long Binh Post. After the initial rocket-mortar attack and ground probe at Long Binh early on the morning of 23 February 1969, the ULOCC was brought to a state of full manning. Senior representatives of the ACoS, Security, Plans and Operations; Ammunition; Transportation; Supply; the Director of Petroleum and the Provost Marshal occupied the ULOCC at night. The Commanding General or his immediate representative was also present and available to make critical decisions. The staff sections presented and maintained a series of detailed charts in the ULOCC depicting such vital information as ammunition and POL status; status of convoys; location and sailing time remaining of ships bearing critical cargo; and stock status of weapons, communications equipment, barrier material, and other essential supplies. Road conditions and security classification as well as the current alert status of all logistical support activities was constantly displayed. The 1st Logistical Command Tactical Airlift Liaison Officer (TALO) monitored Air Force special mission flights including combat essential and emergency resupply from the ULOCC during the hours of darkness. Excellent communications were available consisting of dial telephones, direct or "hot line" telephones, single sideband radio, and FM tactical radios. Nightly briefings were held on the intelligence situation and recent incidents of hostile activity affecting 1st Logistical Command units as well as the logistical status throughout Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION: After the ULOCC had been in constant use for several days, it became evident that a better system was needed to present briefings and graphically display information in the close confines of the underground bunker. The first step taken to improve the ease of briefings was to move a partition separating the staff portion from the command portion of the bunker, thus giving several more feet of length to the area where the briefings were conducted. A set sequence in the order of which staff sections would brief was established, and the representatives of these staff sections were then assigned working areas based on this sequence. Next a series of special charts was made to reduce the number of questions which tended to interrupt the briefings. These included charts on the alert status, enemy activity, road conditions and security classifications, casualty and damage reports, pass words, and combat essential or emergency resupply air missions flown. The various staff sections also prepared charts depicting such information as they would brief. One main chart was prepared to provide Essential Elements of Information. Questions were written on this chart by the Commanding General or his representative, and the various staff sections would in turn secure the answer and post it to the board. This precluded much verbal

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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exchange. When these several things were combined they resulted in shorter, better organized briefings and exchange of information.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

2. (G) Improved Communications Established for the ULOCC.

a. OBSERVATION: There were times when difficulty was encountered in reaching one or more of the support commands on the direct field phone. In addition, there was no direct communication with the Long Binh Tactical Operation Center (TOC) other than the dial telephone system.

b. EVALUATION: A system was developed whereby each support command was directed to call into the LOCC once each hour. The time was staggered so that one called in on the hour, one on the quarter hour, one on the half hour and one on the three quarter hour. If at any time the support command could not or did not call at the prescribed time, a call was placed from the LOCC to the appropriate support command. Good direct communications were established with the Long Binh TOC when a direct hot line telephone was installed. This added greater reliability in receiving prompt intelligence reports.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

3. (U) Improved Security for the Underground Logistics Operations Control Center (ULOCC).

a. OBSERVATION: In the event of perimeter penetration it would have been relatively easy for a sapper to approach the ULOCC and place satchel charges down the air vent or down the entranceway.

b. EVALUATION: Since the ULOCC is located in an open area with only one guard on the entrance, it was decided to erect a fence around the area of the LOCC. This made it more difficult to approach and get into the area. Then two bunkers were constructed on the hillside below, and a third at the entrance to the ULOCC itself. Next, a grill was constructed across the top of the air shaft to preclude any grenades or satchel charges from being thrown into it. Since this shaft is also used as an escape route from the ULOCC, it was necessary to construct this grill so that it could be opened from the inside. Lastly, two large concrete blocks were made and placed over the two primary electrical power access boxes so that it would be difficult to place explosive charges on these boxes, and cut off the central power. These new features combined, greatly increased the security of the ULOCC.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

4. (C) Alert Notification System for the Headquarters Improved.

a. OBSERVATION: The alert notification system in use required one person to call as many as 20 individuals, many living in BOQs with one phone serving

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32 officers. This system often required 30 or 45 minutes to implement.

b. EVALUATION: A goal was set to be able to reach all required persons in five minutes. Two large alert notification rosters were prepared, one in the upstairs LOCC and one in the underground LOCC. These rosters were divided into four sections of four or five names each, and each section was given a number. When an alert notification is received the senior person present immediately designates four persons to call the names listed in each of the four groups. This system enabled notification of all key personnel within the five minute limit.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

5. (C) V-100 Armored Cars for Organic Internal Security to Convoy Movements.

a. OBSERVATION: Transportation companies do not have organic capability to provide convoy security in a tactical environment such as we have in Vietnam. Currently, the 18th Military Police Brigade provides some area convoy security services to 1st Logistical Command convoys. Because of the extensive areas of military police responsibility and distribution of their limited resources, this service does not fulfill all of the requirements for escort security of the 1st Logistical Command convoys. Hence, transportation truck units must provide their own internal security. Though these transportation units perform the same security function as the 18th Military Police Brigade provides during convoy escort, their capabilities are greatly reduced due to the lack of armored cars. Inherent security capabilities are of utmost importance for transportation companies in a combat zone such as Vietnam where there are no clearly defined battle areas or secure areas.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) Immediate advantages to be gained by using the armored car are threefold:

(a) A reduction in the number of security personnel required to accomplish a comparable security function.

(b) An increase in the protection afforded convoy security personnel.

(c) A reduction in the number of task vehicles diverted from their primary mission. In addition, when under attack, the crew of the V-100 can "button up" against small arms fire and still continue the mission effectively.

(2) Hardened vehicles presently used for convoy security have proven their worth on numerous occasions; however, they have several disadvantages.

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(a) The use of cargo vehicles for security degrades the cargo carrying capability of transportation units.

(b) The continuous use of these vehicles with the additional weight of the armor plating causes accelerated washout of the hardened vehicles.

(c) Gunners on hardened vehicles are exposed to hostile fire. These vehicles are often the first targets of an enemy ambush and personnel in the vehicles have sustained heavy casualties.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the request which was submitted through the United States Army Combat Development Command (USACDC) recommending the use of organic V-100 armored cars instead of the hardened organic vehicles in transportation units as is current doctrine by approved and implemented.

6. (C) Underwater Noise Detector (Hydrophone).

a. OBSERVATION: A continuous threat of swimmer sapper attacks exists throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Sappers are perhaps the most highly trained enemy we face in Vietnam, and detection of these swimmer sappers is very difficult. In some cases, charges planted by the sapper have been discovered attached to bridges, ship hulls, anchor chains and piers before they were able to do their damage. Yet, in other cases, the sapper has been successful, and the price paid for failure to detect his activity was very high.

b. EVALUATION: Personnel assigned as guards on bridges, docks, piers and anchored vessels have been instructed in the methods of employing concussion grenades in the water at random intervals as a deterrent against swimmer sapper attacks. They are also directed to fire at debris floating in the water. The Port Security and Waterways Detail, United States Coast Guard, Office of the Provost Marshal, 1st Logistical Command, sought the assistance of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in developing and testing an underwater swimmer detector. A detector, the hydrophone, consisting of a sensitive waterproof microphone, conductive wire, headset and battery power pack was fabricated and shipped to the Officer in Charge, Port Security and Waterways Detail, for testing and evaluation. Tests were conducted under realistic conditions. A friendly swimmer was instructed to cut a random number of wires at different distances from the submerged hydrophone, swim about and plant "charges". The hydrophone not only detected these sounds but also all background noises caused by debris striking the protective wires, and other water noises. By reducing the pickup level, the swimmer activity was masked. In effect, the hydrophone worked too well, and as a result, many false alarms were reported. Operation of the hydrophone, while simultaneously employing concussion grenades, rendered the hydrophone inoperative. Therefore, if the hydrophone were to be used, the use of concussion grenades would have to be discontinued. The hydrophone assembly was returned to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center with a complete evaluation report for further evaluation and

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testing. Interrogation of captured enemy swimmer sappers has disclosed that the thing they fear most is the concussion grenade. Employment of grenades must be encouraged and, in fact, insisted upon particularly in critical locations and areas where sappers have been detected previously. LC Reg 190-35, Security of Ports and Waterways (U), will be published and will provide the policies that should be followed to prevent attacks by swimmer sappers. Additional directives will be published by this headquarters in the near future.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

7. (C) Conversion of 175mm Gun M107 and 8 Inch Howitzer M110.

a. OBSERVATION: During the period November 1968 through February 1969, ten 175mm guns were converted to 8 inch howitzers. This headquarters had no prior knowledge of the impending conversion of the first eight tubes, and only one month advance notice of the last two. The effect of this conversion on the stock status of 8 inch ammunition was to increase requirements during the period from the first conversion in November to first remedial supply action in March by 28,110 over that originally planned for. Since the order and ship time for Class V is 90 days, even though requisitions submitted in January accounted for the increased requirements, it was not until March/April that the stocks actually arrived in theater. The increased 8 inch Howitzer weapon density automatically increased the safety level and the stockage objective, and combined with the increased consumption, caused the stock status of 8 inch ammunition to go considerably below the safety level until supply action could be consummated to remedy the situation.

b. EVALUATION: Tactical commanders have the option to convert 175mm guns and 8 inch Howitzers as the tactical situation requires. As pointed out, the conversion of a significant number of tubes can have a significant impact on the stock status until the pipeline can react. To reduce this impact, and to increase the capability of this command to support sudden conversions, coordination was effected with Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) to establish the safety levels for the 175mm and 8 inch ammunition based upon the maximum expected number of each weapon as the result of potential conversions. The operating level continues to be computed at the actual density of each weapon at the time of requisitioning. Thus, an increased capability exists to provide required support when conversions must be made with little or no advance notice.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That continuous liaison be made between tactical and logistical staffs to provide as much advance notice as possible regarding proposed tube conversions.

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(2) That off-shore reserves of 175mm and 8 inch ammunition be constituted and available for call-forward in the event tube conversion coincides with intense combat activity which exceeds the capability of the pipeline to respond. (ACofS, Ammunition)

8. (FOUO) Security of Logistical Installations and Activities.

a. OBSERVATION: The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, assigned the task of improving the security and defensive posture of the command to Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey, the Deputy Commanding General. This was a natural choice because of General Ramsey's extensive service in tactical units. Based on his observations during the frequent visits to subordinate units, Major General Ramsey prepared a paper on lessons learned relating to security of logistics installations. This was given wide distribution in order that subordinate commanders could apply the lessons learned to situations in their units. The paper is attached hereafter.

b. EVALUATION: See following paper.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND
APO 96384

AVCA GO-S

29 March 1969


SUBJECT: Lessons Learned from Security Inspections

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The success of some recent enemy initiated actions against several 1st Logistical Command installations has served to make it clear that despite precautions and actions taken prior to the initiation of the current increased tempo, there remain significant weaknesses in the recognition and correction of potential hazards to perimeter security.
2. There is no substitute for experience whether gained through years of service and contact with the enemy or whether gained as a result of recent enemy encounter. The attached lessons learned have been prepared as a result of the type of experience cited above and are designed to serve as a valuable guide to all concerned.
3. Personnel at all levels will examine existing defenses to insure that the attached lessons learned are applied where necessary. Such action as is necessary to comply with this requirement and to upgrade defense measures as required, will be taken expeditiously.

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JOS. M. HEISER, JR.
Major General, USA
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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned from Security Inspections

1. Perimeter Defense:

a. Mutual Support.

(1) OBSERVATION: Many fighting bunkers are not sited to permit mutual support. In one recent incident, a guard suspected that the enemy had infiltrated between his bunker and the one to his right. Not having a firing port on the affected side through which he could observe and protect the other bunker, he had to step outside the rear of his position to observe. He was successful in killing a VC who had penetrated the perimeter between the two bunkers. Other instances have been noted in which adjacent bunkers are hidden from view, one from the other, by intervening terrain or natural growth. The enemy is adept at infiltrating and isolating positions which he has determined can be attacked without receiving fire from nearby bunkers.

(2) EVALUATION: It is essential that bunkers have good observation to all sides and are sited so that they are capable of providing mutual support as well as interlocking fires to the front. Commanders, when siting defensive positions should place themselves in the role of the enemy and determine, by ground reconnaissance, that mutual support is provided.

b. Restricted Vision.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some bunkers have been partially covered with shelter halves to provide shade for the guards. Such devices restrict the vision of the guards and in some case prevent observation between bunkers.

(2) EVALUATION: The primary purpose of a bunker is to provide security. Guards must have good observation.

c. Blind Spots.

(1) OBSERVATION: Many bunkers are located in such a way that you can see the next bunker, however many times there are blind spots between them. In one area, local nationals bent on pilfering supplies, were able to cut through a cyclone fence without being detected. A sapper team would no doubt select areas such as this to breach a perimeter line.

(2) EVALUATION: Blind spots must be covered by some manner of security if bunkers cannot be sited to cover them. Mines, trip flares, dog patrols and listening posts are some examples of coverage that can be employed. The commander concerned must make a personal reconnaissance to ascertain the blind spots and decide which methods to employ.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned from Security Inspections

d. Culverts and Ditches.

(1) OBSERVATION: Culverts and ditches are excellent avenues of approach for enemy attacks. In several cases, it has been noted that these entry points lead directly into or through the perimeter and the methods employed to deny their use were inadequate.

(2) EVALUATION: Culverts should be blocked with barbed wire or concertina barriers. Undergrowth must be cleared from ditches and the ditches barred with barbed wire, concertina, mines, trip flares or other devices.

e. Brush and Foliage.

(1) OBSERVATION: In many cases brush and foliage have grown up around the perimeter fence so that an enemy can get to the fence line in daylight hours without being seen.

(2) EVALUATION: Brush and foliage must be cleared on both sides of the fence in order that guards will have an unobstructed view. The brush and foliage should be cleared by cutting, burning and or scraping. The area should be cleared inside and out as far as practicable.

f. Tower Construction.

(1) OBSERVATION: On many guard towers, the walls are so low that when the guards stand up to observe, the upper portion of their bodies are exposed to enemy fire. Other tower design deficiencies exist in many areas: wooden floors which offer no protection from projectiles or fragments coming from beneath the tower; lack of grenade baffles at platform entrances; walls which will not stop small arms projectiles; roofs which do not provide sufficient overhead protection; and, top heavy construction on inadequate supports.

(2) EVALUATION: Towers must provide adequate protection to our soldiers; otherwise, they contribute little to the overall security posture. Untenable towers invite attack and creation of gaps in the perimeter.

g. Communication.

(1) OBSERVATION: Wire lines to bunkers are poorly installed in many cases. In some instances, the lines are laid on the ground where vehicles can run over them; in other cases, they are hanging so low that they can be pulled down by personnel and vehicles moving in the area at night. At one installation, the line connecting guard towers and bunkers with the

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defense coordination center had been installed on the ground between the perimeter fence and the bunkers; consequently a cut in the line usually inactivated most of the guard telephones until repairs were made. Often the land lines to defensive positions are a patchwork of improper splices which result in weak and unreliable signals. A case was noted where three emergency switchboards (SBD22) were stacked together. The resulting resistance on the lines was such that only a few of the tower phones would ring down; unless the guards in the other towers had the receiver at their ears, they could miss calls to their locations.

(2) EVALUATION: Wire communications to bunkers and towers must be properly installed and protected. Splices in wiring should be properly made to avoid current loss. Switchboards must be of the proper capacity to handle all trunks efficiently.

h. Alternate Means of Communication.

(1) OBSERVATION: Provisions for alternate means of communication are not employed in some areas and personnel on the perimeter are not instructed what to do if their telephones are dead.

(2) EVALUATION: Commanders must insure that perimeter guards have some alternate means of communication. Jios are preferred but not always available. In their absence, flares, flashlights, whistles, gongs, runners, voice relay or other audible and visual devices can be employed.

i. Hand Grenades.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some bunkers with very small firing ports are equipped with hand grenades.

(2) EVALUATION: Attempting to throw a hand grenade, at night, through a small port creates a hazard for the bunker occupants. Grenades should not be stocked in bunkers that are not constructed with enough space for throwing grenades without being a hazard to the occupants of the bunker.

j. Unserviceable Ammunition.

(1) OBSERVATION: Dirty, corroded and damaged ammunition has been found in bunkers and towers. The most flagrant instance noted involved damaged M79 grenades. The ammunition had been removed from the normal carrying case and placed in an empty sand bag. The bunker was occupied only at night and the daily movement of the rounds to and from the position caused them to become damaged to the point that many would not fit into the chamber of the launcher.

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(2) EVALUATION: Ammunition must be accounted for and inspected for serviceability.

k. Concertina.

(1) OBSERVATION: Improper installation of concertina barriers has been noted. Single rolls merely laid on the ground or three roll pyramiding without staking and interlacing with barbed wire are the common deficiencies.

(2) EVALUATION: Single rolls of concertina laid on the ground provide little protection. Pyramiding without staking and interlacing with barbed wire can be defeated by the enemy laying a board across the top roll or using his assault technique of employing several men to throw themselves on the concertina and forming a pathway for the remainder of the force. Concertina must be wired, staked to the ground, interlaced with barbed wire, protected by flares and mines and covered by fire if it is to be an effective barrier.

l. Alertness of Guards.

(1) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that, in some areas, bunker and tower guards have been provided with lawn chairs. The reclining comfort of lawn chairs has contributed to guards being found asleep on post.

(2) EVALUATION: Guards must be alert at all times. We must take care of the comfort of our soldiers but not to the detriment of security.

m. Guard Effectiveness.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some soldiers are placed on guard in perimeter positions for periods extending up to 12 hours.

(2) EVALUATION: The soldiers involved, even though conscientious, will lose effectiveness if required to be on the alert for extended periods of time. If feasible, guards should be rotated frequently.

n. Meals for Guards.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some guards in perimeter positions are not properly fed. In some instances, they are provided "C" rations, a can of water and left to fend for themselves. In other instances, the unit failed to deliver a hot meal on time.

(2) EVALUATION: While "C" rations may be the only solution in isolated cases, hot meals can usually be provided with prior planning.

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o. Guard Orders.

(1) OBSERVATION: Inadequately briefed guards have been noted in several locations.

(2) EVALUATION: Not only must every man receive a thorough briefing on his duties before assuming his post on the perimeter, written instructions must be available at each location.

p. Weapons Training.

(1) OBSERVATION: Instances have been noted in which soldiers on the perimeter had not fired the weapons with which they are armed.

(2) EVALUATION: Familiarization firing must be conducted so that every soldier knows how to operate every weapon he might be expected to use while on guard.

q. Establishing Patterns.

(1) OBSERVATION: In many areas, definite patterns have been established; e.g., guards are relieved at the same hours, walking and motorized patrols habitually use the same routes and schedules, sentry dog patrols are employed without variations in routes or timing, weapons are fired on schedule. In one very vulnerable area, all weapons on the perimeter, were fired, in concert, once before midnight and once after midnight with little variation in timing. The commander eliminated this pattern and fired various weapons at different hours throughout the night. Shortly after changing the pattern, he fired a flare at midnight as a signal for a short burst of small arms firing. In the light of unexpected flare, two VC were discovered inside the perimeter.

(2) EVALUATION: We cannot afford to establish patterns because the enemy, observing our movements and activities, makes his plans to take advantage of times when surveillance of areas critical to him is minimal or nonexistent. An element of uncertainty may result in the enemy abandoning a sapper attack.

r. Condition of Bunkers.

(1) OBSERVATION: Many bunkers inspected were in a filthy condition and poor state of maintenance.

(2) EVALUATION: Such conditions are indicative of a lack of supervision. Soldiers who aren't sufficiently motivated to keep their fighting bunkers

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clean and in acceptable repair may not be sufficiently alert to detect the approach of an enemy.

2. Command Posts:

a. OBSERVATION: Many so-called command posts are located in buildings with little or no protection against mortar or rocket attacks. For such installations, personnel who should be manning the unit "nerve center" are directed to go to personnel shelters during attacks. In many instances, there are no communication facilities in the personnel bunkers.

b. EVALUATION: A commander without communications ceases to be a commander. It is important that personnel be protected and that communications be established in these protected areas.

3. Gates:

a. Weak Spots.

(1) OBSERVATION: Many weak spots have been noted at points where perimeter fencing is connected to gates. The most common deficiency is that only a few strands of barbed wire connect the fence to the gate and post.

(2) EVALUATION: Perimeter fencing must be equally as effective at the juncture of fence and gate as it is elsewhere.

b. Vulnerability.

(1) OBSERVATION: Gates are particularly vulnerable to sapper attacks even though they may be closed, locked and covered by fire.

(2) EVALUATION: Gates, when closed for the night, should be given additional protection by use of barricades or concertina on both sides.

4. Gate Guards:

a. Protection.

(1) OBSERVATION: In some cases, gate check points have no protective positions for guards in case of attack.

(2) EVALUATION: Gate guards must have immediate access to protected positions from which they can fight. During critical hours an exposed gate guard should be covered by a back-up guard located in a protected position.

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b. Vehicle Inspection.

(1) OBSERVATION: Vehicles being checked are often stopped where they obstruct the view of other guards.

(2) EVALUATION: Traffic must be stopped where guards not engaged in vehicle inspections can maintain an unobstructed view of the gate area to preclude unauthorized entry or exit.

c. Distraction.

(1) OBSERVATION: Gate guards have been distracted by local nationals, particularly children, and US soldiers loitering around the entrances to compounds. In one instance, three children known to be friendly with guards on a gate duty were given a package by a local national who told them it was a present for the guards from a friend. As the children approached the gate, the package exploded, killing two of the youngsters and crippling the other.

(2) EVALUATION: A gate guard, on duty, has no friends. He must perform his duties in a soldierly manner at all times.

(3) OBSERVATION: Gate, tower and bunker guards have personal radios playing in bunkers. In one instance, an installation was infiltrated near a tower in which the sentry was operating a personal radio.

(4) EVALUATION: Sentries and other guard personnel are on duty to observe and listen for the enemy. Radios, operated either with a speaker or earphones, distract the guard from the proper performance of his duty.

5. Local National Check Points.

a. OBSERVATION: LN check points are often designed so that individual are not channeled effectively into areas where they can be identified. In one specific case, it was a simple matter to bypass both the guards and the checkers without being stopped.

b. EVALUATION: LN check points must be designed to insure proper control of individuals during entry and exit of installations. Control procedures must preclude the entry or exit of unauthorized personnel.

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C. (C) TRAINING

1. (U) Training Operators of Power Generation Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Generator operators are often administrative personnel who operate power generation equipment as an extra duty.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) Review of deadline reports and correspondence regarding generator deadline has revealed that many generators were deadlined due to improper operation.

(2) Supervision of operators has also been inadequate. Many supervisors were also unfamiliar with generator operation.

(3) All subordinate commands have begun training both operators and supervisors of operators on proper methods and techniques of operating power generation equipment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That theater-wide generator operator training be established. (ACofS, Maintenance)

2. (U) Training of 6,000 pound and 10,000 pound rough terrain (RT) forklift operators.

a. OBSERVATION: Operators for the 6,000 pound and 10,000 pound RT forklifts are not familiar with the operation and maintenance of their assigned equipment.

b. EVALUATION: Visits to the port facilities and maintenance units have revealed that one of the reasons for a low operational readiness (OR) rate of RT forklifts is that operators, in many instances, lack the technical knowledge to do their job. This also includes maintenance that the operator must perform to keep his equipment operational. Lack of familiarity with the equipment being operated creates a serious safety hazard which has been responsible for many serious accidents in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That CONUS service schools place more emphasis on safe operation and operator maintenance of RT forklifts. (ACofS, Maintenance)

3. (U) Property Disposal Operations Training.

a. OBSERVATION: The lack of a training base for property disposal personnel has contributed to the management problem from within the property disposal activities. This fact is substantiated by the results of the command requested audit by the US Army Audit Agency.

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b. EVALUATION: It has been determined that such a deficiency can be filled by forming an in-country training team to conduct formal and informal classes on the receipt, storage, accounting and disposal of Foreign Excess Personal Property. Such a team would also assist the PDO's in recurring problem areas such as receipt of property in place and the handling of Department of the Navy, Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) and AF excess. Initial selection of this team will commence on 1 May 1969, with standardization and training of the team beginning on 16 May 1969. It is envisioned that this will be a continuing process due to personnel turbulence.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the Department of the Army insure that sufficient enlisted personnel destined for Vietnam be sent to QM school for property disposal operations training prior to their departure, thereby eventually eliminating the need for an in-country property disposal training base. (ACofS, Services)

4. (U) SKILLS I Program.

a. OBSERVATION: The 1st Logistical Command experienced a shortage of trained specialists, supervisors, and personnel in some MOS's which affected performance of the command mission.

b. EVALUATION: To correct this deficiency, the SKILLS I Program was implemented on 15 February to conduct command-wide orientation/indoctrination, specialists and supervision training, and to provide formal on-the-job training. The program has proven to be beneficial. In the month of March 1969, 1671 people received orientation/indoctrination or training under the program. This total is expected to increase appreciably as the program continues to expand.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

5. (C) Operation BUDDY Personnel Selection and Training.

a. OBSERVATION: Initial reaction from ARVN and US personnel involved in the training reveals satisfaction with the Operation BUDDY Program. In a particular case, this has resulted from the implementation of the policy that ARVN Transportation Corps personnel selected for Operation BUDDY are personally interviewed by the ARVN Chief of Transportation. Further, US personnel working with ARVN have received specific guidance on the program to reduce potential cultural and ethnic friction.

b. EVALUATION: Careful screening and indoctrination of participants in the initial stages of Operation BUDDY will facilitate future programs when expanded. Further, more ARVN personnel can be brought into the training program when ARVN and MACV determine their requirements.

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c. RECOMMENDATION: That careful personnel selection be continued and that action be initiated to determine ARVN logistical training requirements so that Operation BUDDY can be expanded. (ACofS, SP&O)

D. (U) INTELLIGENCE

1. None

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E. (C) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Rough Terrain (RT) Cranes.

a. OBSERVATION: Effective on 12 November 1968, all ammunition companies were reorganized under the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 9-17G series. Each company was authorized at this time, four 5 ton RT cranes. These cranes were not in the Vietnam inventory; therefore, 20 ton RT cranes were issued in lieu of the 5 ton cranes. The four ammunition companies of the 3d Ordnance Battalion were issued thirteen 20 ton RT cranes to handle 44,000 STON of ammunition monthly. Being oversized, the 20 ton cranes lacked the versatility of the authorized 5 ton RT cranes and degraded the cargo handling capability of the companies. The average deadline rate is five per day, and due to the unsuitability of the terrain, the 3d Ordnance Battalion was required to contract for three 5 ton cranes similar to those authorized by the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) to handle the resulting shortfall. The regular authorized 5 ton cranes were due in-country during March 1969 and the contract was due to expire on 21 March 1969. At the time of reorganization in November 1968, all battalions were directed to requisition the 5 ton cranes on an individual basis. During the time lapse between November 1968 and March 1969 the validity of requisitions became questionable and had to be resubmitted. At the same time the expected delivery date had slipped to August 1969. As a result of the slippage the contract had to be renewed resulting in an additional cost of \$71,786.76 to the government.

b. EVALUATION: Had the requisitioning of the 5 ton RT cranes been a consolidated command effort under a project code, control to insure that 5 ton cranes required in Vietnam, would have been enhanced.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Ammunition)

2. (U) Substitution of 7808 AV Oil.

a. OBSERVATION: The substitution of MIL-L-7808 Turbine Engine Oil with the higher quality MIL-L-23699 was planned by the Army Petroleum Center (APC) during the fall of 1969. APC message 2314, dated 011829Z Oct 68 stated with USAAVCOM concurrence that 23699 oil could be mixed with 7808 oil without restriction. However, USAAVCOM message 1308 dated 051435Z Jan 68 had indicated certain minor restrictions to complete substitution of these oils.

b. EVALUATION: Substitution of MIL-L-23699 for MIL-L-7808 was severely hampered, however, by the failure of USARV and USAF aviation units to requisition the replacement 23699 oil for all possible aircraft due to confusion over possible restrictions. A declining inventory of 7808 oil in Vietnam caused a run of the remaining stocks of 7808 oil. In an effort to alleviate this supply problem, oil was airlifted from CONUS and USARV

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reiterated the directions for use of both oils by message to subordinate commands on 6 March 1969. The stock posture of 7808 oil in Vietnam continues to remain critical while stocks of 23699 oil are not being fully utilized. Clarification of the substitution criteria for MIL-L-7808 and MIL-L-23699 has been requested of USAAVCOM.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Wide and more intensive guidance must be provided at joint and Army staff levels to all US aviation units to alleviate this POL supply problem and preclude reoccurrence of a similar problem in the future. (ACofS, Supply)

3. (U) Inability of Supply System to Accommodate Demands.

a. OBSERVATION:

(1) Many generator sets are run in excess of established time between overhaul (TBO).

(2) Demands on the supply system are greater than the supply system can efficiently accommodate.

b. EVALUATION: Many generator sets are required to run in excess of the TBO because the supply system cannot replace the sets as rapidly as desirable. For this reason, continual emphasis on operator training should insure safe operation of those items which cannot be replaced at the appropriate TBO.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient generator assets be provided this command for the establishment of a generator DX program. (ACofS, Maintenance)

4. (U) Use of Proper Tools and Equipment.

a. OBSERVATION: Maintenance units, in many instances, do not have the necessary equipment for proper service and maintenance of the brakes on the RT forklifts.

b. EVALUATION: The lack of accumulator charging kits makes the proper maintenance support of the RT forklift brake system almost impossible. Improper pressure within the accumulator creates a serious safety hazard. Malfunction of the accumulator is the major problem area with the brake system on these forklifts, and all operators must continuously observe the system for indications of developing problems.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That all maintenance units responsible for maintenance of the 6,000 and 10,000 pound RT forklifts have accumulator charging kits on hand. (ACofS, Maintenance)

5. (U) Procurement of Non-Standard Items.

a. OBSERVATION: Non-standard items of chapel furniture authorized in CTA 50-922 are being procured from appropriated funds for the first time in Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION: Procurement of these items from appropriated funds is something long overdue. The use of welfare funds posed an additional problem in that heavy, bulky items could not be transported at government expense, thus further adding to the ultimate cost of the chapel furniture.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In future budgeting programs, plans should be made to purchase non-standard items listed in CTA 50-922 from appropriated funds. (Chaplain)

6. (U) Jewish Passover Holy Day Supplies.

a. OBSERVATION: The Jewish Passover Holy Day was celebrated at Da Nang, Long Binh, Nha Trang, and Saigon during the period of 2-4 April 1969.

b. EVALUATION: The use of four widely separated sites is convenient in curtailing travel. Passover food items for all of Vietnam were requisitioned by the Director of Subsistence, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command in coordination with the Staff Chaplain and the Jewish Coordinator six months in advance of required date. Food supplies arrived in time, in good condition, and in correct quantities.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (Chaplain)

7. (U) POL Drum Storage Criteria.

a. OBSERVATION: Storage criteria for packaged fuels and packaged products in TM 10-1101 indicate that 1020 drums may be stored in a 70 foot square section. During the 20 March petroleum fire in Tank Farm #2 at Qui Nhon, 4189 drums of packaged POL, representing 13 percent of the drums stored in the package yard, were destroyed. The criteria outlined in TM 10-1101, were not sufficient to prevent such losses.

b. EVALUATION: The loss of 1020 drums per section due to a rapid conflagration was deemed unacceptable by this command. Therefore, a command message to all support commands modified the TM 10-1101 storage criteria by reducing the number of drums to be stored per section to 612. Additionally, the construction of a 24 inch high berm along three sides of a section was directed. These modifications can be effected in order to minimize losses by fire and permit more efficient employment of fire fighting equipment in order to isolate burning fuel drums in one section from other stocks.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Supply)

8. (U) Ship Slippage.

a. OBSERVATION: As a result of the retrograde program and the intentional draw down of ammunition inventory during October through November 1968, a substantial reduction in the stockage objective was realized. While this decrease from 268,000 STON in October 1968 to 188,000 STON in January 1969 achieved the programmed goal, it also meant that with a lower Stockage Objective (SO), the pipeline had to be responsive to consumption intensity if combat increased. Under the present system, requisitions are placed for requirements ninety days in advance. Accordingly, timely receipts are required to preclude the asset posture from dropping below the safety level and subsequent action to call forth stocks from the off-shore reserve. Once a shipping report is received from the Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency indicating type, quantity, ship number or name, and the port of embarkation, these data are considered in programming asset posture and in the submission of new requisitions. After the ship has sailed from CONUS, update of the estimated time of arrival (ETA) is obtained and this data is considered firm. During the period of 25 February 1969 through 10 March 1969, eight slippages occurred; with a range from three to ten days. While these delays did not affect the tactical situation, they did cause transshipments within country and other management actions such as multiple port discharges from the same vessel, air delivery, ship diversions for maximum throughput, and call forward of off-shore resources.

b. EVALUATION: These slippages could have resulted in a backlog at port discharge points at which time the risks are higher, in addition to increased operational costs. Plans to cross level as required and plans to divert vessels to accomplish maximum throughput must be flexible and executed on a timely basis.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Ammunition)

9. (U) Split Ammunition Shipments.

a. OBSERVATION: The SS Pine Bluff arrived in Vietnam during the month of March with two months production of 2.75 inch rockets. The ship was dispatched in response to a forecasted shortage of these items.

b. EVALUATION: Had the Pine Bluff been the victim of enemy sapper or rocket attack, the theater would have been in a critical posture on an extremely important item.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That cargo that is critical to the war effort, be shipped on more than one vessel. (ACofS, Ammunition)

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10. (U) Rolling Ammunition Supply Point (RASP).

a. OBSERVATION: A mobile Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was constituted just prior to the enemy offensive in February 1969 to assure that stocks would be available in the event of the loss of an Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD). It also provided the logistical manager an increased ability to respond to resupply requirements in the forward area. Upon deployment, ammunition stocks on trailers were positioned to best support the tactical situation and as issues were made, reconstitution of the mobile ASP was accomplished as required to maintain a responsive capability.

b. EVALUATION: The RASP resulted in fast resupply of forward ASPs and served to expedite throughput to supported units.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the concept of a RASP be adopted as standard operating procedure in a conflict such as Vietnam where logistical installations and activities are under continual threat of enemy ground or mortar/rocket attack. (ACofS, Ammunition)

11. (U) Insufficient Storage Space for Class V Stocks Based on the Computed Stockage Objective for Supported Forces.

a. OBSERVATION: The problem of over-stocked ammunition facilities was recognized in Calendar Year (CY) 1968. At that time a program was begun to retrograde non-stockage objective items and suspended/unserviceable items, and to adjust stockage objectives (SO) based upon consumption. Qui Nhon Ammunition Supply Depot (QNASD) had an SO of 47,569 STON in January 1969 versus a high of 56,061 STON in October 1968. As a result of this program, the February 1969 SO tonnage was reduced to approximately 31,000 STON and on-hand tonnage as of 22 February 1969 was 19,000 STON. After experiencing three enemy sapper attacks during late February and early March, further SO reductions as a result of evaluation of storage concepts and security were considered.

b. EVALUATION: Certain decisions and actions were deemed necessary:

(1) Storage plans based upon new guidance were developed. The depot was divided into two subdepots in which two storage locations were required for each item, or four storage locations for a single item in the entire depot. The most hazardous classes of munitions were stored on the outer perimeter of each subdepot, thereby reducing the possible propagation caused by burning missiles.

(2) Fifteen days of supply at the Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) were relocated from QNASD to Cam Ranh Bay Ammunition Depot (CRBASD) to be programmed-in as required. Ten days of supply at the Intense Combat Rate (ICR), previously stored at QNASD for I Corps, were relocated to CRBASD.

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(3) As a result of the realignment, the SO at QNASD was reduced from 31,000 STON to 22,000 STON, with a management level of about 18,000 STON representing stocks actually stored in the depot.

(4) Perimeter ammunition storage pads were vacated in order to upgrade the overall security through increased ability to detect activity along the perimeter.

(5) Perimeter fence was relocated for better defense.

(6) Increased throughput to forward ASPs was instituted to keep depot stocks at the management level.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Ammunition)

12. (C) Kick-outs from Exploding Ammunition Storage Locations Initiating Fires Causing Subsequent Explosions at Other Locations.

a. OBSERVATION: Prior to the post-TET Offensive, Class V stocks were stored by explosive class, with the mass detonation class (Class 7) being stored on the outer perimeter, thus reducing the explosive hazard distance to inhabited buildings and other depot activities. By putting the Class 7 on the outer perimeter, this put the Classes 4, 5 and 6 toward the center with Class 2 on the inner circle close to inhabited buildings. Investigation of the first two explosive incidents occurring at QNASD revealed that explosive Classes 4 and 5 were the most hazardous as to propagation of other storage locations and the greatest fire producing hazard. Also, it was found that Class 2, although a fire hazard, was not as easily initiated as had been suspected. It was also discovered that Classes 6 and 7 do not produce as large a number of burning missiles as do Classes 4 and 5. The greatest hazard of Class 6 and 7 is the shock wave produced when this type ammunition explodes, normally en masse. Ammunition Supply Depots/Points do not have the proper distances between storage locations to reduce propagation with subsequent explosions. This is due to the limited real estate and security requirements of Class V installations in Vietnam.

b. EVALUATION: As a result of the findings, Class V activity commanders were instructed to prepare new storage plans. Guidance was given that each ASD would sub-divide the depot into at least two sub-depots, yielding at least two locations for items on the stockage objective. To the maximum extent possible, explosive Classes 4 and 5 will be stored on the outer periphery of the sub-depot complex; Class 6 and 7 centrally stored; and Class 2 used as a buffer between Class 6 and 7 and Class 4 and 5. Under this concept, if a Class 4 or 5 storage location is detonated, at least 50 percent of the missiles will fall outside the storage area, thereby reducing the hot missile and propagation effect. Since Classes 6 and 7 normally explode en masse, it affords less of a fire hazard to other locations.

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Since Class 2 is a fire hazard rather than missile hazard, it is not as great a hazard to other storage sites when initiated. Additional guidance set forth was that rockets (high explosive) will be stored so that all nose ends are pointed in a direction that affords the least hazard to other locations. Individual storage locations will be limited to 100,000 pounds net explosive weight and not more than two pallets high. Finally, Class 7 items will be stored in separate stacks on each pad with not more than 15,000 pounds net explosive weight per stack.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Ammunition)

13. (U) Nose Plugs on the 105mm High Explosive (HE) Projectile.

a. OBSERVATION: During enemy initiated attacks on key ammunition installations, fires resulted on several pads containing 105mm HE projectiles. Subsequent investigation revealed the possibility that the intense heat may have caused a number of nose plugs to melt, thus allowing the explosive filler (TNT) to exude out of the opening and leak down the sides of the projectiles.

b. EVALUATION: If the nose plugs are in fact melting, the exuding filler is adding fuel to the fire. While TNT subject to fire and intense heat normally burns, low order explosions are possible. In either case, fire fighting operations are hampered and hazards increased. Appropriate agencies in CONUS are being requested to perform tests on the melting point of these nose plugs. It is considered in the field that the ideal nose plug would withstand extreme temperatures allowing the 105mm HE projectile to explode, rather than to exude filler adding to the flame. The theory is that the possibility of extinguishing fires, before heat causes the projectile to explode would be enhanced.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That tests be performed in CONUS to prove or disprove the above theory as soon as possible. (ACofS, Ammunition)

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F. (U) ORGANIZATION

1. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) On-site Teams.

a. OBSERVATION: The EOD mission in Vietnam varies considerably from that envisioned in present organizational documents. Working from an established base camp, and responsible for a geographical area, units have found themselves forced to establish separate on-site teams in order to provide the service in a responsive manner. In some cases, it has been necessary for one unit to operate from three full time locations. The personnel and equipment authorization permit operations from two locations, but a detachment must be augmented when a third location is established. This augmentation in both personnel and equipment can be obtained only at the expense of the other EOD units under the present system.

b. EVALUATION: To achieve the degree of responsiveness required, the Theater EOD organization must have built-in flexibility to permit establishment of additional on-site teams when required.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command has submitted a revised Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) that will provide necessary flexibility. Recommend that action be taken on this proposal as soon as possible. (ACofS, Ammunition)

G. (U) OTHER

1. (U) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program.

a. OBSERVATION: Limited initial guidance, short suspense dates, and a lack of operational experience caused some shortfalls in the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

b. EVALUATION: Unit-to-unit transfers were more efficient and easier to control than were the unit draw down and depot-to-depot transfers. Depots, in particular, are not organized, staffed, or equipped to perform the necessary operations for a smooth transferral operation. Further, obtaining equipment from four widely separated depots and units of the Engineer Brigades made the problems of transportation, communications, and control more difficult. A specific unit, preferably a maintenance unit, assigned the responsibility for operation a transfer and staging area would facilitate the draw down of equipment from units and depots.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, SP&O)

2. (U) Money Order Manipulation.

a. OBSERVATION: Three instances of the illegal sale of money orders involving military postal clerks were discovered at postal activities of this command. The scheme involved the sale of blank money orders validated in the amount of \$100 to unauthorized personnel. The collusion of both money order clerks and supervisory personnel made detection difficult.

b. EVALUATION: It was determined that additional controls to deter the illegal sale of money orders were needed.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That the following be considered for possible implementation:

(1) Establish a bank book type ration card for each individual to record all financial transactions, i.e., purchase of money orders, bank or finance checks or soldiers deposits. Each military or authorized civilian will have his bank book verified by a commissioned officer prior to obtaining any money instruments. This will include verification of amount of money drawn as pay, the amounts of money orders, checks, etc. to be purchased. This will all be recorded. The individual will be issued his book and can go to purchase his money instruments. The postal clerk, finance clerk or bank clerk will record in each book the amount and date of purchase. Money orders, US Treasury checks, soldiers deposits, etc. will not be made if purchaser or depositor does not have a verified bank book ration card. Upon completion of transaction, the ration book will be turned in to orderly room until the next transaction.

(2) A Commander's Certificate will be issued by a commissioned officer or appropriate person in authority over authorized civilians designated on orders to verify these certificates. A copy of this officer's signature will be on file at all APOs so a verification of his signature on certificate can be made. The verifying officer will insure that the money was acquired legally and will then sign the certificate for the man. Each postal clerk will verify the Commander's Certificate has been signed by the authorized officer prior to issuing money orders. All Commander's Certificates will be dated with an all purpose stamp and initialled by the money order clerk. Each certificate will be then attached to the related MACV Form 385. Under no circumstances will money orders be issued without a Commander's Certificate.

(3) Require unit commander or appropriate person in authority over authorized civilians and unit mail clerk to check, prepare certificates, check MACV Forms 385, and prepare all necessary paper work listing all personnel, dates, amounts of desired purchase, etc. Money orders will only be sold to the unit commander or an officer designated as an agent, accompanying the unit mail clerk. The following forms would be presented to the Postal Officer at the APO: a properly completed MACV Form 385, a DD Form 1118 (Unit Mail Clerk's Receipt for Funds and Purchase Record), a Listing of all persons by name, rank, ID Card Number (authorized civilians) SN, SSAN, and amounts of purchases, a copy of orders authorizing officer and unit mail clerk to purchase bulk money orders. These forms will be filed as one transaction by APO.

(4) Each person purchasing a money order will be required to have his thumb print placed on the APO copy of the MACV Form 385 and on the reverse side, lower right corner of each money order purchased. This will enable CID or MP personnel to identify at a later date purchasers of money orders for possible money order violations.

(5) Stop selling money orders at the post offices. Transfer this responsibility to finance for the issuance of a treasury check. Transfer authorized money order spaces to the finance units in Vietnam to insure sufficient personnel to perform additional mission of issuing checks for most transactions instead of money orders.

(6) Have DA and POD set up an agreement to have all money orders sent to 96 APOs be pre-stamped with following indorsement: Payable only at Far East APOs 96____, PX, PACEX, in MPC or in dollar instruments in CONUS. Money orders will be paid to purchaser or payee only. APO will also use proper identification methods prior to selling orders; Commander's Certificates MACV Forms 385, ID cards, etc.

3. (U) Fire Fighting.

a. OBSERVATION: Attacks on a number of ammunition installations with resulting fires, required units to combat fires by field expedient methods (picks, shovels and water tankers) due to the lack of adequate fire fighting equipment.

b. EVALUATION: While the water tankers were able to supply a high volume of water, the scarcity of this type of equipment and the limited capacity provided a less than adequate means of fighting fires. Experience has shown that when an ammunition fire is initiated, the first three minutes are the most critical. Maximum effort to contain a fire in this time frame and still maintain a relative degree of safety requires quick response by fire fighting personnel with adequate equipment. In the majority of the cases, available Engineer support cannot meet this minimum response time and as a result, steps have been taken to ameliorate this situation:

(1) A request has been initiated to supplement depots and ASPs with tank dozers (one per 9-176 Ammo Company) to provide a capability for separating burning pallets, pushing and spreading dirt and maximum protection to fire fighting personnel.

(2) A team of fire fighting experts are surveying key ammunition and POL installations to review current capabilities and to determine minimum equipment requirements for depots/ASPs to fill the gap in response time of outlying Engineer fire fighting teams.

(3) Action has been taken to position 5000 gallon water tankers at strategic locations in the depots to increase the immediately available water supply.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Ammunition)

4. (U) Fire Discipline.

a. OBSERVATION: The fire prevention, fire protection, and fire fighting procedures in the 1st Logistical Command POL and Ammo areas is generally not adequate.

b. EVALUATION: It was determined that a lack of coordination existed between local fire departments and units operating POL and Ammo storage sites in 1st Logistical Command unit areas. In addition, certain rather sophisticated fire fighting equipment was readily available to these units; however, was unavailable to the local fire department. In many cases, such equipment was not being used due to the fact that personnel were not trained in its use. To combat this, this headquarters initiated a plan which encouraged close coordination between POL/Ammo units and local fire departments; provided for an inspection team of fire chiefs to conduct instruct/assist visits to these critical areas; and an immediate and continuing inventory of fire fighting assets. The goal of this plan is to improve the overall fire prevention and protection posture in these areas.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None. (ACofS, Services)

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AVHGC-DST (20 May 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command for
Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters,
1st Logistical Command.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning the use of organic V-100 armored
cars instead of the hardened organic vehicles in transportation units,
section II, page LL5, paragraph B5; nonconcur. Present assets of V-100
armored cars are being issued to US Army military police units and will
be employed primarily for convoy and line of communication security. In
consideration of the increased convoy security that will be provided by
the military police units equipped with the V-100 armored cars, it is not
feasible to issue V-100 armored cars to transportation units. No further
action required.

b. (C) Reference item concerning Conversion of 175mm Gun M107 and
8 Inch Howitzer M110, section II, page LL7-8, paragraph B7; nonconcur.
The conversion of 175mm Gun M107 to 8 inch Howitzer M110 did contribute
to the shortage (14,040 rounds) of 8 inch high explosive (HE); however,
other actions had a more significant impact.

<u>ALLOC PERIOD</u>	<u>NR WPNS</u>	<u>ALLOCATED</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ISSUE RATE</u>	<u>CONVERSION LOSS</u>
24 Nov-24 Dec	78	60,780	53,875	23.53	
24 Dec-24 Jan	86	64,708	47,384	18.36	4,380
24 Jan-24 Feb	88	64,182	52,776	19.99	6,000
24 Feb-24 Mar	83	63,781	60,728	24.38	3,660
					14,040

The February stockage objective was 134,160 rounds and the 30 day safety
level was 77,400 rounds. The balance on hand on 24 February was 32,550.
The 24 February balance on hand was 101,610 rounds below the stockage
objective and 44,850 rounds below the safety level. The weapon density
increased from 78 tubes in December to 86 tubes in January; however, the
total rounds issued after the conversion was 6,491 less rounds. Losses

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (20 May 1969) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command for
Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

due to enemy action for the period was 843 rounds. The actions taken to reduce the tonnage on hand by ship diversions, cancelling of requisitions, failure to requisition, and delays in ship arrivals contributed more significantly to the shortage than the conversion of tubes. The monthly requisitions for selected items are now reviewed by this headquarters. No further action required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd

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GPOP-DT (20 May 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Logistical Command for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 90 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as indicated below.
2. Reference Annex B, Section I, page B5, Status of Funds Chart. Scale on left hand margin of chart should reflect amounts in million dollars, i.e., "MIL \$."
3. Reference Section II, paragraph G2, pages LL23 and LL24. It is considered that recommendations to establish additional controls on the sale of money order are unduly restrictive. The current MACV currency control system is adequate if properly enforced.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. E. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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